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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UC.A. § 78A-4-103(2)U) 
& § 78A-3-102U). This appeal is from a summary judgment granted by the Hon. Ryan 
M. Harris of the Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah entered on October 
1, 2014. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW & PRESERVATION 
Issue No. 1: The District Court erred in granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Mayflower's Public Road Claim because the District Court made 
erroneous conclusions of law, made unreasonable inferences in favor of the moving 
parties rather than reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving parties, and ignored 
disputed issues of material fact. 
Standard of review: This Court reviews a summary judgment for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's decision and the de novo standard ofreview 
applies regardless of the nature (fact-intensive or not) of the underlying law governing 
the parties' rights. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ~~ 15-16, 250 P.3d 56; see also Waddoups 
v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ~ 21, 54 P.3d 1054 (in reviewing a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment, we give the trial court's legal decisions no deference, 
reviewing for correctness). A trial court decides motions for summary judgment as a 
matter of law as there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ~ 
15. Thus, the appellate court has the same paper record that was before the trial court to 
decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ,r 17. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R6009-6034.) 
Issue No. 2: The District Court erred in determining that a single purpose road 
cannot be deemed a highway dedicated to the public through continuous use. 
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,r,r 
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,r 21; see also Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ,r 8, 48 
P.3d 949 (the district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
for correctness). 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R6009-6034.) 
Issue No. 3: The District Court erred in concluding that prospectors under the 
Mining Law of 1872 are not members of the general public and have an inchoate 
property interest. 
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at iJ,r 
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,r 21; Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at ,r 8. 
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• 
Preservation: Mayflower' s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court' s October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R6009-6034.) 
Issue No. 4: The District Court did not make all inferences in Mayflower's favor 
on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,i,i 
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at ,i 21. 
Preservation: Mayflower' s Memorandum in Opposition to Intervenors' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and United Park City Mines Company's Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R3507-35 l 1.) 
Issue No. 5: The District Court applied a "clear and convincing" burden of proof 
to Mayflower's public road claim rather than the "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard proscribed by statute. 
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ,ii] 
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at if 21; Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at iJ 8. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R6009-6034.) 
Issue No. 6: The District Court erred in permitting defendants to argue an 
alternative access theory, brought for the first time in defendants' summary judgment 
briefing. 
3 
Standard of review: De novo standard of review. Se? Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at i liI 
15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at~ 21; Jensen v. Skypark Landowners Ass 'n, 2013 UT 
App 48, ~ 2,299 P.3d 609. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Revised). (R5546-5676.) 
Issue No. 7: The District Court erred in denying Mayflower leave to amend to file 
a Second Amended Complaint and to pursue the previously asserted appurtenant 
easement claim. 
Standard of review: This Court reviews whether a trial court properly denied a 
request to amend a pleading under Rule 15 under the abuse of discretion standard. See 
Daniels v. Gamma W Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ~ 57,221 P.3d 256 (citing 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1998)); see also Posner v. 
Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ~ 23, 222 P.3d 775 (when reviewing 
whether the district court properly enforced a scheduling order, this Court reviews the 
district court's determinations under the abuse of discretion standard). 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
a Second Amended Complaint (R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Suppo1i of Its 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
(R4324-4325.) 
4 
• 
Issue No. 8: The District Court erred in finding that defendants would need 
discovery on Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim because Mayflower intended to 
establish its appurtenant easement claim based on the existing record. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels, 2009 UT 66 at ,i 
57; see also Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at ,i 23. 
Preservation: Mayflower's March 20 12 Disclosures (R1852-1874); Mayflower's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint 
(R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts Motion for Leave to File a Second 
Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for 
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (R4324-4325.) 
Issue No. 9: The District Court erred in its reliance on the March 8, 2012 Order 
when denying Mayflower's motion for leave to amend because the March 8, 2012 Order 
was an abuse of discretion. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels, 2009 UT 66 at ,i 
57; see also Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at ,i 23. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
a Second Amended Complaint (R2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support of Its 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
(R4324-4325.) 
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Issue No. 10: Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures complied with the March 8, 
20 12 Order. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard of review. Posner, 2009 UT 
App 347 at ~ 23. 
Preservation: Mayflower' s March 2012 Disclosures (R1852-1874); Mayflower's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R 
2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts Motion for Leave to File a Second 
Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 Hearing on Mayflower' s Motion for 
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (R4324-4325.) 
Issue No. 11: Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend would not have 
prejudiced defendants. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion standard of review. See Daniels, 2009 
UT 66 at ii 57; Posner, 2009 UT App 347 at~ 23. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File 
a Second Amended Complaint (R 2783-2808); Mayflower's Reply in Support oflts 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (R3376-3383); Jun. 4, 2014 
Hearing on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
(R4324-4325.) 
Issue No. 12: The District Court erred in granting United Park summary judgment 
and dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim because there were disputed 
issues of material fact. 
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• 
Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's determination of an 
easement de novo, as it is a conclusion of law. Alvey Dev. Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002 
UT App 220, ,i 7, 51 P.3d 45. The appellate court has the same paper record that was 
before the trial court to decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at 
'ii 17. 
Preservation: Mayflower's Opposition to United Park City Mines Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R2349-2355.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ST A TUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULA TIO NS 
1. Mining Act of 1866, § 8, R.S. § 2477; 
2. Mining Law of 1872, §§ 1, 5, 6, R.S. §§ 2319, 2324, 2325 
(30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 28, 29); 
3. 1880 Utah Highway Act,§§ 2-3; 
4. U.C.A. § 72-5-301(1); 
5. U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(b); 
6. U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b); 
7. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) & (b) 
8. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) (pre-2011 version) 
9. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (pre-2011 version) 
10. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) (pre-2011 version) 
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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs and appellants Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting 
Mayflower Recreational Fonds ( collectively "Mayflower") are the successors in the chain 
of title to mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain that date as far back as 1871. Through 
this action, Mayflower seeks to preserve and vindicate its rights of access, ingress, and 
egress to its mining claims over a road that Mayflower's predecessor in the chain ohitle 
built in 1871 and over which Mayflower had uninterrupted access until 2006 when 
defendant United Park City Mines Co. obliterated part of this historic road and sought to 
cut-off Mayflower's access to State Route 224 ("SR-224"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Historical records from the General Land Office ("GLO") (now the Bureau of 
Land Management) establish that in 1871 Mayflower's predecessors located the Flagstaff 
Mining Claim, the first mining claim near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2894.) 
Those records also establish that the Flagstaff Mine claimants built two miles of road to 
the Flagstaff Mining Claim from Park City. 1 (R2894.) The Flagstaff Mining claimants 
later applied for and received a mining patent for the Flagstaff Mining Claim, the first 
mining patent issued near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908.) The 
Flagstaff Mine patent granted the Flagstaff Mine Claimants ownership of the Flagstaff 
For purposes of this action, the parts of the historic Flagstaff Road near the 
Flagstaff Mine have been referred to as the Primary Access Road-(including the Lower 
and Upper) and the Flagstaff Loop Road. These segments, along with parts of what is 
now SR-224, were all part of the historic Flagstaff Road. 
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Mine along with the rights necessary to work the mine. See id. Chief among these rights 
was the right of access to the mining claim. 
Although field notes of numerous subsequent, nearby mining claims refer to an 
existing wagon road to Park City, no other field notes refer to the construction of such a 
road. (R2912-2919 (Uncle Charles); R2953-2961 (Home Station); R2939-2947 (Lucky 
Bill); R2989-2997 (Peeler); R3007 (Boliver Plat); R3005 (Boliver 2 Plat); R3015-30 18 
(Overlooked Fraction).). Nor was there any other evidence in the historical record that 
someone other than the Flagstaff Mine claimants built the Flagstaff Road. Thus, the 
reasonable inference from these facts is that these subsequent filed notes were referring to 
the Flagstaff Road. 
Pursuant to Section 8 of the 1866 Mining Act (14 Stat. 251,253 (July 26, 1866) 
(R.S. § 24 77), the Flagstaff Road, including the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff 
Loop Road, became a public right-of-way upon completion. The Flagstaff Road was 
constructed over what at the time was the unreserved public domain. (R2900-2908.) In 
addition to references in several field notes, survey notes, and survey plats between 1871 
and 1901, the Primary Access Road and part of the Flagstaff Loop Road are shown in the 
same location as they were when this action commenced on a topographic map surveyed 
in 1901. (R3043-3044.) Thereafter, the roads appear in the same positions as they were 
at the time this action commenced in aerial photography in 1950, and topographic maps 
from 1955 and 1998. (R3051-3053, R3055, R3061-3063.) 
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Beginning in the years following the discovery of the Flagstaff Mine, and 
continuing for more than 50 years, prospectors combed the mountains outside Park City, 
including Flagstaff Mountain, and successful prospectors laid claim to virtually all of the 
land near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908 (Flagstaff); R2928-293 I 
(Uncle Charles); R3015-3018 (Overlooked Fraction and White); R3009-3011 (Boliver 2); 
R2983-2987 (Lucky Bill); R2965-2968 (Home Station); R3001-3003 (Peeler); R3024-
3026 (Thurman Jr.); R3030-3035 (Ray and Cooledge); R2935-2937 (Silver Hill).) The 
use of the Flagstaff Road, including the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop 
Road, by these successful and unsuccessful prospectors resulted in the Flagstaff Road 
being deemed a highway dedicated to the public through continuous public use when the 
Utah Territorial Legislature passed the 1880 Utah Highway Act. Under the 1880 Utah 
Highway Act, a road was deemed dedicated to the public if it was continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for at least five years. 1880 Utah Highway Act§§ 2-3. That was the 
case here, as members of the general public continuously used the Flagstaff Road as a 
public thoroughfare from 1871 until the 1920s. (See e.g., above.) 
Access to the Flagstaff Mining claim and other mining claims that Mayflower now 
owns was uninterrupted through 2005, when this action was filed. (Rl-6.) Mayflower 
filed this action because United Park obtained approval to construct the Red Cloud 
Subdivision near the summit ofFlagstaffMountain, and in the process of building that 
subdivision, obliterated parts of the historic Primary Access Road. Although listing a 
single claim for relief denominated a prescriptive easement claim, Mayflower's prior 
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counsel asserted facts that would support relief under several theories, including that: 
(i) the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road were public roads under Utah 
law; (ii) Mayflower was entitled to access pursuant to easements appurtenant to the 
mining patents Mayflower owned; (iii) Mayflower was entitled to access pursuant to a 
prescriptive easement based on its long-time use of the Primary Access Road and the 
Flagstaff Loop Road; and (iv) if the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road 
were not public highways under Utah law, or for some reason ceased to be public 
highways, Mayflower had a private right of access over the historic Flagstaff Road right-
of-way as an owner of mining claims that abutted the historic right-of-way. (R4-5.) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mayflower filed its action against United Park in 2005. Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds v. United Park City Mines Co., Case No. 050500500 (Third Jud. Dist., 
Summit County). (Rl-6.) Very little occurred in the case until 2009 when the District 
Court consolidated Mayflower's case with Silver Cloud, LLC v. United Park City Mines 
Co., Case No. 050500430 (consolidated with Case No. 050500500) (Third Jud. Dist., 
Summit County). (R262-268.) 
In December 2010, Mayflower's prior counsel moved to amend the Complaint, a 
motion which the District Court granted in December 2011. (R1552-1556.) The 
Amended Complaint again contained a single claim for relief denominated a prescriptive 
easement claim. (R410-411.) That single claim, however, contained allegations that 
would support relief under a public road theory, a private right of access theory, an 
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appurtenant easement theory, and a prescriptive easement theory. (R410-411.) Relevant 
here, the District Court thoroughly analyzed the Amended Complaint before granting 
leave to amend. (R1565.) 
In March 2012, the District Court denied defendant/appellee United Park's Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings on Mayflower's Amended Complaint. (R1695-1698.) 
While denying United Park' s Motion, the District Court raised issues with the Amended 
Complaint that it had analyzed and approved three months prior, and sua sponte ordered 
Mayflower to make pre-trial disclosures. (Id.) The District Court ordered Mayflower to 
identify all of its claims, all of the facts upon which it intended to rely, all of the 
witnesses it would potentially call at trial, all of the case law and statutes upon which it 
intended to rely, and re-produce hard copies of any documents Mayflower intended to 
proffer as evidence at trial. (Id.) No trial date was pending in March 2012, and the 
District Court's order only applied to Mayflower, i.e. United Park was not required to 
make similar disclosures. (Id.) The District Court fmiher ruled that Mayflower would be 
precluded from using at trial any theories, statutes, case law, facts, witnesses, or 
documents not identified or produced in response to the District Court's Order. See id. 
Mayflower complied with the District Court' s Order, identifying theories, facts, 
supporting statutes and case law, witnesses, and documents and re-producing documents 
that Mayflower intended to rely upon at trial. (R1852-1874.) 
In May 2012, United Park moved for summary judgment. (R1995.) In August 
2012, the District Court granted United Park summary judgment on Mayflower's 
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prescriptive easement claim, but ruled that Mayflower was entitled to take its public road 
claim to trial. (R2563.) Neither the district court nor the parties addressed the 
appurtenant easement or private right of access claim in the 2012 summary judgment 
briefing or order. 
In October 2012, shortly before trial was to commence, the Empire Pass Master 
Owners Association and the Red Cloud Homeowners Association (the "HOA 
Defendants") intervened as defendants. (R2624.) In March 2013, after former counsel 
for Mayflower resigned and current counsel for Mayflower entered an appearance, the 
District Court reopened discovery for all paities. (R2710.) During expert discovery, the 
HOA Defendants submitted an expert report of Ernest Rowley. (R2768.) At his 
December 2013 deposition, Mr. Rowley stated that all easement claims, including 
appurtenant easement claims, were out of the case based on the August 2012 Order. 
Following the conclusion of expert discovery, and in response to Mr. Rowley's 
mischaracterization of the status of the case, Mayflower moved for leave to file a Second 
Amended Complaint to make clear the different theories and claims set forth in the 
Amended Complaint and the March 2012 disclosures. (R2780.) While this motion was 
pending, the parties submitted competing Motions for Summary Judgment. (R2833, 
3179.) Mayflower sought summary judgment on its public road claim as well as on its 
appurtenant easement claim. After seeking extensions, defendants responded to 
Mayflower's motion with a Motion to Strike based on the March 2012 Order. (R3749.) 
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The District Court heard Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend and 
Defendants' Motion to Strike in June 2014. (R4836.) Even though Mayflower's 
proposed Second Amended Complaint relied solely on the existing record developed in 
discovery, the District Court denied the motion based on the restrictions imposed only on 
Mayflower in the March 2012 Order, because of the time since the case had been filed, 
and based on defendants' unsupported claim that they would need additional discovery 
on Mayflower's appmtenant easement claim. (R4837-4838, R4324.) The District Court 
also struck Mayflower's Motion for Summary Judgment on its appurtenant easement 
claim. (R5995.) 
In September 2014, the District Court heard argument on competing motions for 
summary judgment on Mayflower's public road claim. (R6098.) On October 1, 2014, the 
District Court denied Mayflower's motion and granted defendants' motion. (R5963.) On 
October 15, 20 14, Mayflower moved to alter or amend the October 1, 2014 Order 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R5999-6002.) The District 
Court denied that motion on December 12, 2014. (R6076-6083.) Mayflower then 
noticed this appeal on January 8, 2015 . (R6084-6086.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
Mayflower's public road claim. In its October 2014 Order, the District Court determined 
that an R.S. § 2477 road used for a single purpose cannot be dedicated to the public under 
Utah law and that prospectors have inchoate property rights and therefore are not 
members of the general public for purposes of establishing acceptance of the public road. 
Both of these conclusions were contrary to law. This Court has specifically stated that 
even an R.S. § 2477 road used for a single purpose could be deemed a highway dedicated 
to the public. And, under the Mining Law of 1872., a prospector could be any citizen or 
future citizen of the United States and had no inchoate property rights. In addition to 
these errors, the District Court did not make all reasonable inferences from the record in 
Mayflower' s favor, and in contrary to this Court' s precedent made inferences in favor of 
the moving parties. Finally, the District Court applied too stringent a burden of proof in 
ruling on the competing summary judgment motions, ignoring the burden set by statute. 
As the evidence and inferences support Mayflower's public road claim and present 
disputed issues of material fact, the District Court's October 2014 Order should be 
reversed and this action remanded for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim. 
The District Court also erred by denying Mayflower leave to file a Second 
Amended Complaint and to pursue its previously asserted appurtenant easement claim. 
Mayflower's Second Amended Complaint was an attempt to clarify and conform the 
pleadings to the evidence. Mayflower' s appurtenant easement claim is rooted in the 
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mining claims that Mayflower owns and relies on the existing pleadings and discovery 
record. Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim was included in Mayflower's Amended 
Complaint and in Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures. The District Court, however, 
denied Mayflower's motion based on its improper application and reliance on the District 
Court's March 2012 Order - an order that itself was an abuse of discretion because it 
went beyond the discretion granted to the District Court pursuant to Rule l 6(b) (pre-2011 
version), violated Rules 16(d) (pre-2011 version) and 37(b) (pre-2011 version), and 
unduly prejudiced Mayflower. The District Court further erred in concluding that 
allowing the Second Amended Complaint would have prejudiced defendants and was 
filed too late. 
Finally, the district court erred in dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement 
claim as the court erred in its application of the legal definition of "adverse" use. Had the 
District Court applied the proper interpretation of adverse use, the District Court would 
have found disputed issues of material fact that precluded the August 2012 summary 
judgment ruling in favor United Park. 
Based on the foregoing, and as established below, this Court should reverse the 
District Court's October 2014, July 2014, and August 2012 rulings and remand this case 
to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim, appurtenant easement 
claim, and prescriptive easement claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Mayflower's Public Road Claims 
Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should only be granted in 
appropriate circumstances. Strand v. Mayne, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (Utah 1963). For the 
District Court to have granted defendants' summary judgment motion on Mayflower's 
public road claims, the District Court had to find, based on admissible evidence, that 
there were no material facts in dispute and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
1982). As demonstrated below, the District Court erred in so finding. 
In concluding that Mayflower could not meet the burden of proof for establishing 
a public road,2 the District Court went beyond this Court's precedent and concluded that 
a road used for a single purpose, regardless of the number of users, cannot be deemed to 
be dedicated to the public through continuous use. (R5985-5992.) The District Court 
also erred in its belief that prospectors are not members of the general public, but instead 
had some inchoate property right that made them property or rights owners equal to 
locators, claimants, or patentees. (R5989-5993.) Relying upon these erroneous 
conclusions, and failing to construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Mayflower, the 
District Court determined that Mayflower could not demonstrate that the remnants of the 
In its December 12, 20 14 Order, the District Court suggests that even if the burden 
of proof is preponderance of the evidence, it would still grant summary judgment for the 
defendants. (R6077-6081.) As explained in Section I.D, infra, the correct burden of 
proof on Mayflower's public road claims is preponderance of the evidence. 
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Flagstaff Road, i.e. the Primary Access Road and the Flagstaff Loop Road, are public 
roads under Utah law. (R5985-5992.) Because the District Court's summary judgment 
ruling is based on these erroneous findings, along with a failure to construe all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Mayflower, and a misapplication of the undisputed facts to the law, 
this Court should reverse the District Court's October 1, 2014 and December 12, 2014 
Orders and remand this case to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road 
claims. 
A. A Single Purpose Road Can Be Deemed a Highway 
Dedicated to the Public Through Continuous Use 
In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929), this Court 
established the framework that has guided Utah public road jurisprudence for more than 
80 years. In finding that the road at issue in Churnos was a public road, this Court 
analyzed the history of the road, the different purposes for which the road was used, the 
users of the road, and the length of time the road was used prior to the surrounding land 
becoming privately owned. Id. at 648-49. While this Court noted the significance of the 
fact that the road at issue had been used for different purposes, this Court also specifically 
stated that "[i]f the claim rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or 
for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more difficult." 
Id. at 648. Thus, this Court established that a single purpose R.S. § 2477 road could be 
deemed to be a public road through continuous use. 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals have held differently in the 
intervening 85 years. And Federal Courts sitting in Utah or applying Utah law have 
18 
similarly made rulings that left open the possibility that use of a road for a single purpose 
was sufficient for finding that a R.S. § 2477 road was a public road. See So. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 768 (10th Cir. 2005) ("SUWA"). 
The District Court went beyond Churnos and SUWA and believed that the question 
of whether a road used for a single purpose could be deemed dedicated to the public 
needed to be answered. (R5985-5992.) And in so doing, the District Court answered that 
question contrary to Churnos and SUWA and ruled that a road used for a single purpose, 
regardless of the amount of use by the general public, precludes a finding that the road is 
a public highway. (R5985-5992.) This finding was in enor. In reaching that conclusion, 
the District Court relied on other Utah Supreme Court cases and the Federal case of San 
Juan County v. United States, No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460, 
2011 WL 2144762 (D. Utah May 27, 2011. (R5985-5992.) Rather than consider all of 
the factors this Court identified in Wasatch Cnty. v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179 P .3d 
768, and the cases cited therein, one of which was the number of users of the road, the 
District Court focused on the purpose of use. (R5985-5992.) And that narrow focus led 
the Court to ignore the "difficult" question posed by the Churnos court and set forth a 
rule that is inconsistent with Utah law. 
Three of the cases that the District Court relies upon, Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 
(Utah 1916), Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P. 720 (Utah 1954), and Petersen v. Combe, 438 
P.2d 545 (Utah 1968), are inapposite, as these three cases involved property owners or 
invitees of a landowner. As discussed below, that situation is absent in the case of 
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prospectors on Flagstaff Mountain, who were exploring the surveyed and unsurveyed 
public domain. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, cases involving private property owners or 
their invitees are not applicable here. 
The other cases that the District Court relies upon - Cassity v. Castano, 347 P.2d 
834 (Utah 1959), Harding v. Bohman, 491 P .2d 233 (Utah 1971 ), and the San Juan 
County case - involve use of roads on public land. However, in each of these cases, there 
was minimal use - a few cattlemen heading to Stansbury Island (Castano), two sheepmen 
going to grazing land (Harding), and three cattle owners over 60 years (San Juan 
County). While the users may have had a single purpose, it was the small number of 
users, not the purpose of use, that led this Court or the Federal District Court to find there 
had not been use by the general public. Indeed, this reading is consistent with Churnos, 
which does not foreclose finding a single purpose R.S. § 2477 road is a public road. See 
Churnos, 286 P. at 648. Thus, the District Court erred in "answering" the difficult 
question posed by this Court in Churnos and finding that only multi-purpose R.S. § 2477 
roads can be deemed a highway dedicated to the public through use. 
B. Prospectors Are the General Public 
The District Court also erred in its conclusion that a "prospector" had an inchoate 
property right, and therefore was not a member of the general public for purposes of use 
of the Flagstaff Road. The District Court equated a prospector to a locator, claimant, or 
patentee under the General Mining Law of 1872, as locators, claimants, and patentees did 
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have property rights under the law. The distinction between these groups is set forth in 
the statutory language of the Mining Law of 1872. 
A "prospector" was or could be any citizen or future citizen of the United States. 
See Mining Law of 1872, § 1, R.S. § 2319 (30 U.S.C. § 22). "Except as otherwise 
provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both 
surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, ... , by 
citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become 
such." Id. ( emphasis added). Thus, virtually anyone residing in the United States could 
be a prospector, i.e. one who explores or searches for minerals. 
While a prospector has no rights to the unclaimed federal lands that differ from 
any member of the general public, other classifications of groups, " locators," 
"claimants," and "patentees," did have certain property rights based on their 
classification. A " locator," or a "claimant," was someone who through prospecting 
located a claim. To become a locator, a prospector had to stake out a claim, record the 
claim in accordance with the rules and regulations of the mining district or territory, and 
perform a certain amount of work each year to remain in possession. See Mining Law of 
1872, § 5, R.S. § 2324 (30 U.S.C. § 28). While all claimants or locators were once 
prospectors, not all prospectors became claimants or locators. 
A "patentee" was a locator or claimant who applied for and received a Federal 
land patent on his or her claim. To receive a patent, a locator or claimant had to submit 
an application, publish notice of the application, and perform at least $500 of work on the 
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claim. See Mining Law of 1872, § 6, R.S. § 2325 (30 U.S.C. § 29). All patentees were 
locators or claimants, but not all locators or claimants became patentees. Thus, it is 
contrary to the unambiguous language of the Mining Law of 1872 to equate prospectors 
with locators, claimants, or patentees. 
There is another significant difference between "prospectors" on the one hand and 
"locators", "claimants", or "patentees" on the other. The latter groups are identifiable by 
reference to records on file with mining districts, county recorders, and the General Land 
Office. Prospectors, however, being coextensive with present or future citizens, could be 
anyone. 
In the October 2014 Order, the District Court used the term "prospectors" in 
different ways. Sometimes the District Court used the term according to its accepted 
meaning consistent with 30 U.S.C. § 22. At other times, however, the District Court used 
"prospectors" to mean "locators" or "claimants." For example, on Page 25 of the 
October 2014 Order, the Court states that "prospectors associated with the Flagstaff Mine 
built at least two miles of roads." (R5987.) In fact, it was the Flagstaff Mine claimants 
who built the Flagstaff Road. (R2894.) But in the Undisputed Facts section, the Court 
refers to these same people as "claimants." (R5965-5973.) Later in the same paragraph 
on Page 25 of the Order, the Court notes that "other prospectors eventually located other 
mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain." (R5987.) Here, the Court appears to use the term 
consistent with the Mining Law of 1872. Yet, the Court then again uses the term 
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"prospectors" to mean "claimants" or "locators" when referring to the field notes of the 
nearby claims. (R5965-5973.) 
The Court again equates "prospectors" with "claimants", "locators" or "patentees" 
when it refers to proprietary interests on Pages 29-30 of the Order. (R5991-5992.) This 
is contrary to the language of the Mining Law of 1872. While locators or patentees have 
proprietary interests under the Mining Law of 1872, prospectors do not. Compare 30 
U.S.C. § 22 (public lands open for exploration) with 30 U.S.C. § 26 (rights of possession 
and enjoyment of locators). A right of entry onto public land, which is what the Mining 
Law of 1872 effectively granted to all citizens and prospective citizens of the United 
States, is not a proprietary right. In contrast, the rights of claimants or patentees are 
proprietary, as they could be, and were, sold. This error in equating prospectors with 
locators, claimants, and patentees contributed to the District Court' s mistaken ruling to 
grant defendants summary judgment. 
C. All Inferences in Favor of Mayflower on Defendants' Motion 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, all reasonable inferences should be 
made in favor of the non-moving party. See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 
31, ~ 33,235 P.3d 749; Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405,408 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"Even if the moving party's objective statement of facts are agreed upon, reasonable 
inferences made from those undisputed facts can indeed create a genuine issue of 
material fact. That the objective facts are undisputed does not mean that no genuine 
issues remain as to those facts." USA Power, 2010 UT 31 at~ 33. As the non-moving 
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paiiy to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, all reasonable inferences should be 
made in favor of Mayflower, including inferences drawn from the historical record. The 
District Court, however, made a number of inferences in favor of defendants and against 
Mayflower in the October 2014 Opinion, including inferences on the success of the 
prospectors roaming the mountains around Park City in the late 19th century and the 
number of users of the Flagstaff Road. 
1. Not All Prospectors Became Locators or Claimants 
The Mining Law of 1872 allowed any citizen of the United States to become a 
prospector. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, every citizen of the United States was also a 
"prospective prospector," a term the District Court coined and used in Footnote 8 of the 
October 2014 Order. (R5992.) Mayflower is not aware of any independent legal 
meaning to the term "prospective prospector." However, by coining this term, the 
District Court seems to infer that prospectors had an "inchoate proprietary interest" in the 
land they were prospecting, and therefore were no longer members of the general public. 
(R5965-5973, R5988-5992.) This is wrong factually and legally. While a locator has a 
right of use and enjoyment, see 30 U.S.C. § 26, a prospector only had a right common to 
every citizen - to explore public lands for minerals. See 30 U.S.C. § 22. Thus, for 
example, a locator or a claimant could sell their rights. Conversely, a prospector, 
prospective or otherwise, could only sell the tools of his or her trade, not any proprietary 
interest in land. The District Court committed reversible error by inferring that 
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prospectors had inchoate property rights, and therefore were no longer members of the 
general public. 
The Court also infers in Footnote 8 that all prospectors become locators. (R5992.) 
In fact, only some prospectors became locators or claimants. Many, if not most, 
prospectors failed to find any minerals and thus had no basis for staking a claim. Thus, 
the District Court erred in making an inference in favor of defendants that all prospectors 
became locators or claimants. And this error influenced the District Court's improper 
conclusion on defendants' summary judgment motion. 
2. The Court Incorrectly Infers Few Users of the Flagstaff Road 
By conflating "prospectors" and "locators", the Court concludes that the public did 
not use the Flagstaff Road. However, Mayflower did not suggest that the Flagstaff Road 
was only used by claimants or locators. Rather, Mayflower asserted that the Flagstaff 
Road was used by "prospectors", i.e. citizens and future citizens of the United States, 
some of whom later became claimants or locators. The Court tries to minimize this 
distinction in Footnote 8 when it states that " [t]he fact that a few prospectors may have 
wandered Flagstaff Mountain before actually officially locating a mining claim does not 
change the analysis." (R5992.) This statement is incorrect. In Dean F. Wright, A 
HISTORY OF PARK CITY, which the District Court ruled admissible, there are references to 
more than 500 men prospecting in the hills around Park City as early as 1872. (R6029-
6030) (identifying the Flagstaff Mine as one of the mines attracting prospectors).) Five 
hundred is more than a few. And this was in 1872, when the population of Park City, 
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including these prospectors, was less than 1,000 people. By 1880, the population of Park 
City was more than 3,500 people - all drawn to Park City because of the mines. (R6026; 
6032.) ("Such magic names as McHenry, Flagstaff, and Pinyon drew hopeful miners.")) 
This suggests that the number of prospectors, i.e. citizens or future citizens of the United 
States and members of the general public, exploring the hills above Park City by 1880 
was even greater than the 500 documented in 1872. Again, this is more than a few. 
Actual or likely use of a road by dozens or even hundreds of members of the 
general public is well above the amount of use that this Court and the Court of Appeal 
have found sufficient to meet the use by the general public standard. See Boyer v. Clark, 
326 P .2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958) ("the public, even though not consisting of a great many 
persons, made a continuous and uninten-upted use of Middle Canyon Road ... as often as 
they found it convenient or necessary"); see also Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 at~ 4 (finding 
public use where several witnesses testified that they used the roads for recreational 
purposes); AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, ~ 6, 112 P.3d 1228 (finding 
public use where four witnesses testified that they or their family members used the road 
for several years). By making these improper inferences in favor of defendants and 
against Mayflower, the District Court en-ed and its summary judgment ruling should be 
reversed. 
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D. The Burden of Proof on Mayflower's Claims Is Preponderance of the 
Evidence Pursuant to Statute, Not Clear and Convincing Evidence as 
Found by the District Court 
This Court reviews de novo the District Court's burden of proof application and 
analysis. See Bahr, 2011 UT 19 at ii~ 15-16; Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at il 21. 
1. The Legislature has the Authority to Enact Certain Procedural 
Guidelines and Burdens of Proof 
Mayflower, as the proponent of R.S. § 24 77 status of the public roads, bears the 
burden of proving an R.S. 24 77 right-of-way by a "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard. The Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act ( the "R-O-W Act") provides 
that "the proponent of the R.S. 24 77 status of the highway bears the burden of proving 
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence." U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b). 
The R-O-W Act represents the Utah Legislature's intent to apply the "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard when adjudicating R.S. § 2477 claims in Utah courts. The 
R-O-W Act provided Utah courts with clear guidelines for the proper burden of proof 
when facing R.S. § 2477 claims. It is axiomatic that the Utah Legislature has the 
authority and ability to enact such procedural guidelines. 
The legislature of the state, which represents the people and thus the sovereign, 
has all of the residuum of power of government, except only as expressly 
restricted by the Constitution. In order to preserve the independence and the 
integrity of the three branches of government, it is of the utmost importance that 
the judicial exercise restraint and not intrude into the legislative prerogative. It 
cannot strike down and nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clearly and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution or in violation of some plain mandate 
thereof. The court must make every reasonable presumption which favors · 
constitutionality. 
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Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., 446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968). Several decisions 
illustrate that the legislature has the authority to establish the burden of proof to be 
applied to specific actions. See State v. Dre), 2010 UT 35, ~ 15,233 P.3d 476 (holding 
that the legislature may assign the burden of proof for an affirmative defense to a 
defendant so long as the defense does not negate an element of the offense); Smith v. 
Cummings, 117 P. 38, 40 (Utah 1911) (stating that while the legislative power may, 
within certain limits, declare what prima facie shall be deemed sufficient evidence for the 
purpose of establishing a given fact, the courts, in the absence of a statute, cannot, as a 
matter of law, declare what probative force or effect shall be given to any pai1icular act or 
circumstance where the evidence is conflicting or where conflicting inferences may be 
deduced from certain facts); Valcarce v. Valcarce (In re Estate of Valcarce), 2013 UT 
App 95, ~~ 26-27, 250 P.3d 1033 (discussing the Legislature's intent to simplify and 
clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents and where the legislature did not 
displace the previous burden of proof explicitly, the court will not read in a different 
standard). 
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b) is not substantive law. It establishes a uniform guideline 
for the burden of proof to apply to R.S. § 2477 cases. Thus, the district court erred in its 
application of the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard. 
2. Subsection 6(b) of Section 310 of the R-O-W Act is Unambiguous. 
The "primary goal in interpreting statues is to give effect to the legislative intent, 
as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
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achieve." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 , ,i 16, 137 P.3d 726 (quoting Foutz v. City ofS. 
Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ,i 11 , 100 P.3d 1171). The court "presume[s] that the legislature 
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." Id. (quoting CT v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ,i 9, 977 P.2d 479). The 
court will "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Id. ( quoting 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ,i 17, 66 P.3d 592); see also Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline 
Co., 2003 UT 8, ,i 28, 70 P.3d 1 ("We analyze the language of a statutory provision in 
light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we attempt to harmonize the 
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give meaning to each 
provision."); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ,i 40, 116 P.3d 323 ("When 
deciding questions of statutory interpretation, we do not look to language in isolation. 
Rather, we look first to the statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, to 
determine its meaning."). Only when a statute is ambiguous does the court look to other 
interpretive tools such as legislative history. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 at ,i 16. 
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b) is not ambiguous. The plain language of the provision 
states "[t]he proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving 
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not 
subject to Subsection (6)(a)." U.C.A. §72-5-310(6)(b). Subsection 6(a) states that, 
In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable presumption that the R.S. 2477 
grant has been accepted is created when: 
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(i) a highway existed on public lands no reserved for public uses as of the 
cut-off date under Section 72-5-301; and 
(ii) the highway currently exists in a condition suitable for public use. 
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(a). Subsection 6(a) and U.C.A. § 72-5-302(a) do not apply in this 
case. See e.g. San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18. Thus, reading 
the plain language of the provision, it is clear the Legislature's intent was to establish the 
burden of proof in cases establishing the R.S. § 2477 status of highways as the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. The Court does not need to look at other 
provisions of the R-O-W Act. 
3. Subsection 6(b) is Not in Conflict with Any Other Provision in the 
R-O-W Act. 
If there could be conflict between two statutes or statutory provisions, "the more 
specific provisions will govern over the more general provisions." Grynberg, 2003 UT 8 
at~ 28 (citingPerryv. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214,216 (Utah 1984)). 
Subsection 6(b) is not in conflict with any other provisions in Section 72-5-310. Nor is 
the provision specifically related to only circumstances whereby the "provision appears 
as just another subsection of a lengthy statutory provision describing a specific and 
discrete type of adjudicatory proceeding." (R6014-6015.) Subsection 6(b), on its face, 
does not only apply only to the specific action described in Section 310. Subsection 
310(6)(b) does not state that the "preponderance of evidence" burden of proof is 
exclusively applied to the proponent of an R.S. § 24 77 status that has been determined 
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through the State's process of issuing a notice of acknowledgement as described in 
U.C.A. § 72-5-309. 
The structure of the R-O-W Act supports Mayflower's interpretation. U.C.A. 
§ 72-5-310(6)(a) specifically refers to U.C.A. § 72-5-302. U.C.A. § 72-5-302 states that 
"this part applies to all R.S. 2477 rights of way." U.C.A. § 72-5-302. U.C.A. § 72-5-
310(6)(b) encompasses all situations that do not apply to U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(a) stating, 
"The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving 
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not 
subject to Subsection (6)(a)." Id. at § 72-5-310(6)(b ). Because the greater includes the 
lesser Subsection (6)(b) "applies to all R.S. 2477 rights-of-way." See Wilson v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 23 1 P.2d 715,719 (Utah 1951) (sole causation may include contributory 
negligence as the greater includes the lesser regarding the statutorily imposed duty). 
This comports to the legislature' s intent. The Legislative Notes accompanying 
Subsection 6(b) state, " [t]his act provides that a proponent of the R.S. 24 77 status of a 
road that is not presumed bears the burden of proving acceptance by a preponderance of 
the evidence." 2003 Utah Laws Ch. 293, 2003 Utah HB 274. Thus, the burden of proof 
articulated in Subsection ( 6)(b) is not in conflict with the other provisions of the statute 
and clearly states the legislature's intent. See State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31 at i1 16. 
Subsection 6(b) is unambiguous; the plain meaning of Subsection 6(b) should be applied. 
Mayflower, therefore, as the proponent of the R.S. § 2477 status of the highways has the 
burden of proof to show acceptance by the "preponderance of the evidence." 
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4. San Juan County 
No court has offered guidance in applying U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b). In 2011, the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah was presented with a different 
provision of the R-O-W Act. San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18. 
The provision at issue in San Juan County was U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(a), which sought to 
presume acceptance of the R.S. § 2477 grant without following the mechanics of 
"acceptance" under the R.S. § 2477 framework. Id. San Juan County does not discuss 
U.C.A. § 72-5-310(6)(b). In fact, San Juan County confirms that the two statutory 
provisions, U.C.A. §§ 72-5-302(a)(2) and 72-5-310(6)(b) are not related. 
It appears that in 2003 the Utah Legislature attempted to alter the burden of proof 
concerning the acceptance ofR.S. 2477 rights-of-way, creating a presumption in 
favor of right-of-way existence where "the state or a political subdivision of the 
state makes a finding that the highway was constructed and the right-of-way was 
accepted prior to October 21, 1976." Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-302(3)(a). Not 
having been formulated until many years after the opportunity to accept the R.S. 
24 77 grant had been terminated by Congress, this post hoc presumption cannot 
serve to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof in this case. Whether the R.S. 24 77 
grant has been accepted "is a question of compliance with the then-existing laws 
of the state where the right-of-way was established." 
San Juan County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460 at 17-18. San Juan County did not 
involve the analysis of a consistent burden of proof to apply to R.S. § 2477 
determinations. San Juan County held that the Utah Legislature could not, post hoc, 
eliminate the burden of proof by presuming acceptance. Id. However, San Juan County 
does not analyze U.C.A. § 72-5-31 0(b )(6) and the provision's intent to apply a uniform 
burden of proof to the R.S. § 2477 framework. Thus, San Juan County is not applicable 
to the analysis of the unambiguous language of subsection 6(b) of the R-O-W Act. 
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E. Defendants Were Not, and Are Not, Entitled to Judgment as a Matter 
of Law on Mayflower's Public Road Claim 
These errors described above in the District Court's otherwise thorough and well-
reasoned opinion led the District Court to grant defendants' summary judgment motion. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court, and remand this action to the 
District Court with instructions to enter an order denying Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and setting this case for trial. 
I. The Evidence and Inferences Support Mayflower's Public Road 
Claim 
Mayflower's public road is rooted in historical records. Those records show that 
Mayflower's predecessors located the Flagstaff Mining claim in 1871, built two miles of 
road from Park City to the mine in 1871 or 1872, and in 1876 obtained the first patent 
near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2894, 2900-2908.) Over the ensuing 50 plus 
years, all of the surrounding land was located, claimed, and patented. Yet, while field 
notes for these other claims made reference to the wagon road to Park City (R2912-2919 
(Uncle Charles); R2953-2961 (Home Station); R2939-2947 (Lucky Bill); R2989-2997 
(Peeler); R3007 (Boliver Plat); R3005 (Boliver 2 Plat); R3015-3018 (Overlooked 
Fraction)), not one of these other claimants alleged to have built any roads to their mines. 
The most reasonable inference from this evidence, if not the only reasonable inference, is 
that the Flagstaff Mine claimants built the Flagstaff Road. 
The historical records also show that the location of the Flagstaff Road has not 
changed in more than one hundred years. The first topographical map of Flagstaff 
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Mountain in sufficient detail was surveyed in 1901. It shows the Primary Access Road 
and part of the Flagstaff Loop Road in the same place as they were when this action 
began. (R3043-3044.) Aerial photographs in 1950 and detailed topographical maps in 
1955 and 1998 again shows the roads in the same locations as they were when the case 
began. (R305 l-3053, 3055, 3061-3063.) And, GLO survey notes in 1897 describe a 
road crossing certain section lines in the same place as the Primary Access Road 
appeared on the 1901 and later topographic maps. (R3580-3590.) The most reasonable 
inference from this evidence is that the Flagstaff Road was built in 1871 in the same 
location as it appeared in 1901 and later. Indeed, it is unreasonable to infer that a road 
that has been static for more than 100 years, was constructed and moved in the 30 years 
prior without any evidence of such. 
Moreover, pursuant to U.C.A. § 72-5-302(3)(b), the Primary Access Road and 
Flagstaff Road's condition suitable for public use in 2005 "establishes a presumption that 
the highway has continued in use in its present location since the land over which it is 
built was public land not reserved for public use." That would be back to the 
construction of the Flagstaff Road by the Flagstaff Mine claimants in 1871-1872. 
Finally, the prospecting, and subsequent locating and patenting of the mining 
claims around the Flagstaff Mining claim without evidence of any other road from Park 
City to the summit of Flagstaff Mountain suggests these later prospectors, locators, and 
patentees used the Flagstaff Road. Indeed, it would be an unreasonable inference to 
suggest that later-in-time prospectors would not use the established road. And, when the 
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Utah Legislature passed the Utah Highway Act in 1880, the Flagstaff Road became a 
public highway as it had been used by the public for more than five years. See 1880 Utah 
Highway Act§§ 2, 3. 
Under the appropriate preponderance of the evidence standard, Mayflower 
proffered undisputed facts and reasonable inferences that warranted, at minimum, a trial 
on Mayflower's public road claim. 
2. Disputed Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment 
The foregoing record and inferences created disputed issues of material fact on 
defendants' summary judgment motion that required the District Court to deny 
defendants' summary judgment motion and pennit Mayflower to go forward on its public 
road claim. The issues included both the type and number of users on the Flagstaff Road, 
as well as the continuous use of the Flagstaff Road. Ironically, on a far less impressive 
record in August 2012, the District Court ruled to that effect, ruling that Mayflower's 
public road claim should go to trial. (R2563 .) 
For the District Court to grant defendants' motion, the District Court had to find 
that the public did not use the Flagstaff Road between 1872 and 1880. Defendants did 
not offer any evidence to that point. Instead, they claimed that Plaintiffs could not 
provide any such evidence, and the District Court agreed, ignoring the record before it 
showing the number of prospectors roaming the hills of Park City in the 1870s and the 
number of subsequent claims made near the Flagstaff Mining claim. At minimum, these 
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facts should have been submitted for trial to allow the trier of fact to hear the evidence 
and make findings. 
3. The Court Erred in Permitting Defendants to Raise and Present 
Evidence Supporting an Alternative Access Theory for the First 
Time in their Summary Judgment Briefing. 
Defendants did not assert an alternative access theory prior to their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendants' alternative access theory has been waived. Thus, the 
district court should have refused to address issues not properly raised prior to summary 
judgment. See Jensen v. Skypark, 2013 UT App 48 at ,r 4, Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 
UT App 243, ,r 33, 166 P.3d 639 (an issue not properly raised with respect to a summary 
judgment motion is waived). No alternative access theory is asserted in United Park's 
Answer to the Amended Complaint (Rl584-1589) and no alternative access theory is 
asserted in the HOA Defendants' Answer to the Amended Complaint. (R2674-2678.) 
Nothing in defendants ' answers could hint at the alternative access theory. See R. T 
Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,r 12, 40 P.3d 1119 (raising of an issue in the answer 
and counterclaim without any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not 
present the issue to the trial judge for a decision and preserve the issue for appeal). 
Defendants were on notice that Mayflower was asserting a claim for a private right 
of access over a public road, as it was included in Mayflower's March 2012 Disclosures. 
Defendants had ample opportunity to assert their claims and defenses. Because of the 
untimeliness of defendants' alternative access theory, Mayflower was denied an 
opportunity to discover and present evidence, question witnesses, and present legal 
36 
arguments in opposition to that theory. The trial court should not have allowed, let alone 
accepted defendants' alternative access theory raised for the first time on summary 
judgment. See Jensen v. Skypark, 2013 UT App 48, ,i 4; Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243 at ,i 
33. Thus, defendants' alternative access defense has been waived and allowing it to 
proceed was prejudicial to Mayflower. 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants on Mayflower's public road claim should be reversed 
and this case remanded to the District Court for a trial on Mayflower's public road claim. 
II. The District Court Erred in Denying Mayflower Leave to Amend to File a 
Second Amended Complaint and to Pursue the Previously Asserted 
Appurtenant Easement Claim 
Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(a). " [R]ule 15 should be interpreted liberally as to allow parties to have 
their claims fully adjudicated." Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, iJl 9, 3 P.3d 2 
(quotation and citation omitted). The fundamental purpose of Utah's liberalized pleading 
rules is "to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they 
have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the requirement that their adversary have 
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P .2d 966, 971 (Utah 
1982) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, parties are entitled to "notice of the 
issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that 
is required." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) enables the court to allow amendments to the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence. Amendment is mandatory if a claim is tried by consent or 
without objection. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ~ 9, 263 P.3d 440. 
Where the parties did not consent to a trial of the issues, the court may still allow 
amendment to conform to the evidence if two requirements are met. See Eldridge, 2007 
UT App 243 at ~19 (citing Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ~9, 974 
P .2d 288). First, the trial court must find "that the presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved by amendment." Id. Second, the Court must determine "that the 
admission of such evidence would not prejudice the adverse party." Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). Under Rule l 5(b ), a new cause of action may be allowed if it is not a 
wholly different cause of action or legal obligation. See Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167, 
170 (Utah 1954). 
This Court reviews whether a trial court properly denied a request to amend a 
pleading under Rule 15 under the abuse of discretion standard. See Daniels v. Gamma W 
Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ~ 57, 221 P .3d 256 ( citing Fishbaugh v. Utah Power 
& Light, 969 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1998)). 
A. Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim 
To establish an appurtenant easement claim, a party must show: (i) unity of title 
followed by severance; (ii) an apparent, obvious, and visible servitude at the time of 
severance; (iii) that the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of severed 
property; and (iv) the easement must be continuous and self-acting. See Adamson v. 
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Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264,272 (Utah 1947) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1132 
(Utah 1916)); see also. Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Res. Corp. , 555 P.2d 277,280 
(Utah 1976). Here, by the granting of the Flagstaff Mining Patent and the R.S. § 24 77 
right-of-way, Mayflower meets these elements. 
1. The Appurtenant Easement Claim Is Rooted in the Mining Claims 
That Mayflower Owns and Alleged 
The law presumes an easement to be appurtenant to and to run with the land. See 
Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass 'n, 2004 UT App 149, 112, 92 P.3d 162. 
Mayflower is the successor to a number of patented mining claims, including most 
significantly the Flagstaff Mine claim, the first mining claim located and patented near 
the summit of Flagstaff Mountain. (R2900-2908.) Under the Mining Law of 1872, a 
land patentee not only acquired title to the land described in the mining claim, but also 
"the rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances of whatsoever nature therein." 
(R2900-2908.) By necessity this includes right of ingress and egress, i.e. access, as 
otherwise the patentee or its successors would not be able to exercise "the exclusive right 
of possession and enjoyment" the United States granted in the patent. (R2900-2908.) 
These were rights that accompany every mining patent issued during this time 
period. See SUWA, 425 F .3d at 741-42 (right to use public right-of-way); Robertson v. 
Smith, 1 Mont. 410, 417- 18 ( 1871) ( a prior in time public right of way over a 
subsequently patented mining claim subjects the patented mining claim to the easement 
rights of the public); see, e.g., Ski Park City West, Inc. v. Major-Blankeney Corp. , 517 
P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1974) (right of ingress and egress); Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. at 
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1132 (same). By alleging that it was the successor to these mining patents, and while 
further alleging that United Park was the successor to other mining claims, Mayflower 
put United Park (and later the HOA defendants) on notice that it sought to vindicate these 
rights. (Rl3 76-13 78.) And, in the case of the Flagstaff Mine, i.e. the first patent granted 
near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain, these rights were "prior to and superior to" the 
rights of any other patent holder, including United Park. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Condas, 
290 P. 954, 958 (1930) ("The right of way having been established over public lands by 
public user, the predecessors of the plaintiffs when the patent was issued to them, and the 
plaintiffs when they acquired their interest in and to the lands, took them subject to the 
easement.") 
2. Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Relies on the Existing 
Pleadings and Discovery Record 
a) Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Was Included in 
the Amended Complaint. 
When Mayflower moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, the 
reason was not to add a new cause of action, but to clarify the causes of action that were 
included in the Amended Complaint and its claim for relief. (R2780-2782, R4324-4325.) 
See Wells, 272 P.2d at 170. Clarification was necessary because of defendants' efforts to 
narrow and recast Mayflower's claims, such as defendants' expert Ernest Rowley 
claiming in December 2013 that the August 2012 summary judgment ruling eliminated 
all easement claims, when in fact it only addressed the prescriptive easement claim. 
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As Mayflower argued below, the appurtenant easement claim was referenced in 
several paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, including Paragraphs 1 (by reference to 
the patented mining claims), Paragraphs 6-7 (reference to existence and use of easement 
roads for access), Paragraph 8 (right to a prescriptive easement and as a beneficiary of a 
public right-of-way), Paragraph 16 (right of ingress and egress over the easement roads 
and "such right is superior and prior to the rights" of other owners). (R1374, Rl376, 
R1377.) 
The significance of alleging patented mining claims in Paragraph 1, as discussed 
above, is that it includes the critical rights of ingress and egress to the property. The 
allegation in Paragraph 8 demonstrates that the Amended Complaint was about more than 
a prescriptive easement, as it refers to both the prescriptive easement claim and a right as 
a beneficiary of a public right-of-way. Those are two separate claims. See Alvey Dev. 
Corp., 2002 UT App at ,i,i 10, 13 (describing differences between prescriptive easements 
and appurtenant easements). 
The allegation in Paragraph 16 about a superior and prior right again refers to 
something other than a prescriptive easement claim, as a prescriptive easement, by 
definition, arises after another property owner's rights, not before. See Valcare v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P .2d 305, 311 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). An appurtenant easement, in contrast, 
can arise prior to another owner's claim. See, e.g., Sullivan, 290 P. at 958; Garland v. 
Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 34 P. 368; 370 (Utah 1893), aff'd, 164 
U.S. 1 (1896) (citing Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453 (1879)) (holding that all patents 
4 1 
granted by the United States are subject to pre-existing rights-of-way); Silver Bow Mining 
& Milling Co. v. Clarke , 5 P. 570, 578 (Mont. 1885) ("lands conveyed by the patent are 
subject to the prior rights of the locators of valid mining claims thereon"). 
b) Mayflower's Appurtenant Easement Claim Relies on the 
Existing Discovery Record 
Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim derives from the mining patents to 
which Mayflower is the successor. The United States issued these mining patents in the 
latter apart of the 19th Century, beginning with the Flagstaff Mine patent in 1876. 
(R2900-2908.) Thus, the record supporting Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim 
consists of the historical records of the General Land Office and records on file with the 
Summit and Wasatch County Recorders. This is the same record that supports 
Mayflower's public road claim. Accordingly, the record that supports Mayflower's 
appurtenant easement claim is the same discovery record that has already been developed 
for Mayflower's public road claim. (See, e.g., R2780-2782, R6097 p. 20-32 (making this 
argument to the District Court).) 
In short, Mayflower's appurtenant easement claim was not a wholly different 
cause of action. See Wells, 272 P .2d at 170. Rather, it was an amendment that would 
subserve presentation of Mayflower's claims on the merits without prejudicing 
defendants because the claim was based on the existing discovery record. See Eldridge, 
2007 UT App 243 at 1 19. 
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B. The District Court's Reliance on the March 8, 2012 Order to Deny 
Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend Was Error and Should be 
Reversed 
The July 17, 2014 Order denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend lists 
three reasons for the denial: (i) the time since the case had been filed; (ii) a failure to 
comply with requirements of the March 8, 2012 Order; and (iii) prejudice to the 
defendants. (R4836-4840.) The transcript of the June 4, 2014 hearing makes clear that 
the March 8, 2012 Order was the principal reason for the Court's decision, with the other 
two reasons being secondary. (R6097 p. 65-68.) The District Court's reliance on the 
March 2012 Order and the alleged lack of compliance therein is erroneous because the 
March 2012 Order was an abuse of discretion, and the District Court's reliance on the 
March 2012 Order does not comply with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Moreover, the issues of delay and prejudice were not valid grounds for 
denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend. 
1. The March 8. 2012 Order Was an Abuse of Discretion 
The District Court's March 2012 Order was an extraordinary order. The District 
Court required Mayflower, and only Mayflower, to state the claims it was making, 
identify the facts supporting those claims, state the statutory and case law supporting 
those claims, provide a map showing the roads at issue, identify the witnesses that 
Mayflower might call at trial, and re-produce the documents that Mayflower might use at 
trial. (Rl695-1698.) Not only did the March 2012 Order impose an onerous burden on 
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Mayflower, it created an asymmetrical process that prejudiced Mayflower and was 
contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 
a) The March 8, 2012 Order Goes Beyond the Discretion 
Granted to the Court Pursuant to Rule 16 o[the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
The District Court issued the March 8, 2012 Order pursuant to its case 
management authority under Rule 16. The pre-2011 version of Rule 16(b) affords the 
District Court discretion to issue pretrial orders on several matters, including orders 
governing Rule 26 disclosures. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b) (pre-2011 version). Rule 26 
disclosures include the identification of facts, the identification and production of 
documents, setting forth computations of damages, and disclosing applicable insurance. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l) (pre-2011 version); see Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 
331, il 5, 170 P.3d 1138. The District Court's March 2012 Order, however, went beyond 
ordering further or renewed Rule 26( a)( 1) disclosures, as it also ordered Mayflower to 
state its claims and identify all case law and statutes that supported Mayflower's claims. 
(R1697.) Nothing in Rule 26 authorized the District Court to order Mayflower to 
disclose such information, and doing so was an abuse of discretion by the District Court. 
See Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at~ 8.4 
Because this action was filed in 2005, the pre-2011 versions of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure control. See Order, In re Proposed Amendments to Rules, Case No. 
20110725-SC (Aug. 29, 2011). 
The District Court's March 2012 Order was akin to ordering the disclosure of trial 
preparation materials. Such materials can only be ordered upon a showing of substantial 
need. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (pre-2011 version). Even then, the District Court is 
prohibited from ordering the disclosure of the legal theories of counsel. See id. 
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The info1mation that the District Court ordered disclosed regarding claims, facts, 
case law, and statutes was more in the form of an order compelling responses to an 
interrogatory or interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Yet, the District Court did not identify any such pending interrogatory. Nor is the 
District Court authorized to propound interrogatories under Rule 33. Rather, only a party 
may propound interrogatories. See Utah R. Civ. P. 33(a) (pre-2011 version). By 
improperly inserting itself into the discovery process, the District Court further abused its 
discretion. Thus, while parts of the March 2012 Order were a valid exercise of the 
District Court's authority under Rule I 6(b ), ordering Mayflower to disclose its legal 
theories, supporting facts, case law, and statutes, was not. Because the District Court 
then relied on this abuse of discretion to deny Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend, 
the District Court's denial of that motion is improper. 
b) The March 2012 Order Violates Rules J6(d) and 37(b) o[the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
In addition to exceeding the scope of its authority under Rule l 6(b ), the District 
Court's March 2012 Order violates Rules 16(d) and 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by making issue and evidentiary sanctions self-executing instead of requiring a 
hearing and showing of non-compliance. Although the Rules do provide for certain self-
executing sanctions, those self-executing sanctions concern the failure to disclose a 
witness or produce a document, i.e. items required to be disclosed pursuant to Rules 
26(a)(l) and 26(e). See Rukavina, 2007 UT App 33 1 at ,i 8 (if a party fails to make the 
disclosures mandated by Rule 26, the trial court is required to exclude the evidence). For 
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any other sanction, a hearing is necessary. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16( d) ("If a party or a 
party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, ... , the court, upon motion or 
its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)." (Emphasis added.)); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (requiring finding of a failure to comply). 
The District Court dispensed with the requirement of a hearing. This is another 
abuse of discretion rendering the March 2012 Order invalid, at least in this regard. And 
this abuse of discretion is relevant, as it was the self-executing nature of the March 2012 
Order that the District Court relied upon in denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to 
Amend. This is another reason the District Court erred in denying Mayflower leave to 
amend. 
c) The March 2012 Order Preiudiced Mayflower 
The March 2012 Order was also improper because it created an asymmetrical 
record. While Mayflower was locked into the facts, witnesses, documents, and theories 
disclosed in March 2012, United Park and later the HOA Defendants were not so limited. 
When first the HOA Defendants intervened, changing the complexion of the case, and 
next discovery was re-opened in March 2013 for all parties (R2710), the District Court 
should have terminated the punitive restrictions of the March 2012 Order. Yet, while the 
District Court tempered the restrictions on witnesses or documents identified or 
developed through discovery after March 2012, the District Court remained steadfast on 
the restrictions on Mayflower's theory of the case. This was a further abuse of discretion 
by the District Court that warrants reversal. 
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First, nothing in the rules permits the creation of an asymmetrical record. Initial 
disclosures may be sequential; final pre-trial disclosures are not. Compare Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(a)(l) (pre-2011 version) with Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) (pre-2011 version). 
Second, the District Court enforced the March 2012 Order in the same way that 
Utah courts used to enforce final pre-trial orders prior to 1987. Under the pre-1987 
version of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if a claim or theory was not 
included in the final pre-trial order, it was not permitted to go forward at trial. See Lewis 
v. Mou/tree, 627 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1981) (allowing amendment of pre-trial order under 
pre-1987 Rule 16 only in cases of manifest injustice). This was the effect of the District 
Court's interpretation of the March 2012 Order on Mayflower's Motion for Leave to 
Amend. But this provision of Rule 16 was removed more than twenty-five years ago and 
is no longer a valid exercise of discretion by a trial com1. Thus, it was error for the 
District Court to so rigidly interpret the March 2012 Order. 
2. Even if the March 8, 2012 Order Is Valid, Mayflower's March 2012 
Disclosures Complied With Its Terms 
Even if the March 2012 Order was entirely valid, which it was not, the District 
Court erred in enforcing its punitive, self-executing issue sanction in light of the response 
that Mayflower did provide following the March 2012 Order. Mayflower provided an 11 
page written response to the March 2012 Order that set forth facts, case law, statutes, and 
legal theories. (Rl 863.) That response referred to Mayflower's public road claim, its 
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prescriptive easement claim, its right of access along public rights-of-way theory, and 
Mayflower's appurtenant easement theory.5 (Rl852-1863.) 
In denying Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Amend, the District Court took an 
overly restrictive view of Mayflower's disclosures. The Rules of Civil Procedure only 
require Mayflower to provide notice and allegations in support of that notice. See, e.g., 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8; Mackv. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47, ~17, 221 P.3d 194 (fair notice 
of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved is all that is required) . The District Court, however, held Mayflower 
to something akin to a summary judgment standard in the disclosures. (R1695-1698.) 
This was error, and Mayflower should have been permitted to go forward with its 
appurtenant easement claim. 
3. Mayflower's Motion For Leave to Amend Was Justified and 
Granting the Motion Would Not Have Prejudiced Defendants 
The District Court's July 17 Order denying Mayflower leave to amend also cited 
delay and prejudice as reasons for the denial. Both were incorrect. 
See Rl 853 ("Thus, they include not only a right of the public to use the roads, but 
a right of access of private owners such as plaintiffs to adjoining lands."); Ri 854 ("The 
latter [prescriptive] right was established by private use to reach lands now owned by 
Mayflower, and is to be distinguished from the private right of access to adjoining lands 
over publicly dedicated roads."); Rl 858 (Section entitled Included Private Rights: 
"Dedication of a public road establishes rights of two kinds: public rights and rights of 
access in private owners served by the road .. .. While the public may lose the right to 
use the road, private owners do not lose their right to access their property over the old 
public right of way."); Rl 862 ("The rights of ordinary members of the public and of 
private owners on public roads are not mutually exclusive, but alternative."); id. ("The 
correct form of claim in such a case, therefore, is for declaration of a right of access 
which, depending upon the proof, may take the form of a public/private right or a private 
right.") ( emphasis added). 
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On the issue of delay, the District Court focused on the fact that the case had been 
pending since 2005. (R4838.) But the HOA Defendants intervened in November 2012 
and Mayflower's prior counsel withdrew in November 2012. (R2624-2626, 2656-2657.) 
As such, the case took on a new complexion in March 2013 when the District Court held 
a status conference and re-opened discovery for all parties, not just the HOA Defendants. 
(R6096.) The only discovery that the HOA Defendants provided was an expert report by 
Ernest Rowley in November 2013. In December 2013, Ernest Rowley claimed in a 
deposition that all easement claims had been dismissed. In response, Mayflower moved 
for leave to amend to clarify its claims, as the District Court had never addressed an 
appurtenant easement claim. That is not excessive delay and justifies Mayflower's 
motion. 
On the issue of prejudice, the District Court accepted defendants' unsupported 
assertion that amendment would require additional discovery. Defendants never 
identified any actual discovery they would need, merely referring to the general 
discovery procedures. (R6097 pp. 41-45 .) And given that Mayflower's appurtenant 
easement claim was based on the same historical evidence already in the record as a 
result of Mayflower's public road claim, there was no legitimate additional discovery that 
defendants could seek. Accordingly, the District Court erred in accepting defendants' 
prejudice argument. Instead, the District Court should have acknowledged the lack of 
prejudice and permitted Mayflower to file its Second Amended Complaint. Kelly v. Hard 
Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 131, 87 P.3d 73.4 (quoting 61A Arn. Jur.2d 
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Pleadings §776 (2003)) (the court's inquiring regarding prejudice should center on 
whether the nonrnoving party has a fair opportunity to litigate the new issues). 
III. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mayflower's Prescriptive Easement 
Claim. 
In its August 16, 2012 Order, the District Court found that "there is no disputed 
fact that Stichtings' access to the subject property was permissive. Stichtings' use of the 
roads to which they claim a prescriptive easement was not adverse." (R2563.) However, 
the district court erred in its application of the legal definition of"adverse use." 
A prescriptive easement exists where a party proves that their use of another's 
land was: (i) open, (ii) notorious, (iii) adverse, and (iv) continuous for at least 20 years. 
Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ,i 18, 186 P .3d 978 ( quoting Marchant v. Park City, 
788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990)). "A prescriptive easement does not result in ownership, 
but allows only use of property belonging to another for a limited purpose." Marchant v. 
Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 681-682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, "a use need not be 
regular or constant in order to be continuous. All that is necessary is that the use be as 
often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." Crane v. Crane, 
683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 
The District Court's August 16, 2012 Order focused on adverse use. Adverse use 
means "the use must be against the owner as distinguished from under the owner." 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P .2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981 ). "An antagonistic or adverse use of a 
way cannot spring from a permissive use .... It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a 
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license or mere neighborly accommodation." Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 1070, 1073 
(Utah 193 5). 
However, the fact that the parties were initially friendly or cordial with one 
another does not prevent a prescriptive right from arising because of the presumption that 
the use of another's land is adverse to him. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 
312 (Utah 1998); Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535,537 (Utah 1953). Therefore, a mere 
showing of "neighborliness" does not preclude adverse use. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 
312 (citing cases where adverse use was found despite cordial neighborly relations). In 
fact courts have upheld a district court's finding of adverse use where the users of the 
disputed road had access to a key to a gate blocking access to the road. Crane, 683 P.2d 
at 1065. 
In Crane, the Grazing Association, as the "adverse user," was provided with a key 
to the gate blocking the subject road in order to drive their cattle along the road. Id. The 
land owners argued that the use of the key was evidence of permissive use. Id. However, 
the court noted that the use of the key could also be evidence of the land owner's 
recognition of the Grazing Association's continued right to use the road. Id. The court 
stated, "in view of the [Grazing Association's] insistence during the 1950's that they had 
a right to use the trail and would force their way through if necessary and in view of the 
testimony that the association riders in fact forced their way through the fence or gate 
when they did not have a key during the period from 1950 to 1980, we cannot say that the 
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evidence clearly preponderates against the district court's finding that the plaintiffs use 
was adverse to rather than by permission of defendants." Id. 
The facts relied upon by the court in making its August 16, 2012 Order, similarly, 
do not preclude a finding of "adverse use". In its Motion for Summary Judgment, United 
Park states, 
11 . A cable with a combination lock denied access to the Stichting's property, but 
upon request Stichtings' representative was given the combination of the lock 
so that he could access the Stichtings' property. (R2 l l 9.) 
12. For a time United Park and Stichtings were on "very, very good terms," had 
common development interests and were discussing joint venture and 
common planning for their contiguous properties. (R21 I 9-2120.) 
13. Stichtings' representative understood that United Park's position with regard 
to accessing the roads was that "basically you can use whatever road you 
want." (R2120.) 
14. United Park never denied Stichtings, their agents, or their representatives 
access to the Alleged Roads. (R2121.) 
United Park argued that Mayflower's access to their property following 
installation of the cable across the road was permissive because Mayflower was on good 
terms with United Park at times and Mayflower was provided a combination to access the 
road. However, Mr. Theobald's deposition testimony contradicts these assertions and 
establishes that Mayflower did begin the prescriptive period by accessing the properties 
without permission. Thus, there were disputed issues of material fact. 
United Park's factual statements were disputed by Mayflower. A closer 
examination of Robert Theobald's testimony reveals that there was no permissive use. 
Mayflower's use of the roads to access Mayflower's property mirrors the use in Crane, 
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683 P.2d at 1065. Mr. Theobald testified that Mayflower acquired the properties in the 
late 1970's. (R3366.) As Mayflower's representative, Mr. Theobald began accessing the 
Mayflower properties during this time. When Mr. Theobald began visiting the property 
there were no gates or fences or cables denying access to the Mayflower properties. 
(R3368.) After the cable was installed, Mr. Theobald obtained the combination from 
Deer Valley, not United Park. (R2119.) It was reasonable for Mayflower to infer that 
United Park's installation of the cable was adverse to Mayflower' s use of the road in 
order to access their property. 
Based on the testimony from Mr. Theobald, Mr. Theobald and other Mayflower 
agents never sought permission from United Park when accessing the Mayflower 
properties via the road prior to the installation of the cable. (R3369.) While Mr. 
Theobald was provided the combination to the cable when it was installed, he was given 
access by Deer Valley, not United Park. (R2119.) Even though the relationship between 
United Park and Mayflower was at times cordial, Mayflower' s use of the road to access 
their property began as adverse use. Again, the presumption is that a party adversely uses 
the property of another. See Lunt, 260 P .2d at 53 7. When United Park installed the cable 
across the road that prevented access to Mayflower's property, Mayflower continued to 
access their property. (R3368-69.) Mayflower used the road when the cable was down 
and received the combination from Deer Valley when the cable was up. (Id.) The 
combination was never sought from or provided by United Park. (Id.) Using the 
combination provided by Deer Valley does not preclude adverse use. See Crane, 683 
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P.2d at 1065; see also Vigil v. Baltzley, 448 P.2d 171, 173-74 (N.M. 1968) (finding 
adverse use and an easement by prescription even though the adverse users had a key to 
gates). Mayflower provided evidence regarding the "adverse use" element of a 
prescriptive easement claim that created a disputed issue of material fact. This evidence, 
coupled with Utah law relating to adverse use, means there are disputed issues of fact that 
entitle Mayflower to a trial on this issue. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing 
Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim in its August 16, 2012 Order. 
I 
I 
I 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, May Dower respectfully submits that this Court should 
reverse: (i) the District Court's October 2014 Order granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Mayflower's public road claim; (ii) the District Court's July 2014 
Order denying Mayflower leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and striking 
Mayflower's appurtenant easement summary judgment claim; (iii) the District Court's 
August 2012 Order dismissing Mayflower's prescriptive easement claim; and (iv) the 
District Court's March 2012 Order to the extent it went beyond the limits of Rules 16, 26, 
and 37(pre-2011 version) and created self-executing issue and evidentiary sanctions and 
required Mayflower to disclose legal theories protected by law. 
Dated this ..,;Jd:fay of May, 2015. 
Richards Brandt Miller Nelson 
CRAIG C. COBURN 
STEVEN H. BERG 
BRAD M. LIDDELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and 
Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
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ADDENDUM 
1. March 8, 201 2 Order Denying Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and 
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2. August 16, 2012 Order on Summary Judgment 
3. July 17, 2014 Order on Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
4. October 1, 2014 Memorandum Decision and Order 
5. December 12, 2014 Ruling and Order 
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 15, 16, 26, 37, 56(pre-2011 versions where applicable) 
7. Mining Act of 1866, § 8, R.S. § 2477 
8. Mining Law of 1872, §§ 1, 5, 6, R.S. §§ 2319, 2324, 2325 
9. 1880 Utah Highway Act,§§ 2-3 
10. Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act, U.C.A. §§ 72-5-30 1, 302,309,310 
11. Flagstaff Mine Field Notes 
12. Flagstaff Mine Survey 
13. Notice of Flagstaff Mine Claim Patent Application & Patent 
14. 1901 USGS Survey Map Overlaid w ith Mining Claims and Roadways 
15. 1950 NAIP Aerial Photograph (enlarged) 
16. 1955 USGS Topographical Map (enlarged) 
17. 1997 Google Image 
18. 1998 USGS Topographical Map ( enlarged) 
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FILEDOif---
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
ST ATE OF UTAH, SIL VER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT 
SIL VER CLOUD, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation; and DOES I TO X, 
person and entities whose true names are 
unknown, 
Defendants. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMP ANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS AND REQUIRING 
CLARIFYING DISCLOSURES 
UNDER RULES 16 AND 26 
Civil No. 050500430 
(Consolidated with 050500500) 
Honorable Keith Kelly 
This case came before the Court on February 22, 2012, at 3:00 p.m. for a scheduling 
conference and a hearing on defendant United Park City Mines Company's Motion for Partial 
Judgment on the Pleadings. The Honorable Keith Kelly presided. United Park was represented 
by Stephen K. Christiansen. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower 
Recreational Fonds were represented by E. Craig Smay. Silver Cloud, LLC was represented by 
John A. Bluth. 
Based on the pleadings, moving papers, opposition, exhibits, and arguments of counsel, 
and for good cause appearing, the Court denies United Park's motion. However, the Court is 
concerned that United Park be afforded due process with respect to the allegations in the 
Stichtings' Amended Complaint, which are somewhat cryptic in nature and do not put United 
Park on adequate notice regarding what is claimed. Consequently, the Court exercises its case 
management authority and prerogative under Utah R. Civ. P. l 6(b) and enters the following 
order sua sponte, requiring Stichtings to make the following disclosures to ameliorate the effects 
of the form of the Amended Complaint: 
1. Stichtings shall make full and complete disclosures of their claims and evidence 
in this case in the nature of Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures. Such disclosures shall be made 
notwithstanding any prior disclosures, shall be made in writing, and shall not incorporate other 
disclosures or materials by reference. Failure to make such disclosures by the date set forth 
herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to use the individual, document, or evidence in 
further proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(t). 
2. Stichtings shall provide a map-in reasonable detail specifying the roads claimed in 
this action, including the roads' width, exact location, and a specific identification as to which 
roads are claimed to be public, which are claimed to be a private easement, and which are 
claimed to be both. Such disclosure shall be by affidavit, sworn and signed by a representative 
of Stichtings. Failure to provide such information by the date set forth herein shall result in 
Stichtings being unable to proceed with their claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
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3. For each roadway claimed, Stichtings shall provide the specific statute or case law 
they allege supports their claim to a public or private road. Failure to provide such information 
by the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to proceed with their claim 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
4. Stichtings are to provide a list of witnesses, including names, addresses, and 
telephone numbers, along with a description of the testimony supporting the claim to the 
roadways. This is in addition to and independent of the requirements for expert disclosures 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3). This requirement does not provide Stichtings any additional time 
for the disclosure of expert witnesses. The Court intends to strictly enforce the rules regarding 
expert testimony, including the timeliness of disclosures. Failure to provide such information by 
the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to use such witnesses in further 
proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
5. Stichtings are required to disclose any and all documents they intend to use at 
trial. These exhibits shall be provided to United Park in 3-ring binders and shall be identified 
with exhibit numbers. Failure to provide such information by the date set forth herein shall 
result in Stichtings being unable to use such exhibits at trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
6. All such disclosures ordered herein shall be made by the close of business on 
March 14, 2012. If any item required hereiq.to be disclosed or produced has already been 
disclosed or produced, it shall nevertheless be disclosed or produced again. Nothing in this order 
shall constitute a waiver of or prejudice to any party's right to challenge the propriety of prior 
disclosures. Following Stichtings' disclosures as ordered herein, United Park may thereafter take 
additional reasonable discovery. The parties shall meet and confer regarding what additional 
reasonable discovery is necessary. Upon completion of such additional discovery, the parties 
3 
shall further meet and confer in preparation for trial and certification thereof with reference to 
Judge Kelly's procedures for complex trial in his Bench Book on the Utah State Bar's Litigation 
Section website. 
7. A Rule 16 pretrial scheduling and case management conference is hereby set for 
April 27, 2012, from _1:00 to 4:09 P·W· o{ ~ fta...,,t2 ~ ~~c_u{ a-of 
"8'" . 0 gp--c< d1"/'VO t~ f-~ p--rrn n d 
IT IS SO ORDERED. a,,re., ~b1 ~~ · 
BY THE COURT: 
-yy/_~4C, t... g-1 i() 17--
By: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C. 
By: 
E. Craig Smay 
Counsel for Stichting Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds and Stichting 
Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
By: 
John A. Bluth 
Attorneys for Silver Cloud, LLC 
482S-71S7-9406, v. I 
I 
Date 
... -
I 
Date 
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Addendum 2 
· Order Prepared and Submitted By: 
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512) 
Kelley M. Marsden (13076) 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801.532.3333 
Facsimile: 801.534.0058 
Attorneys for United Park City Mines Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY; 
STATE OF UTAH, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT 
SILVER CLOUD, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a· 
Delaware corporation; and DOES I TO X, 
person and entities whose true names are 
unknown, 
Defendants. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNT AlN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 050500430 
(Consolidated with 050500500) 
Honorable Keith Kelly 
This case came before the Court for hearing on July 9, 2012 on the Motion for Summary 
August 16, 2012 12:29 PM 
i-,r..-tz._, 
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Judgment filed by Defendant Uruted Park City Mines Company ("United Park"). E. Craig Smay 
appeared on behalf of Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational 
Fonds (together, "Stichtings"). Stephen K. Christiansen and Kelley M. Marsden appeared on behalf 
of United Park. The Court, having carefully reviewed the pleadings and memoranda subrrutted by 
the parties, the relevant legal authority, and counsel's oral arguments, and for good cause appearing, 
hereby FINDS, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. United Park's motion for summary judgment is supported with evidence as required by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Stichtings did not include any 
additional evidence, but instead, reference evidence submitted by United Park. 
3. With respect to Sticbtings' claim that the "Lower Primary Road" and "Flagstaff Loop 
Road" are public roads, there is some evidence in the record to support such a claim. Stichtings' 
,,-. public road claim may proceed to trial. 
4. With respect to Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim, there is no disputed fact that 
Stichtings' access to the subject property was permissive. Stichtings' use of the roads to which they 
claim a prescriptive easement was not adverse. Stichtings' claim for prescriptive easement fails as a 
matter of law. 
5. Uruted Park's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENlED in part. 
6. Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this_ day of _____ , 2012. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Keith Kelly 
Third District Court Judge 
August 16, 2012 12:29 PM . 2 of 3 
Dated: August 16, 2012 
12:29:52 PM 
August 16, 2012 12:29 PM 3 of 3 · 
Addendum 3 
The Order of Court is stated below: 
Clark K. Taylor (5354) 
Nicole M. Deforge (7581) 
VAN Corr, BAGLEY, CoRNWALL & McCARTHY, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 1 
Telephone: 801.532.3333 
ctaylor@vancott.com 
ndeforge@vancott.com 
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512) 
311 S. State, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801.716.7016 
stever@skclawfirm.com 
Attorneys.for United Park City Mines Company 
Dated: July 17, 2014 Isl RYAN HA)ill.lS 
09: 15:29 AM District !=ourt Judge_.: 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTJNG MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation; EMPIRE PASS 
MASTER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a 
Utah non-profit corporation and intervenor 
Defendant; RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah non-
profit corporation and intervenor Defendant; 
and JOHN DOES 3-10 
Defendants. 
July 17, 2014 09:15 AM 
ORDER 
Civil No. 050500430 
Honorable Ryan M. Harris 
1 of 5 
This case came on for hearing on June 4, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. on Mayflower's Motion for 
Leave to File a Second Amended Compla int and Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. By agreement of the parties at the hearing, the Court also 
considered Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike in Part Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris presided at the hearing. Steven H. Bergman and Brad M. 
Liddell appeared on behalf of the Mayflower entities ("Mayflower" or "Stichtings"). Stephen K. 
Christiansen and Clark K. Taylor appeared on behalf of United Park City Mines Company. 
Douglas C. Shumway appeared on behalf of Empire Pass Master Owners Association and Red 
Cloud HOA. The Court considered the motions, pleadings, and argument of counsel, and 
engaged in colloquy with counsel. Now, for good cause appearing, the Court enters the fo llowing 
Order: 
I. The Court DENIES Mayflower's Motion for Leave to Fi le a Second Amended 
Compla int. Judge Kelly, who presided previously on this case, specifically ordered on March 8, 
2012: 
Stichtings shall make full and complete disclosures of their c laims and evidence .... Such 
disclosures shall be made notwithstanding any prior disclosures, shall be made in writing, 
and shall not incorporate other disclosures or materials by reference .... 
For each roadway c laimed, Stichtings shall provide the specific statute or case law they 
allege supports their claim to a public or private road. Failure to provide such information 
by the date set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to proceed with their 
c laim under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
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The Court finds that the c laims Mayflower set forth in their Pre-Trial Disclosures of March 23, 
20 12, filed in response to Judge Kelly's order, did not include a c la im for an appurtenant 
easement nor identify any case law or statute in support of such a c laim. The Court is going to 
require Mayflower to stick to w hat they have in the 20 11 Amended Complaint as clarified by the 
March 23, 2012 Pre-Trial Disclosures. Furthermore, in the Court's exercise of its discretion, the 
Court determines that Mayflower's motion does not meet the case law e lements that would 
support a motion to amend at this juncture of the case. See, e.g., Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator 
Co., 854 P.2d I 025, I 028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (identifying timeliness of motion, justification 
given, and prejudice to the responding party as factors in the court's analysis). This case has been 
pending nine years. There wou ld be more time and expense required to address the claim. The 
Court would be required to move discovery deadlines and re-open discovery to a llow the 
defendants a chance to address the amended c la ims. The Court will not allow Mayflower to 
recast their c laims at this point through the amendment they seek. 
2. T he Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Joint Motion to 
Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike in Part 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, as fo llows: 
a. The Motions to Strike are GRANTED insofar as Mayflower's summary j udgment 
briefing re lies on an appurtenant easement theory or any c laim that the roads in question were 
established after 1880. The appurtenant easement theory does not appear in Mayflower's Pre-
Trial Disclosures of March 23, 20 I 2. Moreover, those same Disclosures twice indicated the 
3 
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roads in question were establ ished by 1880. As a lready set forth in this Order, Mayflower was 
required in those Disclosures to identify with specificity its claims, supporting law, and ev idence. 
The failure to do so with respect to these aspects of the claims bars the ir use now. 
b. The Motions to Strike are DENIED insofar as the defendants seek to exclude 
Mayflower from using documents in their summary judgment briefing that the defendants c laim 
were not timely produced. 
C. The Motions to Strike are a lso DENIED insofar as they seek a determination that 
prior court orders eliminated the "Upper Primary Access Road" as one of the roads in question in 
this case. That issue was never specifically brought before the Court or conc lusively determined 
on summary judgment adversely to Mayflower. It therefore remains as an open cla im in this 
case. 
d. In light of this Court's legal determinations herein, the Court hereby GRANTS 
LEA VE to Mayflower to re-file its Motion for Summary Judgment and to Defendants to file a 
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment directed to the Upper Primary Access Road. These 
shall be briefed on the following schedule: 
1. Motions and supporting memoranda filed by June 13, 201 4 . 
11. Response memoranda filed by July I 8, 20 I 4. 
111. Reply memoranda filed by August I, 20 I 4. 
iv. Optional Sur-Reply by defendants to Mayflower's re-fi led Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by August 15, 2014. 
3. All other pending motions and obj ections not resolved in this hearing shall be heard 
4 
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on September 4, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. The Court has set as ide three hours for the hearing. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM (signed bye-filer with authorization): 
RlCHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
By: Isl Steven H. Bergman 
Steven H. Bergman 
Brad M. Liddell 
Attorneys for Stichting Mayflower 
VIAL FOTHER1NGHAM LLP 
7/16/2014 
Date 
By: ls/Douglas C. Shumway 7/ 16/20 14 
Douglas C . Shumway Date 
Attorneys for Intervenor Defendants 
-- END OF DOCUMENT --
-- JUDGE'S APPROVAL OF ORDER APPEARS AT TOP OF FIRST PAGE --
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST~RICJ 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
·r\ltO lff 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; 
EMPIRE PASS MASTER OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit 
corporation and intervenor Defendant; 
RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah non-profit 
corporation and intervenor Defendant; 
and JOHN DOES 3-10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 050500430 
October 1, 2014 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
on February 28, 2014 by Empire Pass Master Owners Association, Inc. and Red Cloud HOA 
("the HOA Defendants"), along with a joint Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendant United Park City Mines Company ("UPCM") (UPCM and the HOA Defendants are 
sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Defendants"); (2) a Joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re: Upper Primary Access, filed on June 13, 2014 by all of the Defendants jointly; (3) 
a Revised Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 13, 2014 by Plaintiffs Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds ("Plaintiffs"); and (4) an 
Objection to Certain Evidence in Defendants' Pleadings, filed on August 28, 2014 by Plaintiffs. 
All of these matters came before the Court for oral argument on September 4, 2014, at which 
hearing Plaintiffs were represented by Craig C. Coburn, Steven H. Bergman, and Bradford M. 
Liddell; UPCM was represented by Stephen K. Christiansen, Clark K. Taylor, and Nicole M. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER et al. v. UNITED PARK CITY MINES et al. Case No. 050500430 
Deforge; and the HOA Defendants were represented by Douglas C. Shumway. Based on the 
briefing submitted by the parties, and on the arguments presented on September 4, the Court 
issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this unusual, interesting, and nine-year-old case, the Court is called upon to determine 
whether a public road was created, at some point prior to October 1881, over land now owned 
by UPCM, which road would link land now owned by Plaintiffs with SR-224, the main road that 
leads from Park City over Empire Pass and from there to Midway or Guardsman Pass. In 
making this determination, the Court must interpret an 1866 federal statute and an 1880 state 
statute, and must review and examine pri~ary and secondary source evidence dating back as 
far as the 1870s. As discussed below, in order to prevail in this case, Plaintiffs are required to 
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, continuous use of the claimed roads, sometime 
prior to October 1881, by the public for at least five years. 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the passage of so many decades since the relevant events 
occurred has rendered the task of proving their claims extremely difficult. They are, of course, 
unable to produce any eyewitness testimony regarding whether, and how, the public used the 
claimed roads before 1881. Rather, the only evidence available to them is documentary 
evidence, which in this case for various reasons is neither voluminous nor detailed. After 
considering all of the submitted evidence, as well as applicable legal principles, the Court is 
convinced that Plaintiffs' remaining claims lack sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. For all of 
the reasons discussed below, the Court believes that Defendants' summary judgment motions 
should be granted, and that Plaintiffs' cross-motion should be denied. 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS 
General and Procedural Background 
Case No. 050500430 
1. Plaintiffs have come to own certain parcels of land near the top of Flagstaff 
Mountain south of Park City, which parcels straddle the Summit-Wasatch county line. These 
parcels were formerly old mining claims that were located and patented by prospectors in the 
latter decades of the 19th century. 
2. UPCM also owns similar property in the same area, and its land also consists of 
old mining claims located and patented during the late 19th century. 
3. Plaintiffs claim that a public road, or network of public roads, exists across UPCM's 
land, which public road would link Plaintiffs' land with SR-224, the main road that leads from 
Park City over Empire Pass and from there to Midway or Guardsman Pass. Plaintiffs' property 
is not "landlocked"; that is, there is anotber way to reach Plaintiffs' property from another 
direction. Plaintiffs are interested in establishing the purported public road from SR-224, 
however, because that road, if it exists, would provide easier and more convenient access to 
their property than the available alternative route. 
4. A map depicting the claimed roads is attached as Exhibit A. Some segments of 
the roads have been given names during this litigation to tell them apart from one another. The 
"Primary Access Road" is the road that veers off, eastward, from SR-224 in the lower-right-hand 
comer of the map. The "Flagstaff Loop Road" is the road that loops off of the Primary Access 
Road and around the site of the former Flagstaff Mine. The Primary Access Road is sometimes 
referred to as having two parts: the Lower Primary Access Road, and the Upper Primary 
Access Road, with the upper portion being simply that portion stretching eastward beyond the 
Flagstaff Loop Road. The term "Claimed Roads" is herein used to include all of the roads 
claimed by Plaintiffs, including the Flagstaff Loop Road and the entire Primary Access Road. 
3 
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5. UPCM has undertaken to develop portions of its property over which Plaintiffs 
claim a road exists, and takes issue with Plaintiffs' claim that any such road exists. Some of this 
development already exists and, as described below, the HOA Defendants intervened in this 
case in 2012 to assert their interests, which generally align with UPCM's interests. 
6. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this matter in October 2005 (in case 
number 050500500), alleging rights to a road over UPCM's property. The original complaint 
was quite terse, just six pages long, and gave few details into the claims pied. 
7. For its first few years the case languished, with so little action being taken to move 
the case forward that it ended up on Judge Lubeck's Order to Show Cause calendar not once 
but twice, in October 2007 and again in September 2009. In what can only be described as 
moments of mercy, Judge Lubeck elected not to dismiss Plaintiffs' case on either occasion, 
eventually granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate its case into another related case, Case No. 
050500430. 
8. After consolidation, the case finally started to pick up speed, with the parties 
retaining expert witnesses and conducting discovery through 201 O and 2011. In December 
2011, Plaintiffs asked for and received leave to file an Amended Complaint, which was filed on 
December 9, 2011, and which was not much longer or more detailed than the original complaint. 
9. Following the filing of the Amended Complaint, UPCM moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing inter alia that Plaintiffs' allegations were inscrutable and therefore 
unreasonably difficult to defend against. The Court (Judge Kelly by this time) heard argument 
on the motion in February 2012, and determined that Plaintiffs' claims were indeed "somewhat 
cryptic in nature and do not put [UPCM) on adequate notice regarding what is claimed." See 
Order dated March 8, 2012, at 2. As a consequence, Judge Kelly ordered that Plaintiffs "make 
full and complete disclosures of their claims and evidence in this case" in writing, and that failure 
4 
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to do so "shall result in [Plaintiffs] being unable to use the individual, document, or evidence in 
further proceedings." Id. More specifically, Judge Kelly ordered Plaintiffs to "provide the 
specific statute or case law they allege supports their claim to a public or private road," and that 
failure to do so "shall result in [Plaintiffs] being unable to proceed with their claim." !Q.. at 3. 
10. Following entry of this order, in March 2012 Plaintiffs submitted a more detailed 12-
page recitation of their claims, for the first time specifically citing to an old post-Civil War statute 
known as "RS 2477" as the basis for their claimed road. See Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Disclosures, at 
3 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 932). Plaintiffs also continued to recite their claim for prescriptive 
easement under the common law. lg. at 8. Thus, as near as anyone could tell following the 
pre-trial disclosures, Plaintiffs were making two claims: (1) for public road pursuant to RS 2477; 
and (2) for prescriptive easement under the common law. 
11. In May 2012, after the filing of the pre-trial disclosures, UPCM moved for summary 
judgment, which motion was heard on July 9, 2012. Judge Kelly determined that summary 
judgment was appropriate on Plaintiffs' claim for prescriptive easement, and dismissed that 
claim with prejudice. However, Judge Kelly allowed Plaintiffs' public road claim pursuant to RS 
2477 to survive the motion, determining that there was at least "some evidence in the record to 
support such a claim." See Order dated August 16, 2012, at 2 ,r 3. Judge Kelly, just before 
being assigned away from Summit County, set the matter for trial in November 2012, to be 
presided over by his successor. 
12. In late October 2012, almost on the eve of trial, the HOA Defendants appeared for 
the first time and sought leave to intervene in the case, asserting that they "own0 and maintain□ 
at least some of the sections of road" that are the subject matter of this case, see HOA 
Defendants' Memo. in Support of Motion to Intervene, at 2 11 4, and asserting that they only 
became aware of the existence of the lawsuit a few days earlier, id. at 3 ,r 11. After considering 
5 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER et al. v. UNITED PARK CITY MINES et al. Case No. 050500430 
the situation, this Court allowed the HOA Defendants to intervene, struck the pending November 
2012 trial date, and allowed the HOA Defendants to conduct discovery. 
13. In November 2012, Plaintiffs' longtime attorney withdrew from representation of 
Plaintiffs, and it took Plaintiffs several months, and some cajoling from the Court, to obtain new 
counsel, who wasn't in place until March 2013. Throughout the remainder of 2013, the parties 
(including the new parties, the HOA Defendants) completed additional discovery. 
14. In February 2014, Plaintiffs' new attorneys filed a motion seeking leave, after 
nearly nine years of litigation, to file an amended complaint re-stating their claims for relief, and 
stating a new claim for "appurtenant easement." After hearing in June 2014, this Court denied 
that motion, and determined that Plaintiffs were stuck with their December 2011 complaint as 
clarified in their April 2012 pre-trial disclosures. 
15. After finally completing all additional discovery, in early 2014 the parties began to 
submit dispositive motions. In February 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' sole remaining claim (the RS 2477 public road claim), asserting that this Court should 
take another look at this claim on summary judgment after completion of the additional 
discovery. In June 2014, Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the public road claim. 
That same month, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the "Upper 
Primary Access" road, asserting that, at a minimum, they are entitled to summary judgment on 
that portion of Plaintiffs' claims. All of these motions came before the Court for oral argument 
on September 4, 2014. 
The Flagstaff Mine 
16. Prior to 1871, the land on or near the summit of Flagstaff Mountain was part of the 
unsurveyed public domain of the United States. 
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17. Sometime around May or June 1871, a group of prospectors "located"1 a mining 
claim on Flagstaff Mountain that became the site of a mine known as "the Flagstaff Mine."2 The 
Flagstaff mining claim was the first mining claim located on Flagstaff Mountain. 
18. Secondary sources indicate t~~t the first shipment of ore from anywhere in the 
entire Park City mining area came from the Flagstaff Mine, and was made in July 1871. 
Another shipment of ore was made the following year, in 1872. However, for a time after 
October 1872, mining operations ceased at the Flagstaff Mine due to a change in ownership. 
19. In field notes filed in 1872 in aid of eventually obtaining a patent for their mining 
claim, the Flagstaff mining claimants asserted that, among other improvements to their claim, 
they had made "two miles of road." See Field Notes of the Survey of the Flagstaff Mining Claim 
dated December 11, 1872 (hereinafter "Flagstaff Field Notes"), at 36. However, there is no 
indication in the Flagstaff Field Notes of where this road was located, which two-mile stretch of 
road they were referring to, or who used it. 
20. The Flagstaff mining claim was surveyed on December 11, 1872, and a very rough 
map sketch was included with that survey. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Although a small 
unattached stretch of "road" is shown on that map sketch, it is not connected to any other road, 
and is in a completely different orientation from any of the roads now claimed by Plaintiffs. 
1 The "location" of a mining claim "is the initial step taken by the locator to indicate the place and extent of 
the surface which he desires to acquire. It is a means of giving notice. That which is located is called [in 
statute] and elsewhere a 'claim" or a 'mining claim.' Indeed, the words 'claim' and 'location' are used 
interchangeably." See Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co., 171 U.S. 55, 74 (1898). 
2 There appears to have been more than one "Flagstaff Mine" in the area at the time. A different 
"Flagstaff Mine," this one located in Salt Lake County in the Little Cottonwood Mining District, was the 
subject of no small amount of litigation during the 1870s and 1880s. See,~. Eilers v. Boatman, 2 P. 66 
(Utah Terr. 1883); Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463 (1878); McCormick v. Varnes, 2 Utah 
355 (Utah Terr. 1877). Neither party argues that the "Flagstaff Mine" at issue in these cases is the same 
Flagstaff Mine at issue here, and it appears plain from the recitations contained in the cases that it is not. 
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21. In 1873, the Flagstaff Mine claimants published notice of their application for a 
"patent"3 on the Flagstaff mining claim, and that patent was approved and issued by federal 
mining officials in 1876. 4 
22. At some point before 1874, several mining structures (including a log house and an 
ore house) were constructed at the Flagstaff Mine site. However, by 1875, the original ore 
strike at the Flagstaff Mine had apparently been depleted, and a second shaft was sunk, which 
was apparently just rich enough to result in periodic ore shipments being made from the mine as 
late as 1881, although not quite rich enough to keep a mill recently built in Park City in business. 
23. There is no evidence of any ore being taken out of the Flagstaff Mine after 1881, or 
of any other mining work being done at the Flagstaff Mine after 1881. Indeed, secondary 
sources indicate that the Flagstaff Mine was "another mine that did not meet the expectations of 
its owners." See Wright, A History of Park City, at 90 (Defendants' Exhibit J). 
Other Mining Activity in the Area 
24. While the Flagstaff mining claim was the first mining claim in the area, it certainly 
wasn't the last. Many other mining claims were located in the vicinity during the 1870s and 
1880s, including many now owned by Plaintiffs (including the Overlooked Fraction, the Uncle 
Charles, the Black Rock, and the Blue Ledge), as well as many now owned by UPCM (including 
the Lucky Bill, the Home Station, and the Peeler). 
3 
"A mining claim always starts out as an unpatented claim. The owner of an unpatented claim must 
continue mining or exploration activities on an unpatented claim, or it becomes null. Activities on 
unpatented claims must be restricted to those necessary to mining. A patented claim is one for which the 
federal government has issued a patent (deed). To obtain a patent, the owner of a mining claim must 
prove to the federal government that the claim contains locateable minerals that can be extracted at a 
profit. A patented claim can be used for any purpose desired by the owner, just like any other real 
estate." See WIKIPEDIA, en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_claim (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). 
4 This patented mining claim, after a series of land transfers largely not relevant here, is now part of the 
land owned by Plaintiffs. 
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25. Although all of the mining claims listed in the preceding paragraph (as well as quite 
a few others) were eventually patented and therefore had to list all of the improvements made in 
aid of that patent, none of the field notes associated with any of the other surrounding mining 
claims mention any work on construction of any road. Indeed, the relevant field notes are 
simply silent, in material part, with regard to exactly how the claimants on these later-filed claims 
traveled to their claims. The furthest that any of the field notes go in this regard is to include 
general language to the effect that prospectors traveled "southerly from Park City by wagon 
road." See,~. Lucky Bill Field Notes, at 298. 
26. The Claimed Roads cross the Lucky Bill, Home Station, and Peeler mining claims, 
all currently owned by UPCM. These three claims were located between 1881 and 1883. The 
first of these claims to be officially located was the Home Station claim, which was located on 
October 13, 1881 . The Lucky Bill claim was next, and was located on January 1, 1883. Finally, 
the Peeler claim was located on December 17, 1883. 
Use By People Other Than Prospectors 
27. The record contains no actual direct evidence that anyone other than prospectors, 
prior to 1900, ever used any of the Claimed Roads. There were no homesteads on Flagstaff 
Mountain before at least 1912, and therefore no members of the public were using any of the 
Claimed Roads for homesteading purposes. There are no records to indicate that any member 
of the public used the Claimed Roads prior to 1900 for timber harvesting, livestock grazing, 
hunting, recreation, or any other purpose. And given the passage of time, it goes without saying 
that no live witness testimony supporting any of these uses is available. 
Surveys and Maps 
28. Prior to 1894, surveyors (even official government ones) were not required to show 
all roads and their routes across land they were surveying. Perhaps because of this fact, or 
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perhaps for other reasons, in this case there are no maps or surveys issued prior to 1897 
describing any roads that could even possibly depict the Claimed Roads. 
29. After 1894, the rules applicable to surveyors changed, and after that point 
surveyors were required to show roads that crossed land they were surveying. 
30. In 1897, the Government Land Office ("GLO") conducted a survey of the lands in 
the vicinity of the Flagstaff Mine, including Township 2 South, Range 4 East. That survey noted 
two roads crossing the boundary lines between Section 32 and 33 as the surveyors go from the 
south to the north, and Plaintiffs posit that one of these roads was the Lower Primary Access 
Road, and the other is the road (now SR-224) leading up from Park City. 
31. The GLO map that was issued as a result of that survey came out in 1899. That 
map (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 56) does show a road, matching fairly well with the modern SR-224, 
coming up Empire Pass from Park City, as well as a second road leading off south from SR-224 
toward Bonanza Flats, but that map shows no road actually leading to the Flagstaff Mine, or any 
other road that could be any of the Claimed Roads. 
32. A couple of years later, the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") surveyed the entire 
Park City district, including Flagstaff Mountain, and issued a topographical map in 1901 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 31). This map is the first map to depict a road leading east off of SR-224 near 
the top of Flagstaff Mountain and headed in the general direction of the Flagstaff Mine. 
However, even the road depicted on that map does not lead all the way to the Flagstaff Mine, 
and does not include depictions of all of the Claimed Roads. In addition, that 1901 map also 
depicts a possible alternative route, leading off of SR-224 at a much lower point, that would 
have allowed prospectors to access the Lucky Bill or Flagstaff Mines without passing over most 
of the Claimed Roads. 
33. In 1950, the National Agriculture Imagery Program of the U.S. Department of 
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Agriculture took aerial photographs of the Park City area, including Flagstaff Mountain. These 
photos taken in 1950 by the U.S. government clearly depict most of the Claimed Roads. 
34. In 1955, the USGS prepared updated topographical maps, and these also clearly 
depict the Claimed Roads. 
35. Beginning in the late 1990s, additional aerial imagery became available, and this 
aerial imagery clearly shows the Claimed Roads that were depicted in the 1950 aerial images 
and in the 1955 topographical maps. 
36. In 1998, updated USGS maps became available, and these also clearly show the 
Claimed Roads, as depicted in the 1950 aerial images and in the 1955 topographical maps. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be 
granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIv. P. 56(c). 
Rule 56 contains a presumption in favor of the nonmoving party, stating that "the moving party 
[must meet] its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists" before the court should obligate the nonmoving party "to demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1116, 177 P .3d 600 ( citations 
omitted). However, "[t]he non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial" to survive a summary judgment motion. See Peterson v. Coca-Cola 
USA, 2002 UT 42, 1120, 48 P.3d 941. Finally, in addressing a summary judgment motion, a trial 
court is required "to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." IHC Health 
Serv., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, 1119, 196 P .3d 588. It is in this context that the 
Court addresses the cross-motions for summary judgment at issue here. 
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DISCUSSION 
A. General RS 2477 Legal Overview 
Case No. 050500430 
In this case, Plaintiffs' claim of right to the alleged "public roads" across Defendants' 
property is grounded in a "short, sweet, and enigmatic" statute passed by Congress in 1866. 
See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F .3d 735, 761 (10th Cir. 
2005) (hereinafter "SUWA"). That year, Congress enacted an open-ended grant of "the right of 
way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses." See 43 
U.S.C. § 932. This statute, commonly called "RS 2477" "after its residing place in the 1866 
volume of the Revised Statutes," see County of Shoshone v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 2d 
912,915 (D. Idaho 2012), remained in effect for over a century. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in 
its leading RS 2477 case, "most of the transportation routes of the West were established under 
its authority," which comported with then-current congressional policy that "[r]oads were deemed 
a good thing" and that public policy should promote "the development of the unreserved public 
lands and their passage into productive hands." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 740, 741 . 
In 1976, however, Congress articulated a new policy with regard to public lands in the 
West, and initiated a "statutory sea change." Id. at 7 41. That year, Congress enacted the 
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), and as part of that enactment, Congress 
repealed RS 2477. After passage of FLPMA, "[t]here could be no new RS 2477 rights of way." 
,IQ. However, Congress specified that "any 'valid' RS 2477 rights of way 'existing on the date of 
approval" of FLPMA-October 21, 1976-would "continue in effect." ,IQ. In this way, Congress 
effectively "grandfathered" in all existing RS 2477 rights-of-way as of 1976, subject (of course) 
to the owners of any such claimed rights-of-way proving entitlement to those claims in court. 
However, courts have struggled with adjudication of RS 2477 claims, largely because 
RS 2477, perhaps unique among land-grant statutes, required absolutely no administrative 
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formalities for establishment of rights thereunder: "no entry, no application, no license, no 
patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the 
states or localities in whom the right was vested." Id. In short, RS 2477 "'was a standing offer 
of a free right of way over the public domain,' and the grant may be accepted 'without formal 
action by public authorities."' Id. (citing Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos. 285 P. 646, 
648 (Utah 1929)). Because of the licentious nature of the land grant, parties usually had little 
need to make written records of their use of the land, and little "incentive to raise or resolve 
potential RS 2477 issues while the statute was in effect," jg., all of which has the effect, decades 
(if not centuries) later, of making RS 2477-cases particularly difficult to adjudicate. Now, in 
litigating RS 2477 cases, "litigants are driven to the historical archives for documentation of 
matters [that] no one had reason to document at the time." Id. at 742. 
In SUWA, the Tenth Circuit finally had occasion to issue a definitive opinion in an RS 
2477 case, and that opinion is the starting point for trial courts as they determine how to 
navigate a case arising under RS 2477. The first question that the court tackled in SUWA was 
whether state law or federal law standards governed litigation of RS 2477 claims. The court 
answered that question like this: 
We therefore conclude that federal law governs the interpretation of RS 2477, but 
that in determining what is required for acceptance of a right of way under the 
statute, federal law 'borrows' from long-established principles of state law, to the 
extent that state law provides convenient and appropriate principles for 
effectuating congressional intent. 
_!_g_. at 768. In that case, which arose in Utah, the court then looked to Utah law for guidance in 
determining what was required under RS 2477 for "acceptance" of the road by the public. 
The leading Utah case on point was Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos. 285 P. 
646 (Utah 1929). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the RS 2477 grant "may be 
accepted by public use without formal action by public authorities, and that continued use of the 
13 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER et al. v. UNITED PARK CITY MINES et al. Case No. 050500430 
road by the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate 
an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient." Id. at 648. The Utah 
Supreme Court then looked to the state statutes in force at the time that the right of way was 
claimed to have been accepted, most notably Utah's 1886 Highway Statute, which stated that: 
All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or erected by others than the Public 
and dedicated or abandoned to the use of the public are highways. A highway 
shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the Public 
when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a Public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court then determined that a road was an RS 2477 public right-of-
way if the road "was used as a public thoroughfare" for "a time in excess of that required by the 
O statutes in force" at the time the grant was claimed. Id. Based largely on this statute, as 
discussed and interpreted· in Churnos, the Tenth Circuit in SUWA determined that "[a]cceptance 
of an RS 2477 right of way in Utah," at least for roads claimed after 1886, thus "requires 
continuous public use for a period of ten years."5 See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771 (citing Churnos, 
285 P. at 648). It can therefore be said that there are essentially three elements of an RS 2477 
claim under Utah law in any case that concerns a right of way claimed in or after 1886: the 
claimed right of way must have been (1) continuously used (2) by the public as a public 
thoroughfare (3) for the requisite period of time (after 1886, ten years). See San Juan County v. 
United States, 754 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter "Salt Creek Appellate Case"). 
B. Standards Applicable Here, Where a Significant Part of the Land in Question 
Was Withdrawn From the Public Domain in 1881 
However, this case tosses its first curveball at the batter in the form of the date of 
withdrawal of the property from the public,.domain. The courts in SUWA and Churnos both 
relied heavily on Utah's 1886 Highway Statute in coming up with the relevant common-law 
5 Whether the relevant time period at issue In this case is ten years, or some other span of time, Is 
discussed below. 
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standard to which both federal and state courts should look in determining whether an RS 2477 
right-of-way had been accepted by the public. For SUWA and Churnos, the 1886 statute more 
or less defined the relevant standard, including the three elements listed above. The obvious 
problem here is that the 1886 statute was not yet in effect on October 13, 1881 , when the Home 
Station mining claim was officially located, thus withdrawing it from the public domain. Plaintiffs' 
RS 2477 right-of-way therefore needed to be completely established as of that date, because 
once the mining claims were located, the land subject to those mining claims was removed from 
the public domain and was no longer subject to being saddled with a public right-of-way 
pursuant to RS 2477. See United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 503, 505 (101h Cir. 1949) (stating 
that "where one acquires from the United States legal or equitable title prior to an effective 
, . 
acceptance of the grant or dedication, he and his successors in interest do not hold subject to 
an easement for the subsequent establishment of [an RS 2477] highway"); see also Swanson v. 
Sears, 224 U.S. 180, 181 (1912) (stating that "[a] location and discovery on land withdrawn 
quoad hoc from the public domain by a valid and subsisting mining claim is absolutely void for 
the purpose of founding a contradictory right"); Galli v. Idaho County, 191 P .3d 233, 237 (Idaho 
2008) (stating that "[n]o RS 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed 
from the public domain"); Our Lady of the Rockies, Inc. v. Peterson, 181 P .3d 631, 635 (Mont. 
2008) (holding that, once a mining claim is located, "[t]he area becomes the property of the 
locator and, thus, segregated from the public domain - i.e., the grounds within the boundaries of 
the location cease to be public lands when the location is made"). 
In this case, Plaintiffs' Claimed Roads cross directly and significantly over the former 
Home Station mining claim. After leaving SR-224 on the former Peeler claim, the claimed road 
travels only a few feet of the Peeler claim before moving into the Home Station claim, and from 
there it travels next right through the middle of the Home Station claim, and proceeds from there 
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past the former Flagstaff Mine site and on to the rest of the claimed roads. The Home Station 
property is effectively the gateway to all of Plaintiffs' claimed roads. Without that section of 
property, the remainder of Plaintiffs' claimed roads-even if established-would be marooned, 
effectively unable to reach SR-224 (which, after all, is the entire point of this exercise). Because 
the Home Station claim was withdrawn from the public domain on October 13, 1881, that date 
becomes a central date in this case, and the date by which Plaintiffs need to have completely 
established public acceptance of any RS 2477 roads.6 
Both parties agree that "when determining whether an RS 2477 highway has been 
accepted in Utah, courts must look to Utah law in effect at the time of the alleged dedication." 
See Defendants' Br., at 25. This is surely accurate. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771 (stating that 
courts are to look "to the Utah statutes in force at the time the right of way was claimed to have 
been accepted"); see also San Juan County" v. United States, Civ. No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011 
WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9 (D. Utah May 27, 2011) (hereinafter "Salt Creek District Court Case") 
(stating that "[w]hether the RS 2477 grant has been accepted is a question of compliance with 
the then-existing laws of the state where the right-of-way was established" (citations omitted)), 
affd, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014 ). If the Court does so in this case, however, the Court cannot 
rely upon the 1886 statute for any purpose, because it was not yet passed in 1881. All parties 
appear to assume that the Court should not rely upon the 1886 statute in establishing the 
relevant time period (Plaintiffs argue for a five-year time period based on the 1880 statute, and 
Defendants argue for a 20-year time period based on the common law of prescription). But 
6 The Court, in its ruling rendered after hearing on June 4, 2014 (and memorialized in an order dated July 
17, 2014), stated that Plaintiffs needed to prove complete acceptance of the RS 2477 road by 1880, given 
the representations made by Plaintiffs in their April 2012 pre-trial disclosures required by Judge Kelly. 
However, moving that date forward some ten m6nths to October 1881 (or even forward until December 
1883, when the last of UPCM's three relevant claims were located) ultimately makes no difference to the 
outcome of the case, and the Court will proceed analytically as though the effective date is October 1881 
rather than the end of December 1880. 
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neither side takes the next logical step, an'! neither asks the Court to ignore the 1886 statute's 
role in formulating the substantive RS 2477 standard articulated by SUWA and Churnos. 
However, in the Court's view, this is exactly what is required. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771; Salt 
Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9. In the end, the Court is convinced 
that the applicable substantive standard for all purposes (and not just for time period) must be 
gleaned from the 1880 statute, at least to the extent that the 1880 statute "provides convenient 
and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent." SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768. 
Utah's 1880 Highway Act was passed in February 1880, and contains 25 separate 
sections, only two of which are materially relevant here. These two sections were helpfully 
quoted in their entirety in Churnos: 
Sec. 2. Highways are roads, streets or alleys and bridges, laid out or erected by 
the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the use 
of the public. 
Sec. 3. Roads laid out and recorded· as highways by order of the County Court, 
and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are highways .... 
See Churnos, 285 P. at 648 (quoting Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1880). 
In the Court's view, the elements required for establishment of an RS 2477 claim 
between 1880 and 1886 are, under the 1880 statute viewed in conjunction with the Salt Creek 
Appellate Case, more or less the same (with the exception of the duration of the relevant time 
period) as post-1886 elements set forth above: (1) continuous use (2) by the public (3) for the 
requisite period of time. The second element-use by the public-is plainly included in Section 
2 of the 1880 statute, which requires roads to have been "abandoned to the use of the public." 
The Court sees no reason to interpret this element any differently under the 1880 statute than it 
is interpreted under similar language ("abandoned to the use of the Public . . . as a Public 
thoroughfare") in the 1886 statute. The third element is discussed more fully below, but in any 
event a time period must be applied. And the first element-continuous use-is not at all 
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present in the 1880 statute, but the Tenth Circuit recently stated in no uncertain terms that any 
common-law standard that does not inclo·de the continuous use requirement contravenes 
congressional intent. See Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d at 798-99. 
Thus, in the end, although one additional analytical step was required here due to the 
1881 (as opposed to the post-1886) withdrawal of a material portion of the relevant property 
from the public domain, the end result is no different. Plaintiffs, in order to succeed on their 
claims, must demonstrate that the Claimed Roads were (1) continuously used (2) by the public 
(3) for the requisite period of time. 
C. The Applicable Time Period in This Case is Five Years 
Some additional extended discussion is required here with regard to the applicable 
length of time required under pre-1886 law to establish an RS 2477 right-of-way. With regard to 
the applicable time period, the parties advance conflicting arguments. Plaintiffs ask this Court 
for a straightforward interpretation of the 1880 statute, which mentions "a period of five years" #. ~· 
as the applicable time frame. Defendants, by contrast, argue that the 1880 statute's reference 
to "five years" applies only to roads that are both (a) "laid out and recorded as highways by 
order of the County Court," and (b) "used as such for a period of five years." Defendants 
maintain that, unless the road in question was actually laid out and recorded as a highway by an 
order of the applicable county court, the five-year time period listed in the statute does not even 
apply, and that one must then default to common-law prescriptive time periods which, at the 
time, were twenty years. See Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291, 292 (Utah 1891) (stating 
that the period required for dedication, "unless other provision was made in local statutes, . .. 
has been assumed to be the term of twenty years" ( emphasis added)). 
Defendants' arguments seem, on their face, to be overly complicated and contrary to a 
plain and simple reading of the applicable statute, and seem to advance an interpretation that 
~·--· 
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requires this Court to read words out of the statute (e.g., "Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways by order of the County Court, and ati--roaG6 used as such for a period of five years, are 
highways"). The better reading of the plain language of the statute, in the Court's view, is that 
there are two ways to establish a "highway." The first is if the county court laid out and recorded 
the road. Under this factual scenario, the road becomes a "highway" immediately, and no actual 
use is required. The second is if the road is "used as such," "by the public," "for a period of five 
years." While the phrase "used as such" is perhaps not as clear as it could be, in the Court's 
view it is plain enough: any road that is actually used as a highway by the public for five years 
qualifies as a "highway" under the statute, regardless of whether that road was laid out and 
recorded by the county court. Defendants' proposed interpretation is therefore not consonant 
with the language of the statute, and requires ignoring several critical words that appear there. 
However, Defendants have the Idaho Supreme Court on their side. In Galli v. Idaho 
County, 191 P.3d 233 (Idaho 2008), the court interpreted Idaho's highway statute in effect at the 
time, which was materially identical to Utah's 1880 Highway Act. In a two-sentence analysis, 
the court concluded that, under the applicable statutory language, "[a] highway may not be 
created unless it is a road, street, alley or bridge that is erected or laid out by the public, and it is 
used for a period of five years," and that the two sections of the statute "are not mutually 
exclusive, and must be read in conjunction with one another." Id. at 238. The analysis of the 
Idaho Supreme Court is, in this Court's view, less than persuasive. The court there did not act 
as though the issue was strongly contested in that case, and did not offer a detailed explanation 
of its reasoning. This Court is, of course, not bound to follow the Idaho Supreme Court, and in 
this instance this Court elects not to do so. 
In addition, however, and perhaps more to the point, the Court considers this issue at 
least implicitly answered by Churnos, a case handed down by the Utah Supreme Court, which is 
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a court that this Court is bound to follow. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court implicitly 
weighed In on this very issue, citing both the 1880 and 1886 statutes as potentially supplying 
the relevant time period in an RS 2477 case spanning the years 1876 to 1894. See Churnos, 
285 P. at 648. In the end, the Utah Supreme Court held that the evidence in that case was 
sufficient, under "the territorial statute2 in force" during the relevant time period, to demonstrate 
public use for "a time in excess of that required." Id. (emphasis added to point out that the court 
used the plural). There was no indication in Churnos that the road in question had ever been 
laid out and recorded by the applicable county court. It is therefore at least very strongly implied 
by the Churnos Court that the 1880 statute does supply the relevant time period to be applied to 
RS 24 77 claims arising between 1880 and 1886, and that this Court's statutory interpretation set 
forth above was shared by the Court in Churnos. 
Accordingly, with regard to the time period element of Plaintiffs' RS 2477 claim, this 
Court determines as a matter of law that the 1880 Highway Act applies here to supply the 
relevant time period, and that, under the applicable imported state-law standard that federal law 
"borrows" for interpretation of RS 2477 claims, Plaintiffs in this case must demonstrate that the 
claimed roads were ( 1) continuously used (2) by the public (3) for at least five years. 
D. Burden of Proof 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the evidence presented to the Court on summary 
judgment, it is important to next discuss the burden of proof. In many cases, the burden of proof 
is sort of an afterthought, something that only matters at the margins. But in RS 2477 cases, 
especially cases involving evidence that is 130 to 140 years old, the burden of proof matters a 
great deal, even in the summary judgment context. "[l]n ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the judge must view the evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary 
burden." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). 
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In all "public road" cases, including RS 2477 cases, "the burden of proof lies on those 
parties seeking to enforce rights-of-way" against the landowner. See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768 
(citations omitted). Under long-established Utah law in "public road" cases, "the presumption is 
in favor of the property owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required period 
of time is on those claiming it." !Q. (citations omitted). And this comports with the federal 
interests at stake: "[T]he established rule is that land grants are construed favorably to the 
Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there 
are doubts they are resolved for the Government, and not against it." Id. at 769 (citations 
omitted). Here, then, Plaintiffs-as the parties seeking to establish public rights-of-way on land 
owned at the time by the federal government-bear the burden of proof. 
And this burden of proof is a heavy one. Courts, both state and federal, in public road 
cases (including RS 2477 cases) have consistently applied a "clear and convincing evidence" 
standard. See Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5. Although the Tenth 
Circuit, in affirming the district court in the Salt Creek District Court Case, declined to definitively 
reach the issue as to whether the "clear and convincing evidence" standard should be applied in 
RS 2477 cases arising in Utah, see Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d at 801, in this Court's 
considered judgment that question is rather easily answered by reference to a long line of Utah 
appellate court cases that clearly mandate the use of the heightened burden of proof in public 
road cases. See, M.:., Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) 
(reasoning that "[t]he public's taking of property [for use as a public road] requires proof of 
dedication by clear and convincing evidence"); Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (Utah 
1972) (reasoning that a "clear and convincing quantum and quality of proof [is] universally 
demanded for the establishment of a public thoroughfare"); Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545, 
548 (Utah 1968) (reasoning that "taking of D property [for the establishment of a public highway] 
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must be proved by clear and convincing evidence"); Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 
2009 UT App 119, ,I11, 208 P.3d 1077 (reasoning that "[t]he public's taking of property [to 
establish a public highway] requires proof ... by clear and convincing evidence"); AWINC Corp. 
v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, W, 112 P.3d 1228 (reasoning that "[t]o establish the dedication 
of a public road, we require clear and convincing evidence"). Thus, not only do Plaintiffs bear 
the burden of proof, but they bear the relatively heavy burden of proving their case not just by a 
preponderance of the evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. It follows therefrom that 
the Court must view the present summary judgment motions through the prism of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard by which dedication of property to use as a public road must be 
proven. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254; Jennings Inv., 2009 UT App 119, ,I11. 
It is also noteworthy that, due to the passage of time, this case looks and feels different 
than most of the RS 2477 cases currently being prosecuted by the State of Utah and some of its 
counties. See,~. Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *24-*29 (citing actual 
testimony from live witnesses regarding use of the claimed road in the 1950s and 1960s ); 
Maffiy, Ruling Sticks: Salt Creek Not a County Highway, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept. 9, 2014 
(stating that "[a] stable of lawyers, most on the taxpayers' dime, have been touring the state in 
~· 
recent months, taking 'preservation' depositions of elderly and infirm witnesses whose testimony 
is needed to establish road use decades ago"). In most of those cases, the state and county 
plaintiffs are trying to establish the existence of a public road before 1976, and the evidence 
they are trying to muster consists to a large degree of eyewitness testimony from the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s. In this case, by contrast, Plaintiffs are trying to establish the existence of a 
public road between 1871 and 1881, a time period more than 130 years in the past. When the 
evidence in question is this old, it is of course impossible to come up with live witness testimony 
to establish any of the necessary facts. And this makes Plaintiffs' task much harder. 
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The year 1871 was a very long time ago, so long that perhaps some perspective is in 
order. At the time that the first group of prospectors located the Flagstaff mining claim, the Civil 
War had only been over for six years. Ulysses S. Grant was President of the United States. 
General George Armstrong Custer was still five years away from meeting his demise at Little 
Big Horn, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt had not yet been born. The light bulb was then still, 
so to speak, just a filament of Thomas Edison's imagination. The United States flag had only 37 
stars on it. Utah was still a territory, and was closer in years (24) to Brigham Young's 
declaration that "This is the right place" than it was (25) to statehood. In cases like this one, 
where no live testimony is available due to the passage of an extremely long period of time, the 
parties' arguments can only rest on whatever documents might exist from the 1870s, and the 
parties are by necessity "driven to the historical archives for documentation of matters [that] no 
one had reason to document at the time." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742. That historical record 
is necessarily limited and, although the parties in this case have done a remarkable job of 
unearthing and marshaling the evidence that does exist, the task faced by Plaintiffs in trying to 
gather enough evidence to meet a heightened "clear and convincing evidence" standard in this 
context is terribly daunting. Because of this, the Tenth Circuit in SUWA warned that, because 
all RS 2477 cases by definition require courts to look back further than 1976, the "evidence in 
these cases is over a quarter of a century old," and that in some cases "the burden of proof 
could be decisive." SUWA, 425 F.3d at 769. As discussed more fully below, in the Court's view 
this case is one of those cases. 
E. Plaintiffs Cannot Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Use, By the General 
Public, of the Claimed Roads for Five Years 
Now, after all of that prelude, the Court now turns to the substance of the matter: 
whether either side is entitled to summary judgment in this case under the evidence presented 
and under applicable law as set forth above. After careful analysis of the evidence and the law, 
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the Court is convinced that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, because-even 
drawing certain reasonable inferences from the evidence in Plaintiffs' favor-Plaintiffs cannot as 
a matter of law carry their heavy burden of proof on this factual record. Specifically, Plaintiffs' 
case founders on the second element that they must prove: use by the public. 
This issue was first flagged in Churnos. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court examined 
all of the available evidence regarding the road in question, and determined that the road had 
indeed been used by a wide cross-section of the public, including sheepherders who "trailed 
[their sheep] over the route in question," Churnos, 285 P. at 647; people visiting a sawmill in the 
vicinity who "traveled the road for the purpose of hauling lumber from the sawmill," id; members 
of the "general public" who traveled the road "extensively ... in going to and from [a nearby] 
mining camp," i.Q..; as well as "hunters, fishermen, and others who had occasion to travel over it," 
id. After examining all of this evidence, the Court stated as follows: 
We think the evidence established a general public use of the road. If the claim 
rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or for mining 
purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more difficult. 
But here the road connected two points between which there was occasion for 
considerable public travel. The road was a public convenience. When sawmills 
were established on or near the road, it was used, not only by those conducting 
the sawmills, but by many others who went to the sawmills to get lumber, etc. 
During the period when the mining camp existed in the vicinity, the road was 
unquestionably used very extensively by the general public for general purposes. 
And all the time it was used as a general way for the driving or trailing of sheep. 
This latter use was not by a few persons, but by many persons, and it involved 
more than the mere driving of animals on the road. Camp outfits and supplies 
accompanied the herds and were moved over the road in camp wagons and on 
pack horses. While it is difficult to fix a standard by which to measure what is a 
public use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by 
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who 
desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the 
situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a 
public highway by public authority. We therefore conclude that the court was 
justified in finding that the road had been continuously and uninterruptedly used 
as a public thoroughfare for more than ten years . 
.!Q. at 648-49 (emphasis added). 
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The question left open in Churnos-whether "public use" could be established by 
evidence of use by only one specific group of users-was flagged again in SUWA. After 
quoting the above-quoted language from Churnos, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w)e think it 
significant that the Utah Supreme Court stated that if the claim rested 'alone upon the use of the 
road for sawmill purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question 
would be more difficult."' See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 773. A few pages later, the court stated that 
"[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads constructed for 
a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but not by the general public." Id. at 
781-82 (emphasis added). The court then noted that the standard it had adopted-public use, 
rather than a standard grounded in mechanical construction-was "better calculated to 
distinguish between rights of way genuinely accepted through continual public use over a 
lengthy period of time, and routes which, though mechanically constructed (at least in part), 
served limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never formed part of the public 
transportation system." Id. at 782 (emphasis added). However, because the SUWA court was, 
at that point in its opinion, simply giving guidance for the trial court to follow upon remand, it did 
not issue a definitive holding on the issue either, although its commentary is certainly instructive. 
In this Court's view, the issue left open by Churnos and SUWA is squarely presented 
here. The undisputed factual record, set forth above, indicates definitively that prospectors 
associated with the Flagstaff Mine built at least two miles of roads7 in the vicinity of the Flagstaff 
Mine, and used those roads to reach the mine. The factual record also indicates that other 
prospectors eventually located other mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain in the late 1870s and 
7 In addition to the arguments discussed in the body of this Memorandum Decision, Defendants also 
argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the two miles of roads built by the Flagstaff Mine 
prospectors are the same roads that they claim as their own today, and in addition argue that there is 
insufficient evidence that any of these roads were used with sufficient frequency. While these arguments 
may have some force, it is not necessary for the Court to reach their merits, given the Court's disposition 
of the "public use" requirement discussed herein. 
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early 1880s, and at no point in the available field notes from those other claims do any of the 
other prospectors discuss building a road. Plaintiffs ask this Court to infer from this evidence 
that at least some of these other prospectors used the roads built by the Flagstaff Mine 
claimants to reach the other mining claims in the area. At least at the summary judgment stage, 
where all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the Court (at 
least in connection with adjudicating Defendants' summary judgment motions) will assume that 
the factfinder would draw this inference in favor of Plaintiffs. 
But even with this particular inference comfortably in their column on summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs have located no evidence at all that anyone other than prospectors ever 
used the roads in question during the relevant time period. There is no direct evidence that 
anyone else ever used these roads, prior to 1881, for homesteading purposes, for timber-
gathering purposes, for livestock grazing, for hunting or fishing, or for recreational pursuits. This 
is the sort of evidence that, in most RS 2477 cases, is usually supplied by "old-timer'' 
eyewitness testimony, but as noted this sort of evidence is unavailable to Plaintiffs as a practical 
matter. In response to this dilemma, Plaintiffs make two arguments. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that it would be reasonable for a factfinder to infer that, given Park 
City's small but burgeoning population in the 1870s and 1880s, at least some members of the 
general public were using the roads in question for timber gathering, hunting, fishing, and the 
like. The Court simply disagrees. There is not a shred of evidence of any kind that any such 
use occurred on these roads during the •1870s and 1880s. While it might be theoretically 
possible to infer that a random hunter or axeman wandered some stretch of these roads during 
that period of time, such an unsupported inference is, in the Court's view, as a matter of law 
insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of public use. The heightened pleading 
standard has to mean something, and if it could be satisfied with this sort of unsupported 
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inference, it would be rendered utterly meaningless. In the Court's view, no reasonable 
factfinder could consider that particular inference to be clear and convincing evidence. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the prospectors who may have used the roads in question 
were, at least prior to their locating a mining claim, simply members of the general public 
themselves. But this is precisely the question that was left open in Churnos and SUWA, 
namely, whether one specific type of user can be considered "the public" for purposes of the 
"public use" element of an RS 2477 claim. And in the Court's view, this question has been 
definitively answered in the negative by the Utah Supreme Court, in the cases following 
Churnos, and by the Utah federal district cou[t in the Salt Creek District Court Case. 
Even before Churnos, the Utah Supreme Court had hinted at its ultimate resolution of 
the issue, stating in 1916 that "such use must be by the public" and that "[u]se under a private 
right is not sufficient." See Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916). After Churnos, the 
Court became even clearer in its intentions. In Thompson v. Nelson, 273 P.2d 720 (Utah 1954), 
the road in question was a 44-foot-long alleyway behind a row of buildings in Brigham City, and 
the Court determined that the only users of this "road" were customers of one of the "few 
business[es]" housed in the row of buildings. The Court stated that 
[t]he road led to no place of public interest and ended in a cul-de-sac. The use 
made of the road was for delivering merchandise and supplies and for parking to 
the rear of buildings on Main Street in connection with the few business houses 
on Main Street in the half block over which the road extends. 
Id. at 345-46. The Court found this evidence "insufficient to establish use sufficient to meet the 
requirements" of the public highway statute._ Id. at 345. 
A few years later, in Cassity v. Castagna, 347 P.2d 834 (Utah 1959), the Court held that 
a trail leading out to Stansbury Island in Tooele County that had only been used by cattlemen 
for grazing purposes was not a public right-of-way under RS 2477, and that "the evidence does 
not support" the plaintiffs case. Id. at 835. 
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Next, in Petersen v. Combe, 438 P .2d 545 (Utah 1968), at issue was a claimed road in 
Weber County. The Petersen Court noted that the plaintiffs in that case did not even allege that 
"any member or members of the general public used the road, save the property owners in the 
area," and held that "[s]uch property owners cannot be considered members of the public 
generally, as that term generally is used in dedication-by-user statutes." Id. at 546. Under the 
circumstances, the Court determined that the record was insufficient "to show clear and 
convincing evidence D that the public generally-not just a few having their own special and 
private interests in the road-had used the road continuously for 10 years." Id. at 546-47. 
In Harding v. Bohman, 491 P.2d 233 (Utah 1971 ), the Court determined in a short 
opinion that a "road" that had been used only by "two sheepmen in trailing their sheep to and 
from grazing lands," as well as by an "occasional" deer hunter, was not a public road. The 
Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the "evidence failed to show a public 
dedication of the strip of land in question as a public road." Id. at 234. 
Most recently, the federal district court canvassed this line of cases in the context of 
examining whether San Juan County had carried its burden of demonstrating, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that a claimed road up Salt Creek Canyon in Canyonlands National Park 
had been used by members of the general public before 1950. See Salt Creek District Court 
Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *33-*34 & nn. 86-96. In that case, there was evidence that the 
claimed road had been used by a solitary cattleman (Mr. Kirk) in the 1890s, who had built a 
cabin in upper Salt Creek and had left various relics there (e.g., a hay rake and a wagon) 
indicating that farming and ranching had occurred there before Mr. Kirk abandoned the site for 
good a few years later. There was evidence that a second individual, Mr. Peachman, had been 
in the cabin area in 1911, but there was no evidence regarding how long he was there. In the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the canyon was used by the Scorup-Somerville Cattle Company, 
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which pastured a herd of bulls near the Kirk Cabin site. With regard to the cattle company's 
presence in the canyon, the court stated as follows: 
Though the company's presence in upper Salt Creek at times during the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s was more consistent than that of Kirk or Peachman, it would 
strain the language to characterize its presence as a "public" use, or that Salt 
Creek Canyon was then being used as a "public thoroughfare." The company 
had its own proprietary interests in upper Salt Creek-federal grazing permits 
issued after 1936, and a 1942 deed to 80 acres of land near Kirk's Cabin. As the 
Tenth Circuit explains in SUWA, "The decisions make clear that occasional or 
desultory use is not sufficient." 425 F.3d at 771. The SUWA panel noted that 
"[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads 
constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but not 
by the general public." lg. at 781-82. 
lg_. at *34. After examining this evidence in light of the applicable RS 2477 case law, the federal 
district court ultimately determined that one cattle company's use of the canyon, even for more 
than two decades, was not the sort of use th13t qualified as a "public use" under the statute, and 
that all of the evidence, even taken together, did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of 
public use prior to 1950. Id.; see also SUWA, 425 F.3d at 782 (stating that roads that merely 
serve "limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never [become] part of the public 
transportation system," do not qualify as RS 2477 rights-of-way). 
In the Court's view, the result in this case is compelled by the Salt Creek District Court 
Case as well as by SUWA and by the several Utah Supreme Court cases cited above. The 
factual record unearthed by the parties in this case indicates that the roads claimed here by 
Plaintiffs were used-even drawing certain reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor-only by 
prospectors for a relatively limited period of time. There is no competent evidence-or even 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn here given the heightened standard of proof-
indicating that anyone else ever used these particular roads before 1881 . The prospectors in 
question here, like the cattlemen referenced in the Salt Creek District Court Case, had their own 
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"proprietary interests" in the area in the form of located and/or patented mining claims.8 This 
situation is materially indistinguishable from the Salt Creek District Court Case, in which the 
court found that evidence that cattlemen used Salt Creek Canyon for more than two decades 
was insufficient to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of public use. There is nothing in 
the factual record unearthed by the parties in this case-or in any reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from that evidence given the high burden of proof here-indicating that the roads 
created and used by the Flagstaff mining claimants during the 1870s were anything more than 
roads that "served limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never formed part of the 
public transportation system." See SUWA, 425 F.3d at 782. 
As explained above, the Court is cognizant of the fact that these motions are brought on 
summary judgment. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot weigh the evidence or 
make factual findings. Rather, the Court must examine the undisputed facts and consider 
whether any reasonable factfinder, upon hearing these facts, could possibly determine that 
there is clear and convincing evidence of at least five years' worth of public use during the 
relevant time period. After careful consideration of the factual record and applicable law, the 
Court is comfortably convinced that, on this record, no reasonable factfinder could so conclude.9 
8 The fact that a few prospectors may have wandered Flagstaff Mountain before actually officially locating 
a mining claim does not change the analysis. Such men were at least prospective prospectors, and had 
at least an inchoate proprietary interest in the area, as contrasted with a member of the public who is 
using the road simply for getting from one place to another, or a family out for a picnic, or any other 
unattached member of the general public. 
9 The Court believes that Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Upper Primary Access is 
resolved by the Court's resolution of the "public use" element discussed above. However, the Court also 
notes that it finds many of Defendants' other arguments contained In the papers supporting that motion to 
be highly persuasive. See Defendants' Reply Br. Re: Upper Primary Access, at 3-4 (arguing persuasively 
that there is no evidence regarding when or how. the Upper Primary Access road was ever constructed, 
and that there is not even an inference to be drawn that it could have been constructed prior to 1878, and 
that even if that inference is drawn by the factfinder that would not constitute five years' worth of use prior 
to 1881 ). This would be an alternative ground for the granting of the Upper Primary Access Road motion. 
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F. Evidentiary Issues 
Finally, Plaintiffs have lodged certain objections to the use of some of the evidence 
proffered by Defendants in support of their summary judgment motions. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
objected to Defendants' use of the following pieces of evidence: 
Dean Franklin Wright's secondary-source University of Utah master's thesis 
entitled "A History of Park City," in which Mr. Wright describes some of the 
mining claims at issue here, including the Flagstaff Mine; 
expert reports issued for and on behalf of Defendants by J. Scott Buchanan 
and Ernest D. Rowley; 
USGS topographical maps from 1900 and 1925; and 
a 1918 USGS instructional manual for USGS topographers. 
The astute reader of this Memorandum Decision will have noticed that the Court has not 
once cited to, or even mentioned, the dueling expert reports obtained by the parties here (in 
addition to Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Rowley, who are Defendants' experts, Plaintiffs have a 
competing expert report of their own, from a Mr. John Stahl). Courts in general do not need 
help from experts in reviewing the historical record or the applicable case law and, while experts 
in reading maps or aerial imagery could conceivably be helpful in certain contexts, such 
expertise was not essential here, especially in the summary judgment context and especially 
given the Court's disposition of the pending motions on the "public use" element. While these 
experts might have been more helpful had this case proceeded to a jury trial, this Court did not 
find them particularly helpful one way or the other under the circumstances and, in part because 
there had been an objection raised to the Court considering their views, this Court elected not to 
consider their opinions. 
This Court has also not relied upon either the 1900 or the 1925 USGS topographical 
maps referenced in Plaintiffs' objection, or upon the 1918 USGS instructional manual. These 
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items are not listed in the Court's factual recitation set forth above, and the Court did not 
consider them or rely upon them in reaching its decision herein. 
The Court did, by contrast, cite and rely upon Mr. Wright's master's thesis. This 
document, created in 1971, qualifies as an ancient document under Utah R. Evid. 803(16), 
which means that the hearsay rule is no bar to its consideration by the Court. Plaintiffs 
complain that Mr. Wright's thesis was not properly authenticated and therefore lacks foundation, 
but the Court is unpersuaded. In their objection, Plaintiffs do not specify what kind of 
authentication or foundation they are expecting Defendants to provide, and their arguments ring 
quite hollow given Plaintiffs' own reliance on a host of ancient unauthenticated documents, 
including field notes from various mining claims as well as secondary source documents that 
look a lot like Mr. Wright's master's thesis. See, ~. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-29 (old mining 
documents that are presented without additional authentication or foundation); see also 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 30 (a USGS narrative history of "Geology and Ore Deposits of the Park City 
Mining District, Utah"). In a case like this one, where the only evidence available consists of old 
historical documents and secondary sources compiling those documents, this Court does not 
believe it improper to examine and consider those documents and secondary sources. 
Plaintiffs' evidentiary objections are largely MOOTED by the Court's lack of reliance 
upon most of the items to which objection is lodged. With regard to Mr. Wright's thesis, 
however, Plaintiffs' evidentiary objection is OVERRULED. 
CONCLUSION 
After nine years of litigation, it is time for this case to finally come to an end. Given the 
passage of more than 130 years since the events in question transpired, Plaintiffs from the 
outset faced a very difficult task: proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was at 
least five years of continuous public use of the Claimed Roads between 1871 and 1881. 
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Despite valiant efforts, Plaintiffs have simply not gathered enough evidence to meet that 
standard, even drawing certain reasonable inferences in their favor on summary judgment. 
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants' summary judgment motions 
are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is DENIED. Specifically, the HOA 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; UPCM's Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Upper 
Primary Access is GRANTED; and Plaintiffs' Revised Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and all remaining claims asserted therein, is 
DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the merits. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' Objection to Certain Evidence in Defendants' Pleadings is largely 
MOOTED, but to the extent not mooted is OVERRULED. 
This Memorandum Decision and Order is the order of the court with regard to all of the 
Motions and Objections listed on the first page hereof, and no further writing is necessary to 
effectuate this decision. 
DATED this1~ day of October, 2014. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT :[i51 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF Ultft_~ 9 ''--- ___ - -· 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER MOUNTAIN 
FONDS and STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FONDS, 
Plalntlffs, 
vs. 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; 
EMPIRE PASS MASTER OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit 
corporation and Intervenor Defendant; 
RED CLOUD HOA, a Utah non-profit 
corporation and Intervenor Defendant; 
and JOHN DOES 3-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 050500430 
December12,2014 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
Before the Court is a Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's October 1, 2014 
Memorandum Decision and Order (ihe Motion"), flied by Plaintiffs Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
· Fonds and Stlchtlng Mayflower Recreational Fonds ePlaintJffs•). The Motion was filed on or 
about October 15, 2014, and has been fully briefed by the parties and submitted for decision. 
Plaintiffs have requested a hearing, but the Court does not believe that oral argument will 
substantially assist the Court In resolving the Motion, and therefore respectfully denies Plaintiffs' 
request for oral argument. 
By the Motion, Plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to reconsider Its decision, 
memorialized in a Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 1, 2014, to resolve this case 
on summary Judgment in favor of Defendants. In support of their contention, Plaintiffs make two 
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main arguments.1 First, Plaintiffs assert that the Court employed an incorrect burden of proof, 
contending that the Court should have used a .. preponderance of the evidence• standard rather 
than a .. clear and convincing evidence" standard, and further assert that the Court misapplied 
that standard. Second, Plaintiffs assert that the Court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs could 
not establish public use of the Claimed Roads. The Court will discuss these two arguments in 
tum. 
A. Burden of·Proof 
Plaintiffs base their arguments regarding burden of proof on a part of the Utah Rights•of-
Way Across Federal Lands Act c•the Act11) that states, on its face, that "(t]he proponent of the 
R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving acceptance of the grant by a 
preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not subject to Subsection 6(a).• See 
Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-310(6)(b). There are two problems with Plaintiffs' arguments regarding 
burden of proof. 
First, the Court remains unconvinced, even after reconsideration, that the burden of 
proof to be appUed to this case Is anything other than .. clear and convincing evidence: The 
federal district court, in the Salt Creek Distri~ .. court Case, declined to apply provisions of the 
Act-at least not provisions that Impacted the burden of proof-to modem RS 2477 
adjudications. That court stated as follows: 
It appears that in 2003 the Utah Legislature attempted to alter the burden of proof 
concerning the acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, creating a presumption in 
favor of right.at-way existence where '1he state or political subdivision of the 
state makes a finding that the highway was constructed and the right.of-way was 
accepted prior to October 21, 1976.• Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-302(3)(a). Not 
having been formulated untll many years after the opportunity to accept the R.S. 
2477 grant had been terminated by Congress, this post hoc presumption cannot 
1 Plaintiffs make some additional seconda,y arguments, but the Court declines to provide additional 
response or analysis with regard to these secondary arguments. The Court believes that its October 1 
Memorandum Oecfslon speaks for Itself on these Issues, and that ft does not need to be altered, 
amended, or reconsidered with regard to these secondary arguments. 
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serve to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proof In this case. Whether the R.S. 2477 
grant has been accepted .. is a question of compliance with the then-existing laws 
of the state where the right-of-way was established." 
See Salt Creek District Court Case, 2011 WL 2144762, at *5 & n.9. Although Plaintiffs correctly 
point out that the federal court was discussing a different provision of the Act, this Court finds 
the analysis of the federal court Instructive here, certainty as to provisions of the Act that might 
.. attempt(] to alter the burden of proor that would have applied to establlshment of RS 24n 
claims on or before October 21, 1976. Id. 
Moreover, the Court after analysis of the relevant statutory provision is also unconvinced 
that the provision was ever intended to apply to RS 2477 claims generally, as opposed merely 
to specific proceedings challenging .. the correctness of [any] acknowledgment of acceptance" 
that may be created or recorded by the State of Utah notifying Interested parties that the State 
of Utah considers "title of the right-of-way" as having •vest(edr in the State of Utah. ,Sn Utah 
Code Ann.§ 72-5-309(1), and 72-5-310(2)(a). Indeed, in Sections 309 and 310 the Act sets up 
a mechanism for the State of Utah and other interested parties to follow In the event that the 
State of Utah claims title to any particular rights-of-way pursuant to RS 2477. Under those 
provisions, if the State of Utah believes It has title to such a right-of-way, it "shall issue a notice 
of acknowledgment of the acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant as to that right-of-way: Id. at§ 
, ,. 
72-5-309(2). That notice of acknowledgement "may" be recorded with the relevant county 
recorder's office, jg. at§ 72-5-309(4), but In all events "shall" be provided by certified mall to llt_he 
last known owner of the servfent estate in land over which the right-of-way" runs as well as to 
•any person known to have a competing dominant estate ownership claim," id. at§ 72-5-310(1). 
Those persons •may petition for a decision of the district court as to the correctness of the 
acknowledgement of acceptance• issued by the State of Utah. whfch petition must be filed in 
"the district court for Salt Lake Countf and is to be filed In the fonn of a •complaint governed by 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."2 Id. at § 72-5-310(2) and (3). It is In this context that 
Subsection (6) appears, declaring that the "burden of proving acceptance• falls upon the 
"proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway," and that this burden is "preponderance of 
the evidence.• Id. at § 72-5-310(6)(b). If this statutory subsection were a stand-alone provision, 
its context may look different But when this provision appears as just another subsection of a 
lengthy statutory provision describing a specific_ and discrete type of adjudicatory proceeding, In 
the Court's view this subsection applies not to RS 2477 lawsuits generally but, rather, only to 
the specific actions described in Section 310 of the Act (e.g., petitions filed to challenge the 
correctness of one of the State of Utah's notices of acknowledgment). 3 
The Court's conclusion, then, based not only on the federal court's analysis but also on 
this Court's own analysis of the statutory provision at issue, is that this particular statutory 
provision does not operate to supply the burden of proof to RS 2477 actions generally, and that 
the Court's discussion of the burden of proof in the October 1 Memorandum Decision does not 
require amendment or alteration, even after reconsideration. 
However, the Court also notes, upon further review of its Memorandum Decision, that 
the Issue of whether the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence or clear and 
convincing evidence would not by itself be dispositive In this case. Despite Plaintiffs' 
characterization, In their briefing supporting their Motion, that this case Is a "close case,• the 
Court did not ever describe this case as such In its October 1 Memorandum Decision. Even if 
the burden of proof to be applied in this case were preponderance of the evidence, the result 
would not be any different. Plaintiffs would still bear this burden of proof-something that can, 
z In addition, the statute sets forth very specific requirements not only for where the petition must be filed, 
but also with regard to when II must be filed, what it must contain, and upon whom it must be served. 
~ Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-310(2) and (3). 
> This result Is hardly without justifiable policy basis. It is not hard to Imagine the Utah legislature wanting 
to make it easier for the State of Utah to establish entitlement to an RS 2477 right-of-way than It would be 
for a private entity or Individual to do so. 
4 
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in and of itself, be "decisive• In RS 2477 cases, ~ .fil!W8, 425 F.3d at 769-and, on the 
evidence presented, Plaintiffs would not be able to surmount even this lessened burden. As 
noted in the Memorandum Decision, Plaintiffs have no actual evidence that anyone other than 
miners and prospectors ever used the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period. In the 
Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court determined that an inference that a "random hunter or 
axeman wandered some stretch of these roads during the (relevant] period of time• would not 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of use by non-miners. ~ Memorandum Decision, at 
26-27. For the record, the Court does not believe that such an Inference could push Plaintiffs 
across the goal line in this case, even if the burden were lessened. Plaintiffs must not only 
prove that the Claimed Roads were used by the public, but must also prove that they were used 
with sufficient frequency to satisfy the ·continuous use• element of the RS 2477 standard. See 
Salt Creek Appellate Case, 754 F.3d 787, 797-98 (10111 Cir. 2014). "Intermittent or occasional 
use by hunters, fisherman, and shephers, farmers, and miners is not sufficient• to meet that 
standard . .!.Q. at 798 (citing Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah 1972)). Thus, even if 
the standard were preponderance of the evidence, a bare inference that an occasional hunter or 
axeman wandered some stretch of the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period would, in 
the Court's view, be insufficient even under the lighter burden of proof. 
Finally, the Court finds Plaintiffs' citation to Haynes Land & Livestock Co, v, Jacob 
Family Chalk Creek, LLC. 2001 UT App 112, 233 P.3d 529, unavailing. In its Memorandum 
Decision, the Court noted that Plaintiffs' burden of proof, under the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, was indeed "daunting• and "heavy,• but the Court did not state-and 
certainly did not mean to imply-that the task was Impossible or that it could never be 
surmounted in any case involving historical evidence. Certainly, Haynes presents an example 
of a case where a court determined that the heavy burden had been surmounted on the 
5 
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strength of evidence that was largely historical. However, as Defendants rightly point out in 
their brief opposing the Motion, In Haynes "the claimants presented evidence of contemporary 
maps dating from fifteen years prior to the date of dedication and additional later maps showing 
that the clalmed roads had existed 'on all maps thereafter,'" as well as •other evidence of vast 
usage.'" See Defendants' Br., at 5, 6 (citing Haynes, at ,r12). The historical evidence unearthed 
by Plaintiffs In this case was nowhere near as conclusive. 
B. Public Use 
Next, Plaintiffs assert that the Court misapplied the "public use• element of the RS 2477 
analysis by focusing on "purpose of use rather than the number of users,• and by too-casually 
using the term "prospector." See Plaintiffs' Br., at 6-9. The Court is unpersuaded by Plalntlffs' 
arguments on both points. 
As explained In detail in the Memorandum Decision, In the Court's view both Chumos 
and SUWA raise the question of whether single-purpose use can constiMe "public use• for 
purposes of an RS 2477 claim. While Chumos does not answer the question, in the Court's 
view the Tenth Circuit in SUWA at least Impliedly did answer the question by focusing on 
"purpose" of use and noting that "[l]arge parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining 
and logging roads constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but 
not by the general public." Id. at 781-82 (emphasis added). The court then noted that the 
standard it had adopted-public use, rather than a standard grounded In mechanical 
construction-was "better calculated to distinguish between rights of way genuinely accepted 
through continual public use over a lengthy period of time, and routes which, though 
mechanically constructed (at least in part), served 1/mited purposes for limited periods of time, 
and never formed part of the public transportation system." .l.d.- at 782 (emphasis added). Part 
of this Court's express holding In the Memorandum Decision was to definitively answer the 
6 
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question only impliedly answered in SUWA, which question the Court views as having been 
squarely presented In this case. The Court views its analysis in the Memorandum Decision as 
sound on this point, and declines the invitation to alter or amend it. 
Under this analysis, whether the individuals using the Claimed Roads were prospectors, 
locators, claimants, or patentees makes no difference. No matter what stage of the mining 
process they were involved in, they are all engaged in the same behavior and activity: mining. 
In order to prevail on the "public use• element of an RS 2477 claim, Plaintiffs must show that the 
Claimed Roads were used during the relevant time period by more than just one segment of the 
population. In the Court's view, even a showing that a lot of miners were using the roads Is 
insufficient; Plaintiffs have to demonstrate that people other than miners used the roads. 
Because there Is no competent evidence in this case that anyone other than Individuals 
engaged in the mining industry ever used the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period, 
under the Court's interpretation of Churnos and fil!11h there is no public use as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion is respectfully DENIED. This Ruling and 
Order Is the order of the court with regard to the Motion, and no further writing is necessary to 
.~ ...... 
effectuate this decision. 
DATED this Yl~ day of December, 2014. 
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so 
amend it at any time within 21 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within 
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be.subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original 
pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading 
sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the 
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
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Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon motion of a pa1ty, may direct 
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or 
conferences before trial for such purposes as: 
(a)(l) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(a)(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted for lack of 
management; 
(a)(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(a)( 4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; 
(a)(S) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(a)(6) considering all matters as may aid in the disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition to any other pretrial 
conferences that may be scheduled, the comt, upon its own motion or upon the motion of a party, 
may conduct a scheduling and management conference. The attorneys and unrepresented parties shall 
appear at the scheduling and management conference in person or by remote electronic means. 
Regardless whether a scheduling and management conference is held, on motion of a party the court 
shall enter a scheduling order that governs the time: 
(b )( 1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(b)(2) to file motions; and 
(b)(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order may also include: 
(b)(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(l) and of the extent of 
discovery to be pem1itted; 
(b)(S) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial; and 
(b)(6) provisions for preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information; 
(b )(7) any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material after production; and 
(b )(8) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
Unless the order sets the date of trial, any party _may and the plaintiff shall, at the close of all 
discovery, certify to the court that the case is ready for trial. The court shall schedule the trial as soon 
as mutually convenient to the court and parties. The court shall notify parties of the date of trial and 
of any pretrial conference. 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action where a final pretrial conference has been 
ordered, it shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under the circumstances. The 
conference shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the 
parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless waived by the court, shall have available, 
either in person or by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to make binding 
decisions regarding settlement. 
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(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or a party's 
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney 
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon_ motion or its own initiative, may take any action 
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2). 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as 
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a _party shall , without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: 
(a)(1 )(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual 
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; 
(a)(1 )(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, 
data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1 )(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making 
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other 
evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1 )(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under 
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to 
satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under 
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined 
after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. 
A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is 
not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the 
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's 
disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or 
less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an 
administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
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(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by 
counsel. 
(a)(2)(8) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are 
subject to discovery under subpart (b ). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used 
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(8) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving 
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery 
as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut 
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(8), within 
60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information 
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of 
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the 
party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(8) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by 
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of 
the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4 )(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and 
those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, 
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) 
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made 
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, 
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed 
waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
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(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless othecwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1 ), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and 
served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of 
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written 
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other 
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests 
for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The 
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing 
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and 
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the 
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is 
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good 
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the 
discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action 
to obtain the information sought; or .,· 
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of 
the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable 
notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, 
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b )(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
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consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party 
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the 
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its 
• subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain 
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously 
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed 
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital 
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
{b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose 
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(8 ), any 
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(8) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been 
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial 
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; 
and · 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the 
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this 
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of 
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions 
from the expert. 
(b )(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable 
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation 
material , the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the 
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 
applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a 
claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may 
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notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being 
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving 
party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the 
claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take 
reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until the 
claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted 
to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and 
for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a 
designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected 
by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited 
to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the 
court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in 
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such 
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. 
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered 
by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and 
conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered 
by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. 
Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests 
of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact 
that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to 
delay any other party's discovery. 
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(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) 
or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the 
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in 
the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under 
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty 
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a 
deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, 
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some 
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not 
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise 
stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in 
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss 
the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by 
subdivision (a)(1 ), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information and to 
develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the meeting. The 
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree 
upon the discovery plan . 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures 
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) 
were made or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be 
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be 
limited to particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored 
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production -
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these 
rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault 
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to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiff's counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any 
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity 
with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each 
of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b )(1 )-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, 
final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the 
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan or any part 
thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on 
any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the 
presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the 
parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 
16(b). 
(f)(S) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan 
and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the 
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after 
joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery or 
response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record 
or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of 
the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, response, 
or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the 
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be 
obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person whc( made the certification, the party on whose behalf 
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding 
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner 
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending 
in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such 
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose 
deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising 
during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court 
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shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that th!;! 
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in 
Rule 30(f)(1 ), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed 
with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach 
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, 1,,1.pon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons 
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(l) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in which the action 
is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken . An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district 
where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel 
disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good 
fa ith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making th e disclosure in an effort to secure the 
disclosure without court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Ru le 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to 
answer an interrogatory submitted under Ru le 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Ru le 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit 
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a 
designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good fa ith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party 
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action , When 
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the 
examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or 
incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a fai lure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)( 4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(a)( 4 )(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was 
filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the 
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the cou rt finds that the 
motion was fi led without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery 
without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially 
justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust . 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the 
party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, 
including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order 
authorized l,mder Ru le 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a j ust manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(l) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a 
question after being directed to do so by th e court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the 
failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Ru le 
16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Ru le 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, , unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the fa ilure 
as are just, including the following: 
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(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other desigr:iated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in 
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts t hereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by 
the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental 
examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failu re to admit . If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of 
any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the 
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to 
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that 
proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request 
was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable gro\,Jnd to believe that he might prevail on the 
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for 
inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Ru le 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the 
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories 
submitted under Ru le 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court . on motion 
may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is 
objectionable unless the party fa iling to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to part icipate in good 
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may 
take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, c;locument or other material as required by Rule 
26(a) or Rule 26(e){l), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Ru le 26(e)(2), that party 
shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action 
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a 
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional 
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these ru les on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to 
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 21 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motior.i , memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the acti.on as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts 
so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential 
to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order 
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just.·'· 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the 
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filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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IN THE SEN A TB Or' 'r HE UNITED ST ATER. 
Juc,y rn. 1866. 
Ordered to be printed. 
AMENDMENT 
Reported by Mr. fhE\V:\RT: from the Committee on Public Lands, 
to the act (H. R. 365) granting tho right of way to ditch and 
canal owners o,·er the public lnntls in the States of Oalifornia, 
Oregon, an<l N evadu., viz: Rtl'ike out all aJter the enacting 
clause, and. insert as follows: 
3 That the mineral lands of the public domain, both surveyed 
and unsnrveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to 
!i exploration and occupation by all citizens of the United 
6 States, and those who have declared their intention to become 
7 citizens, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by 
8 law, and subject also to the local custom or rules of miners 
9 in the several mining districts, so far as the same may not be 
10 in conflict with the laws of the United States. 
1 SEc. 2. And be it further enacted, That whenever any 
2 person or association of persons claim a vein or lode of quartz, 
3 or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, or cop-
4 per, having previously occupied and improved the same 
5 
G 
7 
8 
2 
:wcordincr to the locn.1 crni.torn or rules of. miners in the dist.ri ct 
c, 
where the same is situated, nnd hn,ving expended in actual 
labor and improvements thereon nn amount of not less than 
one thousand dollars, and in regard to whose possession there 
is no controvcr~.v or opposing claim, it shall and may be law-
IO fnl for said claimant or associn.tion of claimants to file in the 
11 local hnd ollicc a diagram of the sn.mc, so ext.ended lafora.lly 
1~ or otherwise as to conform t.o the locn.1 luw8, customs, nml 
13 rules of miners, and t,o enter such tract u,rnl receive n, pnfont 
14 therefor, granting such mine, together wHh the right, to fol-
lf> low such vein or lode with its dips, rmgles, and variations, to 
16 any depth, although it may enter the land rt<,Uoining, which 
17 land adjoining shall he sold snb,jcct to this condition. 
1 SEc. 3. And be £t furthe1· enacted, That upon the filing 
2 of the diagram us provided in the sccoml section of this n.ct, 
3 and posting the same in a conspicuous place on the claim, 
4 together· with a notice of intention to apply for a patent, the 
5 register of t}ie land office shall publish n, notice of the same 
6 in a ne:wspaper published neurest to the location of said clnim, 
7 and shall also post such notice in his office for the period of' 
8 ninety days ; and after the expiration of said period, jf no 
9 adverse claim shall have been filed, it shall be the duty of 
IO the surveyor general, upon application of the party, to survey 
11 the premises and make a plat thereof, indorsed with his ap-
12 proval, designating the 1_wmber and description of the loca-
3 
J 3 tion, the valne of t.hc lahor an<l improvements, and the 
14 chnrncter of the Ycin exposed; and upon the payment to the 
l:°> proper ofliccr of Ii vc dollars per acre, together with the cost 
lG of snch suryey, plat, and notice, and giving- satisfactory evi-
17 deuce that said diagram nud notice have been posted on the 
18 claim dnring said period,-of 11inety days, the register of the 
lU land office sLmll trn11smit to the Gcnci·aJ Lund Ollice said plat, 
20 snrvcy, and description; and a pa.tent shall issue for the same 
~I thereupon. But said plat., survey, or description shall in no 
~2 case cover more tha.11 one vein or lode, nrnl no patent shall 
23 i:;sue for more tha11 011c vein or lode, which shal I be expressed 
~4 in the patent issued. 
1 81'.:c. 4. And be it fm·tlter enacted, 'rhat. when such 
2 location and eut.ry of a miue shall he upon unsurvcye<l lands, 
3 it shall and may be ln,wful, a.fter Lhe extension thereto of t.he-
J' 
4 public slll'vcys, to adjnRt the surveys to t~e limits of the 
5 premises according to the location and possession and plat 
6 aforesnid, a.nd the surveyor general may, in extending the 
7 surveys, vary the same from a rectangular form to suit the 
8 circumstances of the country and the local rules, laws, and 
D customs of miners: Provided, 'l1hat no location hernafter 
l O made shall exceed two hundred feet iu length along the vein 
11 fol' each locator, with a.n additional claim for di~covery to the 
12 discoverer of the lode, with the right to follow such vein to 
13 any depth, with nH its dip_s, variations, and angles, together 
4 
14 with R. reasonable quantity of snrface for the convenient 
15 working of the :::atnc ns fixed by local rules:· And provided 
16 further, That no pcn;on may make more than one location 
17 on the same lode, and not more than three thousand feet shall 
18 . he taken in .any one claim by any association of persons. 
I Si-;c. 5. And be it fu,rt!wr enacted, ~I.1hat u.s a further 
2 condition of sale, in. the absence of necessary legislation by 
3 Congress, t.he local legislature of any State or Territory may 
4 provide rules for ,vorking mines involviug casements, drai11-
5 a.ge, and other necessary means to their complete develop-
6 rnent; nnd those conditions shall be folly expressed in t.be 
7 patent. 
1 St~c. o. And be i"t further enacted, rl'ha.t ,vhcuever any 
2 a.dverse claimants to a.ny mine located and cluimcd us afore-
3 said, shall appear before the ap1n·oval of' tho survey, us pro-
4 vided in the third section of this net, aJI proceedings shall be 
5 stuyed uutil a final settlement and ac\jndicatio11 in the courts 
6 of competent jurisdiction of the rjgbts of possession to snch 
7 c~aim, when a patent may issue ns in other cases. 
1 SEC. 7. And be ,:e further enacted, rrha.t the President 
2 of the United States he, nnd is hereby, nnthorized to establish 
3 additional land districts and to appoint the necessary officer$ 
4 under existing laws, wherever he may deem the same neces-
5 sary for the public convenieuce in executing the provisions 
6 of this act. 
5 
1 Sr:c. 8. And be it fw·thCJ' enacted, 'l'hat tho right of 
2 wa.y for the construction of hig-hwnys over public lands, not 
3 reserved for pnl)lic uses, is hereby granted. 
1 SEc. 9. And be it further enacted, That wheneYer, by 
2 priority of possession, rights to the. use of water for mining, 
3 agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, havo vested 
4 n.nd accrued, and the same are rcc~gnized and acknov.,}edged 
5 by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the 
6 possessors and owners of such vested rights, shall be main-
7 taine<l and protected in the same; and the right of way for 
8 the construction of ditches and· canals for the purpose::; afore-
9 snid is hereby acknovde<lged and c·onfirmed: Provided, how-
l O ever, That whenever, after the passage of this :tct, any person 
i 1 or persoHs shall, in the constrnction of any ditch or canal, 
l'.2 injure or damage the possession of any settler on tlie public 
13 domain, the party comrnit,ting f-uch injury or damage shall be 
14 liable to the party injured for snch injury or damage. 
1 8Ec. 10. And be it furthe1· enacted, That wherever, prior 
2 to the passage of this act, upon tho lands heretofore designated 
3 as mineral lands, which have been excluded from survey and 
.-
4 sale, there have been homesteads made by citizens of the 
;:> United States, or persons who have declared their intention 
6 to become citizens, which homesteads have been made, im-
7 proved, and used for agricultural purposes, and upon which 
8 there have been no valuable mines of gold, silver, cin:\}abar 
6 
D or copper discovered, and which arc properly agricultural 
IO lands, the said settlers or owners of such homesteads shall 
11 _, hiwe n. right of pre-emption thereto, and shall be entitled to 
12 pnrchase the same at the price of one dollar and twenty-fi\'e 
1:-3 cents per acre, a.nd in quantity not to exceed one hundred trnd 
14 sixty-acre8; or said parties may avail themselves of the pro-
15 visions of the act of Congress approved May twenty, eigh-
1 (j teen hundrnd and sixty-two, entitled "An act to secnre 
17 homesteads to actual settlers on tLc public domain," and acts 
18 amendatory t.hereof. 
1 SEc. 11. And be z·t fin·ther enacted, 'I1lrn,t upon the sur-
2 vey of the lands aforesaid, the Decrctary of !'he Interior may 
3 designate and set apart such portions of the sai<l lands as are 
4 clearly agricultural lands, which lauds shall thereafter be sub-
5 ject to pre-emption and sale as other public lands of the United 
G States, and subject to all t.he lnsvs and regulations applicable 
7 to the same. 
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GENERAL LAt[D OFFICE 
SECRETARY OF TD- INTERIOR, 
"½. 
)ONINO STATUTES OF J"ULY ll6, 1866,-JULY ~ 1870, AND MAY 
10, l87ll. :_ 
"· 
Mining Statute of July 26, 1866. 
CHAP. CCLX.TI. -AN Arrr granting the right of way to 
ditch and cane.I owners over the public lands, and for 
other purpoa~s. 
/2Be it enacted by' tk Senate and Bott8e of RepreJJenlativeJJ of e United Stata of America, in Congr/WJ CLB8t:mbkd, That the insral lands of the publio domain, both surveyed and un-nrveyed, are hereby declared to be free end open to e;iplor-
.· ation end occupation by all citizens of the United States, i,. 
and those who ha-ve deolared their intention to become "\ 
citizens, subject to such regulations as msy be prescribed 
by law, and BUbject aleo to the local ouatoms or rules of 
miners in the several mining districts, so fer ss the 11nme 
~o1 be in conflict with the laws of the United States . 
.---- pealed .r --· · · -
Sro. 2. .And be ii f urlher enacted, That w hene-ver any per-
son, or association of pernons, claims a vein or lode of 
quartz, w other rock in pla.oe, bearing ~old, silver, oinna.-
ba.r, or copper, having previously occupied ·and improved 
~he same _acc~rding to the local' cna~m~ or rules of min!'rs 
m the dietnct where the same 18 S1tuated, and havmg "-
e-xpended, in actual labor and improvements thereon~ an 
amount of not less than one thou.so.nd dollara, and in regard 
to whose possesaion there is no controvera7 or opposing 
claim, it shall and may be lawful for said cla.imant, or asso-
ciation of claimants, to file in the local land office a 
diagram of the same, so extended, late~ly or otherwise, 
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as to conform to·the local laws, coelome, a.nd roles of mw-
ers, and to ent.er such tract and pceive a patent therefor, 
grllllt-ing such mine, together wi* I.he right to follow such 
vein or lode, with its dips, SDf4eB, and variations, to any 
depth, although it may ent.ef't.lie land adjoining, which la.nd 
adJoining shall be sold subjec~~ this condition. rRepealed.l 
BEo. 3. ..d.1ul be it furtk:r ~ackd, That upon the filing o1 
the diagram ae provided i;t the second section of t-his act, 
and poetins the same in a ·l )nepicuoua plaoe on the claim, 
together with a notice o(int.ention to apply !or a patent, 
the Register of the Lru:i,d Office shall publish a notice of 
the same in a newspaper published nenrest to the location 
of said claim, and sha['t also poet such notice in hie office 
for the period of n~ days; a.nd alter the expiration of 
such period, if no ,.; verse claim eruill have been filed, it 
shall be the duty ~• •.he Surveyor-genera.I upon application 
of the party, I,,,. au. vey the premises and make a plat 
thereof, indors_ed with bis appro-val, designating the number 
and descriptio., of the location, the value of the labor and 
improve~ents, and the character of the vein exposed; and 
upon the payment to the proper officer of five dollars per 
acre, together with the cost of snob survey, plat, and notice, 
. and giving satisfactory evidence that said diagram and 
notice have been posted on the claim during said period of 
ninety days, the Register of t~e Land Office shall trans1:1i't 
· to the General Land Offic.e saJcl plat, suney, a.nd deecnp-
tion, and a pat.ent shall issue for the same thereupon. ButJ 
said plat, survey, or description shall in no case co·ler more 
than one vein or lode, and no pi.tent shall issue for more 
than one vein or lode, which shall be expressed in the pat,. 
ant issued. (Repealed.] · 
SEO. 4. And be il furfherp11.1.detl, That when such loce.,.. 
tion a.nd entry of a mine eh'iill be upon unenrveyed lauds, it 
ehall and may be lawful, aft.er the extension thereto of the 
publio surveys, to adjust the enrveye to the limits of the 
. premises aooording to the location and possession of lbe 
plat aforesaid; an<l the Surveyor-general may, in extending 
the surveys, vary the same from a rectangoJur form, to suit 
the oironmstanoea of the country and the local rules, laws, 
and custom.a of miners; Provuled, th.at no location hereafter 
.f-' ma.de shall exceed two hundred feet in length along the -vein 
for each locator, with an additional claim for discovery to 
the discoverer of the lode, with the right to follow such vein 
to any depth, with all its dips, variations, and angles, 
to~ether with a reasonable quantity of surface, for the con-
venient working of the same, as fixed by local rules; .And, 
provided. fu.rllu:r, that no person may make more than one 
location on the same lode, and not more than three tbon-
eand feet shall b~ taken in any one olaim by any association 
of persona. [Repealed.] 
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SEC. 5. .Aud be it further cnaclw, That, a.a a further con-
dition of sale, in the absence of necessary legielutioo by 
Congress, the local Legialature of any State or Territory 
may provide rules for working mines, in·rnlving eaaeroents, 
drainage, or other oecesaary means to their complt!le devel-
opment; nod . those oonclitions shall be fnlly expressed in 
the patent. 
SEO. 6. And be it further enacted, That whenever any no.-
ver&e claimants to any mine, located o.nd claimed as afore-
said, shall appear before the approval of the enrvey, as 
provided i.n the third section of this act, all prqceedinf>B 
shall be etayed until final setUemont and aqjudicatioo, m 
the court.a of competent jurisdiction, of the rights of pos-
sess.ion to ench claim, when n patent may issue as in other 
cases. rRepea.led.J 
Bro. 1". And be u furtkr cnacud, That the President of 
the United States be, and is hereby, authoru.ed to esuiblish 
additional land districts, and to appoint the necessary ofli- • 
cers under existing laws, whene-ver be may deem I.be same 
nece881U)' for the public conve11ieoce in executing I.be pro-
visions of this a.ct. .•·· 
SEO. 8. A11d be itf-u.rtkr t:nacl,w, That the right of way 
for the construction of highways over public la.ode, not 
reserved for public uses, is here by granted. 
SEO. 9. .A11d be it {llrther cnaded, That whenever, b,r pri-
orit;Y of poBBeBBion, rights to the use of vwter for m1n 111g, 
agr1cnltoral, msnofaoturing, or other purposes, have vested 
and seemed, and the same are reoogni.zed and acknowledged 
by the local customs, laws, and th!! deoisions of courts, the 
poaseSBora and owners of 81lch vested rjgbts shall be mofo-
tained and protected in the same; and the right of way for 
the construction of ditches and canals for the purpose!! 
aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and con.fi,rmed; Provuled, 
houxwer, that whenever, alter the p~e of _this a.ct., any 
person or peroons shall, in ilia construction of any ditch or 
cansJ, injure or dam.age the possession of any settler on the 
public domain, the pa.rty committing snob injury or damage 
shall be linble to the party injured for such injury or 
damage. 
SEO. 10. .And be it furtkr r:naded, That whenever, prior 
to the po.ss~e of this net, upon the lands heretofore deuig-
nsted sa :onneral li.nda, which have been excluded from 
survey and sale, there have been homeatea.ds made by citi-
zens of the United States, or persons who have decliu-ed 
their intention to beoome citizens, which homesteads have 
been made, improved, and used for sgrionltural purposes, 
and upon which there have boon no -va.lne.ble minee of gold, 
silver, cinnabar, or copper discovered, and which are prop-
erly agricultural lands, lhe said ~tt.Jers or owners of such 
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homesteads shall haTe a right of pre-emption thereto, and 
sha.lJ be entitled to purchase tbe same nt the price of one 
dollar and twenty-five cent.a per u.cre, a.nd in qunutity not to 
exceed one hUDdrod and sixt_;y acres; OT said parties may· 
avail themselves of tho :provisJoos of the Act of Congress, 
approved ~y twenty, mghteen hundxed end sixty-two, en-
titled "An ad to aeon.re homesteads to actual sett)era on the 
public domain,'' and acts amendatory thereof. 
8.w. J 1. .Lind Ix it furl her t.nacled, Th lit upon the survey 
of the lands aforesaid, the _Secretary of the Interior may 
designate and BOt 11parl e'uc·h portions of the said lands as 
BTO clenr_ly e.gricnltnral ln.nds, which lands shall thereafter 
be subject to pro-emption 11nd ea.le as other public lands of 
tho United States, and subject to all the laws and regula-
tions applicable to tho so.mo. 
Approvad, July 26, 1866. 
Mining Statute of July 9, 1870. 
CRAP. CCXXX"V.-AN Acr to amend "An Act granting the 
right of way to ditch and canal. owners over tho publi~ 
land.a, and for other purposes." 
Be it enacted by the Sena!,e, a.nd HO'lf~e oj Represt:nf.oliv~ of 
the United Stales of .America in Congreu auemhled, Thut the 
act grantmg the right of way to ditch and can.al owners over 
tho publjc la_nds, and !cir other· pnryoees_, approved July 
twenty-all:, e1ghteen hundred and s11ty-slX, be, and the 
same ia hereby amended, by addmg thereto the following 
additional sections, num bared twelve, thirteen, fourteen, 
fifleen, sixteen, and seventeen, re11pootively, which shall 
hereafter constitute and form a part of the aforesaid act. 
SEO. 12. .And be it /urtl1tr eooct,ed, That claims usually 
called "placers," mcluding all forms of deposit, excepting 
veins of qUl\rtz, or other rock in place, shall be subject to 
'entry and J.'atent under this act, under like circumstances 
and conditions, ~nd upon lrimilar proceedings, as are pro-
vided for vem. or lode cl~ime; Provitid, that where the 
lands have been previousl7 surveyed by the United States, 
the entry, in it.a exterior limit.a, shall conform to tho legal 
subdivisions of the publio Jahde, no further survey or plat 
in such case being r equired, and the lands may be paid for 
at the rnie of two dollara and fifty conte per aero ; Pn:wided, 
ftLrlher, that legal subdivisions of forty acres may bo sub-
divided into ten-acre tracts ; and that two or more psrsons, 
or associations of persons, having contignoue claims of any 
size, althou~h such claims may be lees than ten aores each, 
I may make Joint entry thereof; .tlnd, provided further, thnt no location bf a placer claim, hereafter me.do, shall exceed 
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one bnndred and sixty licres for any one person or assooia-~ 
· tion of persons, which location shall conform to the United 
States surveys : and nothing in this section contained sh11ll 
. defeat or impair any lxma fide pre-emption or homestead 
claim upon agricultural laudH, or authorize the sale of the 
improvements of any borw. fide settler to any purchaser. . 
SEO. 13. And be itfu.rtkr waded, That where said _per-
son or association, they o.nd tht1ir grantora, shall have held 
and worked their said claims for s period equal to the time 
prescribed by the statute of limitations for mining claims 
of the State or Territory where the Imme may be situated, 
evidence of such possession n.nd workin15 of tho claims for 
snob period shall be sufficient to establish a. right to a pa.t-
ent thereto nnder this act, in the absence of any ·adverse 
claim ; Provided, however, that nothing in iliis act aha.ll be 
deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any 
way whatever to.any mining claim or property tberetq at-
tached· prior to the 1asuance of a patent. 
Bro. 14.. .d11Ci .be ii. further mcded, That al] ez..parle affi-
davits reqnired to be made under this act, or the act of 
which it is amendatory, may be verified before any offictJr 
Blltborized to administer onlbs within the land district where 
the claims may be situated. 
SEO. 15. And be it further enacted, That Registers and 
Receivers shall receive the same fees for services under this 
act BB are provided by law for like senices under other acts 
of Congreaa; and that effect shal1 be given to the foregoing 
·.act according to such regnlati9na as may be prescribed by 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office. 
Bxo. 16. And be it further enacted, That so mnch of the 
act of March third, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, enti-
t1ed "An Act to provide for the snrvey of the public londs 
of California, the granting of pre-emption rights, and -for 
other purposes," 11.8 provide~ that, none other than township 
lines aha.JI be surveyed · where the lands are mineral, ts 
hereby repealed. And the public surveys are hereb;r ex-
tended over iill such la.nds; Provided, tbat all subdinding 
of the surveyed lands into lots of leBS than one hundred 
and snty a.ores may be done by county and local surveyors 
at the expense of the claimants; A11d, provided further, that 
nothing herein contained shall require the survey of waste 
or nseleBS land. 
Bro. 17. .And be iJ.furtha enacwl, Tbatnone of the rights 
conferred byBBctions five, eight, and nine of the act of which 
this is amendstory shall be abrorted by this act; and the 
same are .hereby extended t-0 ~ds affected by 
this a.ct ; and all paten ta gran~ or~prii:emption or home-
steads allowed, sh..:11 be sub~ct to a.ny vested and a.corned 
water rights, or rights to1tches and reservoirs used' in 
- -------
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connection ?lith such water righta as may have been ac-
quired under or recognized by the nint.h section of tho act 
of which thie sot ie amendato:ry. But not.bing in this act 
shall be construed to repeal, 1II1pair, or in any way affect 
tho provisions of tho "Aot granting to A. Sntro tbe right 
of wa7 and other privileges to aid in t.he conetrucLion of a 
draining and exploring tunnel to the Comstock lode, w t.he 
State of Nevada," approved J nly twenty-fifth, eighteen hun-
dred and sixty-six. 
Approved Joly 9, 1870. 
Mining Statute of May 10, 181.2. 
AN Aor to promote tho development of tho mining re-
sources of the United States. 
Be it enaded by tk Senak a11d Hoiue of RepraenJ.atives of 
the Uniud Staua of America,. in Congrru a88embkd, Thal all 
valuable mineral deposit.a in land belonging to the United 
States, both snrveyed and unsorveyed, are hereby declared 
to bi;, free and open to exploration and pnrohMe, and the 
lands in which they are foond to occupation and purchase, 
by citizens of the United States. and t.boee who have de-
clared their intention. to become such, Ullder regulations 
prtiecribed by law, and aocording to the local customs or 
rules of minera, in the several mining districts, so fa.r as 
the same are applicable and not inconi;istent with the laws 
of the United Btntee. 
SEO. 2. That mining cluims upon .-eins or lodes of 
quartz or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver, cinna-
bar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits heretofore 
located, shall be ·governed, as to length along the vein or 
lode, by the customs, regulations, and lawe in force at the 
dale of their location. A minixig claim locateil a.ft.er the 
passage of this act, whether located by one or more peraons, 
may equal, but shall not e-xceed, one thousand five hundred 
feet in Jen~ along the vein or lode; but no location of a 
mining cl111m shall be made until the discov·ery of the vein 
or lode within the limits of the claim located. No claim 
shall extend more than three hundred feat on each side of 
the middle of the Tein nt the surface, nor shall BllJ claim 
be limited, by llllJ mining regulation, to leas that twenty-
five feei on each side of the middle of the vein at the sur-
face, except where ad-verse rights existing at the paaBD.ge of 
this act shall render snob limitation neoeBSOry. The end 
lines of each claim shall be •parallel to each other. 
SEO. 3. That the locators of all mining local-ions hereto-
fore made, or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral 
vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public cloma.in, their 
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hemr and aasigns, where no n.dverae claim e:x.ists at 
the paasage of t.liia ad, so long as they comply with 
the laws of the United States and the State, Territorial, 
and local ragwstions, not ·in conflict with said laws 
of the Unitect States, governing their possessory title, 
ehaJJ have the e:xclneh-e right of ~sseeeion and enjoy-
ment of all the snrfaoe included w1t.b.i.n the Jines of their 
loentions, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges, thron~hont 
their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of 
such surface lines extended downward vertically, although 
such veins, lodes, or lodges may so far depart from a per-
pendicular in their course downward as to e:xtend ootsirle 
the vertical side-lines of said surface locations: Provided, 
that their right of posaession to such outside part.a of such 
veins or ledges shall be oonfuiod to such portions thereof as 
lie bet-veen vertical planes drawn downward as aforesaid, 
throogh the end-lines of their looolions, so conlinoed in 
their own direction that soch planes will intersect soch ex-
terior parts of said veins or ledges. .A11d, pr()l)ide,d further, 
That nothing in this section shaJJ authorize the locator or 
posaessor of a vein or lode which extends, in its downward 
course, beyond the vertical lines of his claim, to enter upon 
the snrfaoe of a claim owned or possessed by another. 
SEO. 4. That where a tunnel is run for the de-velopment-
of a vein or lode, dr for the disc()very of mines, the owners 
of such tunnel shall have the right of possession of all veins 
or lodes within three thousand feet from the face of ench 
tunnel, on the line thereof, not previously known to exist, 
discovered in such tunnel, to the same e:xtent aa ii diecov-
ered from the surface; and locations on the lines of such 
tunnel of veins or lodes not appearing on the st!liace, made 
by other parties after the commencement of the tunnel, anu 
while the same is being proaecoted with reasonable dili-
gence, shall be invalid; but failure to proaecute the work 
on the tunnel for six months-·ehall be con.siderod as an 
abandonment of the right to all undiscovered veins on the 
liDe of said tunnel. · 
Bro. 5. That the miners of each minin6 district may 
make rules and regulations, not in conflict with the laws of 
the United States, or with the la"Wl! of the State or Territory 
in which the district is sitoated, governing the location, 
manner of recording, amount of work necessary to bold 
posaeBSion of a mining elaim, subject to the following re- ......,_ 
quirements: The location must be distinctly marked on 
the ground 8-0 that its boonde.riea can be readily tracecl. 
All records of mining claims hereafter made shall con.tain 
the name or names of the locators, the date of the location, , 
and such a i!eecription of the claim or claims, looated by 
?'1\ference to so·me natural object or permanent monument, 
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as will identify the claim. On each claim located after the 
passage of this act, and tnltil a patent shall have been issocd 
lherefor, not leas than one hundred dollB.Js worth of labor 
shall be performed, or improvements made during each 
year. On nll claims localed prior to the passage of this 
act,. ten dollars worth of labor shall be performed or im-
provementa made each year for each one hundred feet in· 
length along the vein, until n patent uhall have been iasued 
therefor; bot whore such claims are hold in common, each 
expenditure may be made upon an;r one claim; and upon a 
failure to comply with these conditions, the claim or mine 
upon which euch failure oconrrerl shall be opened to reloca-
tion in the same manner as if no location of tho enme bad 
ever beeu made: Provuud, 'that the original locators, their 
heirs, assigns, or legal representatives, hnve not resumed 
work upon the claim after such failure nnd before such 
location. Upon t.he failore of any one oI several co-ownera 
to contribute bis proportion of the .expenditures required 
by this aot, the co-<>wners who have performed the labor or 
made the improvementa may, at the expiTBlion of f.be year, 
give such delinquent co-owner personal notice in writing, 
or notice by publication in the newspaper published nearest 
the claim, for at least once a week for ninety days, and ii, 
at the expiration of ninety days aHer such notice in writing 
or by publication, such delinquent should fail or refuoe to 
contribute his proportion to comply with this act, bis inter-
est in the claim shall become the property of his co-ownera 
who have made the required expenditures. 
SEC. 6. That a patent for any land claimed and l=ted 
for valuable deposita may be obtained. in the following 
manner: A:ny person, association, or cor:eoration, author-
ized to locate a claim under this act, haTIDg claimed and 
located a piece ofland for such purposes, who has, or have, 
com_plied with the terms of this act, may file i~ lhe proper 
land office an application'11or a patent, under ois\h, ahowmg 
§Ucb compliance, together with a plat nnd field;notes of the 
claim or claims in common, made· by or under the direction 
of · the United States Surveyor-general, ab.owing accurately 
the boundaries of the claim or claims, wliich shall be dis-
tinctly marked by monuments on the grounds, and ·shall 
povt a copy of each plat, together with a notice of such ap-
plication for a patent, in a conspicuous place on the lnnd 
e!Dbraced in such plat, previous to the fihng of the applica-
tion for a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least two 
persons, that such not.ice ha.s been duly posted as aforesaid ; 
and shall file a copy of said notice in B'UCb land office, and 
shall thereupon be entiUed t-0 a patent for said land in the 
manner following : .The Register of the land oflh·e, upon 
the filing of snob application, P.lat, and field-notes, noticeo, 
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and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application 
baa been mado, for the/eriod of sixty days, in a newspaper 
to be by him deaignnt.e as po blished nesre1Jt to said claun ; 
and be shall also post snch notice in bis office for the·same 
period. The claimant, 11t the time of filing his application, 
or at any time thereafter, within the sixty days of publica-
tion, shall file with the R-egister a certificate of the United 
States Surveyor-general that five hnndrea dollars worth of 
labor baa been expended, or improvements made upon the 
claim by himself or grantors; that the plat ia con-eel, with 
'Such further description by such reference to natural ob-
jects or permaneut mounments as shall ide_ntify the claim, 
and furn1sb a.n accurate d;siri~ion to r torporated iq 
tb~pira 1 n o the~ y ;7iiof pubhC!I-
~e claimant shall file his affidavit, s:li9wing that the 
plat aud notice have been posted in a coosp~cuons place on 
tbe claim during said period of publication: If no adverse 
claim shall have been filed with the Register and the Re-
ceiver of the proper land office at the expiration of the 
sixty da:ys of )?Ubhcalion, it shall be assumed that the ap-
plicant 1s entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the 
prayer officer· of five dollars per sere, and that no adverse 
claUIJ exists, and thereafter no objection .from third parties 
to the issuance of a patent shall be heitrd, except jt be 
s hown that the. !!,pplicant has failed to com ply with this 
act-. 
SEO. 7. That where an adverse claim shall be filed dur-
ing the period of publication, it shall be upon oath of the 
person or persona making the·sa10e, and shall show the nat-
ure, boundaries, o.nd extent of .such adverse claim : and all 
proceedings, exeept the public,stion of notice, anct making 
and filing of the affidavit thereof, shall be stayed until the 
controversy shall hav!l been settled or deoided by a Court --/--
of competent jurisdiction, or the adve113e claim waived. It 
shall be the dut;)'. of the adverse claim,mt, within thirty days 
e.Iter filing hi11 claim, to commence proceedings in a court 
of competent jurisdiction, to determme the question of the 
ri_g!:it ol pa68esaio?, and prosecute th~ same with reasonable 
dihgeiice to final Judgment; and a failp.re to do so shall be 
a waiver ol hie adverse claim.. After such judgment shall 
have been rendered, the party entiUed to the poSBession · of 
the cl.&im, or any portion thereof, may, without giving fur-
ther notice, file a certified copy of the judgment-roll with 
the Register of the ]and office, together with the certificate 
of the Surveyor-general that the requisite amount of labor 
bas been expended, or improvements made' thereon, and 
the description required in other cases, and shall pay .to the 
Receiver five dollars per acre for his claim, together with 
the proper fees, wher~npon the whole proceedings and the 
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Jndgmeot-roll shall be certified by iho Register to ihe Com-
missioner of tho General Land Office, and a patent ehall 
isane thereon for tho claim, or euoh port.ion thereof as 
tho applicant shall appeM, from ihe decision of the 
court, to rightly possess. ··· 'If it shall appear, from the 
doc\eion of the court, thot several parlies ar~ entiLled to 
soparate and different portions of the claim, each pllrty 
m11y pay for hi.a portion of the claim, with tho proper foes, 
and file the certificale ond description b.1, the Sunoyor-
~oneral, whereupon the :Register shall cert.Hy the proceed-
ings and judgment-roll to tbe CommillllioneE of tho Oenero.l 
Land Office, as iu the preceding case, and patents shall is-
1100 to the several parties according to tbuir rellpoctiTe rights. 
:Proofs of citizenship under. this act, or tho acts of July 
twonty-6ixth, eightee11 bnodred nod .~ixt-y-si:x, and July 
niuth, llighteen hundred and seventy, in toe CBll6 of an in-
dividual, may consist of his own affidavit thereof; a.nd, in 
cnse of en association of persona unincorpo:rnted, of the 
affidavit of their authorized agent, made on hie own know J-
udge, or upon information ond belief, ll!ld in case of a cor-
poration organized under the ]awe of tho United Stotee, or 
of o.ny State or 'l'orritory of tho United Stotes, by the filing 
of a certified copy of their cb&.rtor or certificl\te of incor-
poration ; 1'nd nothin& heroin contain!ld shall be construed 
to prevent the alienation of the title conveyed hy a patent 
for s mining cl.rum to any person whntevor. 
B:w. 8. That the doecription of vein or lode cloime, upon 
surveyed lands, shall do8lgnate the location of the clium 
with reference to tho linee of the public surveys, but need 
not conform therewith; but where a patent sboll be i88u.ed 
as aforesaid for claims upon unsurveyed lnnds, the Survoyor-
general, in extendmg the s~r,veys, shall adjust tho some to 
tho boundaries of such patented cloim, according to the plat 
or deecription thereof, bul so as in no case to interfere with 
or change the location of any such patented claim. 
SEO. 9. That eoctione one, two, three, four and six of an 
act entitled ".A.n .Act grantiJJg the right of way to ditch 
a.nd canal owners over the public lands, and for other pur-
poses," approved July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and 
sixty-six, are hereby re~led, but such repeal shall not affect 
existing rights. .Applications for patents for mining claiml! 
nowpending maJ be prosecuted to a final decision in tho Gen-
eral Land Office; bnt in Rncq cases, whore Adverse rights are 
not affected thereby, patents may iaano in pursuance of the 
provisions of this act; a.nd all patent£ for mining claims 
heretofore issued under Lbo act of Julytwenty-eixtb, eighteen 
hundreil and sixty-six, eball convey all ihe rights and privi-
legoe conferred by this act, where no adverse rights exi.et at 
the time of the paaaa:ge of this act. 
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SEc. 10. That the act entitled •'An Act to amend an net 
granting the right of way to ditch and canal owners over 
the public lands, and for other purposes," approved July 
ninth, eighteen hundred and seventy, shall be and remain 
in full force, except 88 to the proceedings to obtain a pat,.. 
ent., which shall be similar to t.he proceedin~s proscribed 
by sections six. and seven oi this act for obtamin~ pa~ots 
to vein or lode claims; bot whtiro said placer claims shall 
be upon surveyed lands, and conform to legal subdivision, 
no further survey or plat shall be r equired, and all placer 
mining claims hereafter located shall conform as near as 
practicable with the United States system of public laud· :,r--. 
surveys and t.he :rectangular snbdivis1ons of such suTTeys, IJp 
and no such Jocation shall include more t.han twenty acres 
for each individual claimant; but where placer claims cl\.O 
not be conformed to legal subdivisions, survey and plttt 
shall be made as on unanrveyed lunds; Provided, That pro-
ceedings now pending may be prosecuted to their final de-
termination under existing laws; bot tho provisions of 
this act, when not in conflict with existing laws, shall apply 
to such cases ; And, provided also, That where, by the segre-
gation of miner.al land in any legal subdivision, a quaotitJ 
oi agricultum.l land leas than forty acres remains, said frac-
tional portion of agricultural land may be entered by any 
party qualified by law, for homest.oad or pre-emption pur-
poses. 
SEC. 11. That where t.he same person, association, or 
corporation, is in poBBeasion of a placer claim, and also a 
vein or lode included within the boundaries foereof, appli-
cation shall be made for a _p.t1tent for the placer claim, wit.h 
the statement that it includes such vein or lode, and in such 
case (subject to the provisions of this act anrl the act enti-
tled "An Act to amend an act granting the right of way to 
ditch and canal owners over ~e pub~c Janda, and for other 
purposes," approved · Jnly n10th, eighteen hlllldred and 
seventy) a patent shall issue for the pla.cer claim, including 
such vern or lode, upon the payment of five dollars per acre 
for such vein or lode claim, and twenty-five feet of surface 
on each side theTIJof. The :remainder oi the placer claim, 
or any placer claim not embracing any vein or lode clai!ll, 
shall be paid for at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents 
per acre, together with all cost.a of proceedings; and where a 
vein or lode, such as is described in t.he second sectivn of 
tbis act, is known to e:ri11t within the boundaries of a placer 
claim, an application for a patent for such placer claim, 
which does not include an application for the vein or lode 
claim, shall be construed as a conclusive declaration that 
the claimant oi the placer claim has no right .of possession 
of the -vein or lode claim; bt\.t -where the existence of a vein 
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or a lode in a placer claim ia not known, a patent for tho 
placer claim shall convoy all vu.lnnble mineral and other 
deposits within t.he boundaries thereof. 
8:w. 12. That the 8nrvllyor-6ontsml of the United Biol.es 
'mny appoint, in each land dfatr_icl containing mineral lands, 
as many competent surveyors aa shall apply for appointment 
to survey mwin$ claims. The expenses of the survey or 
vein or lode cla.1ms, and the euney and subdivision or 
placer olllims into smaller quantities than one hundred and 
si:xty aores, together with the oosto! publication of notices, 
shall be paid by tho applicants, Md they shall be at liberty 
to obtain the same at the- ·most reaaooeble rates, and they 
shall also be at liberty to employ nny United States Deputy 
Surveyor to make the SUTTey. The Commiaaionor of the 
Genero.l Lnnd Office shall also have power to establish the 
maximum charges for surveys and publication of notices 
under this a.ot; 11nd, in case of excessive charges for publi-
cation, he may dcsignalo any newspaper published in a land 
district where mines are situaLed, for the pnblicatiol! of 
mining not.ices in such diatl-ict, and fix the ·rates to be 
charged by such paper; and, to tho end that the Commis-
sioner may be fully mformed on the subject, each applicant 
shall ·file with the Re~ster n awom statement of all charges 
and the fees paid by a.aid applicant for publication anu survey, 
togethtlr with all fees and mone7 paid the Register end tho 
Receiver of the Land Office, which statement eh11ll be trans-
mitted, with the other papers in the oase, to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office. The fees of the Register 
and the Receiver shill! be five dollars each for filing and 
acting upon each application for patent or adverse claim 
filed, and they shall be allowed the runount fixed by law for 
rnducing testimony to writing- when done in tho Land 
Office, such fees and allowances to be paid by the respec-
tive parties-and no other fees shall be charged by them in 
auoh cases. Nothing in this act sho.ll be construed to en-
large or affect the rights of either party in regard to any 
property in controversy et the time of the passage of tbis 
act, or of tho act entitled "All Aot granting tho right of 
way to ditch nnd ca.no! o.iv.ners over the public lands, and 
for other purposes," approved July twcnty-ei:dh, eighteen 
hundred and si:xty-aix; nor shall this act affect any right 
acquired under said act; and nothing in this act shall be 
construed to. repeal, impair, or in any way affeot tho pro-
visions of the act entitled '' An Act granting to A. Sntro the 
right of way and other privileges to aid in the construction 
of a draining and exploring tunnel to the Comstock lode, in 
the Stole of Nevada," approved July·twenty-fifth, oightoen 
hundred and sixty-six. 
Bro. 13. That all affidavits required to be made under 
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this act, or I.he act of which it is 11.Drendatory, may be veri-
fied before an;y officer aut.borized 'to adminis~r oat.ha within 
the land district where the claims may be situated, and all 
testimony and proofs may be. la.ken before any suoh officer, 
and, when duJy certified by I.he officer taking the srune, • 
shall ha.-ve the same force and effect as if la.ken before the 
&gi.ster and Tuiceiver of I.he Land Office. In cases of con-
test as to the mineral or agricnJtnral character of land, the 
testimony SDd proofs may be taken as herein provided, on 
per11onal notice of at least ten days, to the opposing party; 
or if saitl party cSDnot be found, then by publication of at 
le~t once a week ·for thirty days in a newBpaper, to be 
designated by tho Register of the Land Office as pnblished 
nearest to the location of such land; and the Register shall 
require proof that suoh notice bas been given. 
l:3EO. 14. That where two or more veins intersect or cross · 
each other, friority of title sho.ll govern, and such prior 
location sbal be entitled to all ·ore or mineral contained 
within the space of intersection; Provided, howcva, That 
the subliequent location sho.ll have the right of way through 
said space of intersection for the purpose of the convenieni · 
working of the said mine: And prrwukd, also, That where 
two or more veins uriite, the oldest or prior location shall 
take the vein below the point of union, inolndwg all thll 
space of intersection. 
S:iw.·16. That where non-mineral 18.lld, tot oontignona 
to the vein or lode, is need or occupied by the proprietor 
of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such 
non-adjacent snrfaco-ground m~;y be•embraced and included 
in an application for I\ patent !or such vein or lodo, SDd the 
same may be .Patented therewith, subject to the same pre-
liminary requirements as to survey and notice as are appli-
cable under this act to veins or lodes; Provided, That no 
location hereafter made of such non-adjacent land abs.II ex-
ceed fivo acres, and payment for the same must be made at 
llie same rate as fixed by this act for the superfices of the 
lode. The ownet oI a quartz mill or rednct:ion works, not 
oWDing a mine in connection therewith, may a.lso rect1ive a 
patent for his mill-site as provided in this aootion. · 
8:E0. 16. That all sots and parts of sots inconsistent 
herewith are hereby repealed; Prnwied, that nothing con-
tained in this act shall be constroed to imJ;>air, in any way, 
rights or intereef.s in mining property acquired under exist-
ing laws. 
Approved May 10, 1872. 
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fiO J,A\\'S 01•' U'fAil, 
Conrt on the fil'::it Monday of Jnne, mrnnally, the mdc1 Court 
shall call for ancl recoivo the County 'J'rl'asuror's report, as 
provided in section 218 of the Compiled Ln.ws ot' Utn.h, of 
the conclition of tho. trc:isnt·.v on the 31::JL cfay of Mny next 
prcccc1ing, nnc1 shn.11 snttle with s:tid 'l're:umrer. 'l'hc County 
-rosuum lL Ulcrk shall tlwnmpon submit to the sn.it1 conrt a statement 
c~~\~~~.onito h1 detail, shmving tho receipts during the Jiscn.1 year enc1ing 
Conri, Mny 31, 011 the sn.ic1 81st dn.y ot' :Mn.y; the baliince, it' any, in the 
treasury at the clor-;c ot' the previous fiscal ycn,r; the expen-
ditures during the llscnl yenr just closct1, specitYing sep:t-
rntely in said e:xpem1itnrcs the amount p:iicl to each ofttcel', 
nnd for crnry other disbursement; nml the ba.lnncc on h1mtl, 
Tltc CourL together· with :t statcmc11t of all the debts paynbJa to nn<l by 
~\
1
~1~t,;.:~~[~ said counties. 'J'he sn..icl courts shnll tlwrenpon anc1it saicl 
trif~~;l stl1tl1ll1Cllt, :mc1 the County Clerks slmlJ, within ten chyi; from 
11u1i11ah snmo, the dose of s:iid auclitntion, pnlilish n. true copy of s:Lid 
,•~ r.Y:~oh1~~'_>Y st:1tement, as appro,·ccl by the C01mty Court-, in sonu~ news-
pn.pc1· published in the connty, nm1 ha,ving general eircub-
tion therein, if there be one; if there be no such paper, 
Ponnlly, 
Public llli;h• 
wny~. 
then by posting up the saicl copy in their otlices, and sbl411 
keep sn.icl co1)ie:i posted up during the year. A neg led of 
this l1nty by any Clerk or tho County Conrts shall 1·ende1· 
him liable ton. line in nny snrn not exceeding fin lrnndrcd 
c1ollnrs . 
.Approrccl F cbrunry 20, J880. 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
111(;11 W .A YS, 
.AN AC'f 11ortnl11l11g to Ulghwnys. 
SEr. J. Belt c:nael,ecl uy tl1e Govm1or rtn<l LeoislatioJ 
.1lss 1111ul·11 nf tlu: 'l'.Jrrilor!f nf Ulalt.: 'J'lmt all roads shall 
Le considcrC'l1 :,s puhlic highways which arc now used ns 
such antl hare Leen cleclnred such by orller of tho County 
Courts or which m:1.y be Iwrcnfter 8 0 cleclarecl by the County 
Comts witbiu their respective colmtiee, or by mnnici1xll cor-
porr.tion'3. 
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SEO. 2. Highwo,ys n.re ro:ids, stt·eets or nllP-ys n.nd ppn11niuon or briclges, ln,id out or m:ectecl by the pnhlic, or if lnid out or 1 6 wnya. 
erected by others, decliciited or n.bnncloned to tile nse of the 
public. 
S1-:0. 3. Rands laid out nncl recorded ns highwn.ys by cer1n111 ro111ta 
otxlcr of tho County Court, nml nll roacls used ns such for a ~?~~n;~~-A. 
poriod of five yca.ni, nro highways. ,Vhencver nny corpo-
ration owning a toll l>riclgo or n. turnpike, plnnk or•common 
wngon roall is dissolved or discontinued, or has expired by 
limitntion, the hriclge or road l.Jecomcs n highwn.y. 
SEc. ,1, A road not work eel or usccl for tho J)eriocl of Wh~n n ,o,ul 
iivo yenni, ccn.scs to be n. highwity for nny purpose whn.tm·er. cc1160• to Ile" 
S fi 'I') Cl l f' t] 11 t ' t t 1 hlgbwny. EC. l. . le Cl' C O le vOllll ,Y COlll' mm; {Cep n. Co11n1i• Cleric 
lJook, in which mnst lie recorded n.11 l1l'ocee<lings of tho ~~~~~~to~ 
conrt relntiYe to ench roail c1istl'ict, inclui ing on1erti for la.y - prococ,11n1: 
. t }t . 1 . l 1 1 . t· f rolntln to rng Oll , :\. l'l'lllg :me opcmng l'Oa( 8 1 fill( [t ( eSCl'l}) 1011 0 ro11tlH, utc. 
en.eh ronc1 distrlet, its supcn·isorR, its roads, highwayH, con-
trnets ancl n.Il otlll'r matters _pe1-t:l-ining thereto. 
S1-:0. O. By t.iking or nccnpting lnncl for n, highway, IU,:;htoCtho 
tl 11• . 1 t•· . J t f' 1 • '1 t r.11bllul11 lO }Hl I IC nC(llllIC Oil J -ue l'lg 1 0 wn,y nnc lllCJ( L'll S nee- llghwnys ,lc-
essary to enjoying and nmintaining it. A tmm;fot· of Janel, anct1. 
boundccl by n. highway, p:tsscs the title of the person whose 
estate is transft1rrcd to the soil in front to the ccntl'c of thtl 
highwn.y. 
S1-:c. 7. Any owner or occnpn11t of land may constrnct s1u(lwn11c" 
~ side-walk on the highwrty :Llong tho line of his '1aml, 1:mb- ~l;:Ic~~~ou-
Ject, howorer, to tho :mthority conferred by law on the 
County C01ll't and the snpervisors of highwnys, nnd :my 
})Orson using snclt sidewalk with horse or team without per- Dnmngos 10. 
mission of t)lc owner1 is linlJle to such owner or occupn11t for all clnmnge sntt'ered tlwreliy. 
S1w. 8. Any owner or occupant of lnncl ncljoining n. ~f~~!c'-:tr:0~. 
highwn,y not less than fonr rocls wide may plant trees on tho ' 
sides of suclt highwn.y, co11ti;1gons to his lnnd. '!'hey 
must be set :i, c1istnnce of at lea.st 1ifteen feet from each 
other, in regular rows, nncl not more tlrn.n ten feet from tho 
bouut!ary of the highway. If the highwn.y is six rocls wide or 
more, the row must not be less thnn ten nor more thnn PorHons 
twelve feet from the bonnc1nry of the higltwn.y. ,Vhoevl'r l11Jnrtng _troos 
. . , . 1 . l ll1Lblo /01 lllJnres any of sn.1c trees 1s liahlc to the owner for t 1e unmnso. 
clnmn.ge which is thereby susta.ined. , 
. . ltl~htor WRY Sim. n. Evcr,v gas , water, telegra.vh or 1':t1lrom1 corpo- forccrlnln 
ration has tho right of wn.y thronglt the l)nhlic wn.ys ,\ml corporuLlonn. 
sqnnrcs jn any city, villngc, or town, wit 1 the consent of 
the authorities thereof, nml nmlnr such ren.sona,hle regula-
tions as saitl authorities nncl the ln.w prescribe. 'l'he County 
Courts of the severn.l counties h~ve power to grant ii right 
of w:iy over the public highways for rn.ilro:itls, cnnnls, 
62 
Pnw~r nncl 
(luty o! Ille 
County 
Courts. 
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wn.ter pipes nnd telegrn.ph lines, uncler BUCh reasonn.lJlc reg-
ulations :is snch court rnriy establish. Such portions of n.11 
county roads :is lie within tho limits of nny incorporntcd 
town or city, or in :rny town or city JicrcaJtr.r incorporntc<l, 
shnll conform to the clircction nnd gl':1l1c nnc1 be subject to 
:iJl the regulations of other Hlrcets in such town or city. 
SEC. 10. '!'ho County Conrt of each oJ lh0 cmmtics of 
this Tcrritor,r, by propcr'rcgul:ttions, haYe power: First.-
•ro t1iYiclc, wheru not nlrnac1y tlonc, !Jw county iuto n, suita-
n-blo :mcl convenient m1rnber of roncl districts nnd nppoint 
su11errisors tht)refor bienninJl,r, or wheneY<!l' Yncnncies oc• 
ell!', and to remorn them n.t l1lc'.1::iun'. Se<'urnl-'.l'o cnnsc 
to be survercd, vicwcll, ]:de ont, reco1·dcd, opened, and 
workec1, such highwa.ys as nro neces:-:1ry for 1ml>lic conveni-
ence. 'l'hin1.-'l'o cnnse to he reconkc1 ns ltighwa._rs such 
ro:1t1H ns ]1:irn become such liy nsngn m· a.h:1Jl(1011ment to the 
public. Fourth.-'l'o abolish or nham1nn :meh a~ nro nn-
neccssnry. li'ifth.-11'0 contr:wt, ngrt•c for, pmchaso, ot· 
otherwise acquire the right of' wn.y m·er prh·atc prnpcrty fm· 
the use of public higllwn,rs; :rnc1 for that pmpose i111;Litt1te 
or require tlw Connly Prosecuting Allonwy lo inslitull.! pro-
ceL'<ling,; for the ac<ptircmc11t of :--;:ti11 righ t or w:i._y as prn-
vic1l'c1 in 'l'itlc~ :XI, Clt:iptci· If, of' tho Cornpilcil fo.w:ci ol' 
Utah. Sixth.-To c:nrne lo Ju~ 1•n•c:kcl :m<l nmint:dnPcl on 
such hig:hwn.ys as tlw.r ma.y ck-dgn11 ll.', milestones or JlOsh-; 
nml guicw pm,ts, p1·01wrlJ' insr.rilir.c1: 
Si-:c. JJ. 'J'lwCounty Courts t;hn]l tlPsign:1lli thcconnty 
co11n1, ron<la, romls necessrn·.r within or exl<!mli11g throng-Ji c:1ch incorpo• 
number or. rntril town 01· city; which in no cnS<! shall lJl' morn thn u three 
in the s:rnw clircction. 
Sr-:o. 12. Snp1!rYisor:3 of ro:1tl c1h-;frict:-3 rccciYe notice of 
s11por11sors their n.ppointment from the Cl<!rk of the County Conrt, fr1~t'.:.~'mt11::~ ancl within twenty clnfs thereafter mnstgi\'C tho officinJ bond 
~1~g~~~\\.~0d required by the County Conrt, nm1 ta.Im the us11:1l onU1 of 
oflicc. 'J'hc notice :rncl certilicate thnt the honcl hns lieen 
filed~ nnd the oath hken nnd imlorsed thereon, or n. certified 
copy thereof, constitutes n, commission, a1H1 a.uthoriics the 
11erson namecl h1 nncl holding lhe sn,me, to discharge the 
duties of su1x•1Tisor until superseded. 
SEo. 18. Roacl supervisors under the clirection nnd 
Powcrunt1 snvervision and pursuant to 01drrs of the County Conrt n.p-
~~~~~vY!ora. pomting thmn, must: li'irst.-'l'alrn charge of the 1mblic 
]1ighwn.ys within their respective districts. Secoml.-Kcep 
them dear from obstrnctions nnd h1 gooc1 repiiit-. 'l'hird.-
Cn.uso b:mks to be gra.dcd, bridges and cansewn.ys to be mntle 
where necessary, and keep the same in good l'C}Jnir, nnd 
renew them when necessary. Fonrth.-Shall giYe not less 
than two c1nys' notice to the inlmbitants of his road c1i::itrict 
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lin.blc to do work on ro:1.cls, when, wlw~·e, with whn.t imµle-
mcnts, and under whoso direction to work. Pifth.-Collcct 
from each inhabitant notilic<l. to WOJ.'k, iuid who fails to 
wo1·k or prnfors to p:1._y it. · Sixth,-To receive snoh com- compousn-
pensation iis ml.}' be nUowcd by the County COll\'t for ser- tiou, 
vices pcrformetl. . 
S1w. 14. 'l'Jmt two <lays' work of eight hours each, or Poll Tnx, how 
in lien thereof, three dollars ($H) b.wful money, is :111 f.:~t~~'.1011 cot-
annuul road poll hx upon every .nl>le-l>oc1ietl man over 
twenty-one mHl under sixty yen.rs oltl. "\Vithin incoq)oratt~tl 
cities, siticl poll t:1.x nmy \Jc collcctLxl nntler such regnhtions 
n.s m:iy be by onlinancc provillet1, and one-fourth of the now eJ"-
sa.id t.1.x so collectl'd l..>y eitics sha.11, on or l>clorL! the first poollo · 
Monc1a.y in ,Jn.nnnry, April, .July nntl October of e:wh yerir 
he p:Lic1 into the county treasury, to lw expend eel under tile 
direction of thn County Conrt, in nmki11g and improving 
highw,iys, nrnl the olhcr t.hnie-fourths slln 11 be nsetl by s:iid 
citie::; for improving, lit::it, territorial and county roads rnn-
ning through such citil's; am1, second, on a1ty other streets 
or alleys in suclt cities. . 
S1-:c. rn. All uienus otlH~l' than liLhor colketec1 as 1)011 'fnx to bo pnhl 
f;;1x b,r tho rcspectil'c road supervi::ior;-; slml] bo }l'.iit1 L',)' them ~!~~~~r~~ty 
into the connty lrea:m1·y, to l>n a.ppropria.tetl aml expL'1Hled 
on the principal roatls antl bridges under the direction or 
or the County CottrL. 
Si-:e. Hi. '.l'lw Count.y Court shall fnrnisll oach road fiuporvlaor to 
. 't] 1.1 l . t 1 ) "t] t l ) . } lcocp roconl SU]Wl'YlSOl' Wl l :t I.Jan C l'CCCll) )00 c, \\'l ls ll >S, Oil \\' lit: l or t,,x, 1111!.l 
shall lie stated l,_r tlw sn1wrvisor whether snitl poJl t:ix wa::; glvorcceipu. 
p:1.-i1l i11 ca:,;h or Jnbor, nnd the receipt be given to the party 
as odtknco that he h:u:i piiid hii-i l)Oll t:ix, n.ml s:ticl l>ook antl 
stnhs sh:tll he rl!tlll'lH.'<1 to tlte Count.v Uourt, witlt his an-
nual report, togetlwr with the 'rreasmL•r's receipt::;. 
S1-:c. 17. Every Hupervisor mnst make to tlw C.:01111t,v supcrvlaor 
Comt :mnunlly, on or before the 1irst },fomhy in Decemlwr ~:11~8~~1~!<_0 
of each year 1~ writt1m report cont:tinin•r: · Pirst.-Tho names port. 
1 • ' l 1 · j • 
0
·1· l · t S 1 c11nrnotcr or. of nl persons a.ssos;;ec to wor c m us c 1s r1c . 'ecom .-
Tho names of all who ha.vo actun.lly worked, anc1 the mnn~ 
hor of (lays. 'l'lt'nl.-Tltc nn.rncs of all who lmvo commu-
tetl, am1 the a.mount receivctl from them. l1'omth.-Tlto 
names of a.11 ddinquent::i a.JH1 the mnount tluc. Pifth.•-
'l'hc a.mount of liLho1· cxpPnt1et1 a,t en.eh lloint n.ntl the kind 
of 1.thor pcrformcc1. Sixth.-.An accnrnte account of en~ry 
l11ty he lmnsclt' was einployccl, ancl tho natnrc aml items of 
Uw servico 1·e11c1ercc1. 'l'lto County Courts may roquiru 
special reports from ro:1d supervisors when clccmetl proper. 
SJ,'C 18 A failure to nnke n. ''P.l)Ol't as l'Cqnirc(l 01' to Pennlty for 
' • • ' ~ ' ru.11nro to p:ty over, on the ordet· of tlte County Court, nny moneys in mnko roport; 
his hnnds, suhjects the su11ervisor t'o :t pena.lty of twenty-live 
• 
li4 
I'OT80D8 
llnblo for 
dnmngo 
caused by 
wntcr or 
'olhonvlsc. 
_LAWS 01•' UTAH, 
dollarn ($2G), to bo recovered in nn nction on his boncl to-
~ethcr with any balnnco due from him; suit therefor mn,y be 
nrntitutcc1 by tho County Attorney, under order of tho Coun-
ty Court. 
S1-:0. 10. ·whoever wilfully or carelessly obstructs or 
injures any highwriy by How of wntcr or otherwise, is lin.blo 
to n. penn,lty of Jive dolln.rs for cnch day such obstruction or 
injury remn,ins. .Any persoll or wa termnstc•r 11crm itting wnter 
undm· their conh'ol to 11oocl nny higltwn.y to the injury there-
of, shall be lia.hle to the city or county, ns the cnsc m:iy be, 
for the cfamage, nncl to n 1lne b1 any sum not exceeding 
twenty-live doll:11·:3 ($211). 
S1-:c. 20. Whoever rem ores or injnres any milehonrc1, 
In/"rl to or milt!stone, or gnicle post, or nny inscription on snch, 
~!~0 0 " rd8• erected on :my higllwa.y, is lhible to ,i 11cnnlty of ten t1ollars 
1'c11111ty, ($10) l'or every such ofl'e11cc. 
SE<?. 21. .An,v llerson or per;:;ons who dri\'c loose herds 
Pcrsoosltnblo of l10rses, c:1ttfo, s 1ccp, goat:-i or swine orc1· t.ho higltwn.ys 
~~~.~gf'i~;°s where they pnss on dugwn.ys, Hhall be liable fo1· nll dnmnge 
hol'scs, cau1c, c1onc to such highw:i,y:-i IJJ' cari1w or the banks or rolling 
etc • '=' 
· loo:;e rocks into the same. 
SEO. 22. 'l'hc ro:1<1 snpcr\'isorii nny 1rnt up on hric1ges 
Fost url~lns mu1er their charge notices that there iH "lire cloll;i L'S(%) lint~ 
oo brJtt~cs. for r :ding or dri\'illg on lhb br;:~ge fostL•r t.ltan :i walk." 
,Yhoerer tlwr<'nftl~r r:cles or drives f:i,-;tL•t· tlun ti \\'a.lk on 
snch l1ritlge is li:tlllu to it penalty of lire doll:ns (>.iii) for 
InJ11ry to 
trees. 
I'onnltr, 
I'cnnltlcR nnd 
forfcltnrrs, 
how rccoycr-
ctl, 
c.•ach offence. · .·· 
S1•:l!. 2H. '.Vhocn~r clig::; up, cut::; down, or otherwise 
i11j11rr.s or wilfnll,r clestro,rs any sltacle 01· Ol'll:tllll'llt:d tree 
phm tccl a ncl sbntling on :my highway, is Jia.blc to a line of 
twenty-Jive dollar:; ($2/i) i'ot· each 1meh trr.e. 
S1•:c. 2-!. .All penaltb; or forfoitnrcs nm1m· th;:! Act, 
ancl not otherwhm prol'iclcc1 for, mnst-be rcco,·L\t'Ctl by the 
roacl s11pm·\'iso1·:-1 of the respective ro:1d distl'iets am1 be np-
plicd on the liiglnmys 1n whiclt they nre collected. 
Si-:o. 2o. All Acts or 11rnt:.'I of Acts in conllict with the 
coofllctlng provisions of this Act are hereby repe.1It-<1. 
Acta rcpcnl- ApproYed I<'cbrunry 20, 1880. 
oil, 
Addendum 10 
Utah Code 
72-5-301 Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Acceptance," "acceptance of a right-of-way for the construction of a highway over public lands, 
not reserved for public uses," or "accepted" so as to vest the R.S. 2477 dominant estate in the 
right-of-way in the state and any applicable political subdivision of the state, means one or more 
of the following acts prior to October 21, 1976: 
(a) by the state or any political subdivision of the state: 
(i) construction or maintenance of a highway; 
(ii) inclusion of the highway in a state, county, or municipal road system; 
(iii) expenditure of any public funds on the highway; 
(iv) execution of a memorandum of understanding or other agreement with any other public or 
private entity or an agency of the federal government that recognizes the right or obligation 
of the state or a political subdivision of the state to construct or maintain the highway or a 
portion of the highway; or 
(v) 
(A) the acceptance at statehood of the school or institutional trust lands accessed or 
traversed by the right-of-way; or 
(B) the selection and receipt by the state of a clear list, indemnity list, or other document 
conveying title to the state of school, institutional trust lands, or other state lands accessed 
or traversed by the highway; 
(b) use by the public for a period in excess of 10 years in accordance with Section 72-5-104; or 
(c) any other act consistent with state or federal law indicating acceptance of a right-of-way. 
(2) 
(a) "Construction" means any physical act of readying a highway for use by the public according 
to the available or intended mode of transportation, including, foot, horse, vehicle, pipeline, or 
other mode. 
(b) "Construction" includes: 
(i) removing vegetation; 
(ii) moving obstructions, including rocks, boulders, and outcroppings; 
(iii) filling low spots; 
(iv) maintenance over several years; 
(v) creation of an identifiable route by use over time; and 
(vi) other similar activities. 
(3) "Cut-off date" means the earlier of the date the underlying land was reserved for public use or 
October 21, 1976. 
(4) 
(a) "Highway" means: . 
(i) any road, street, trail, or other access or way that is open to the public to come and go 
or transport water at will, without regard to how or by whom the way was constructed or 
maintained; and 
(ii) appurtenant land and structures including road drainage ditches, back and front slopes, 
turnouts, rest areas, and other areas that facilitate use of the highway by the public. 
(b) "Highway" includes: 
(i) pedestrian trails, horse paths, livestock trails, wagon roads, jeep trails, logging roads, 
homestead roads, mine-to-market roads, alleys, tunnels, bridges, and all other ways and 
their attendant access for maintenance; and 
(ii) irrigation canals, waterways,"viaducts, ditches, pipelines, or other means of water 
transmission and their attendant access for maintenance. 
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(c) To be a "highway" a right-of-way need not have destinations or termini that are some kind of 
landmarks distinguishable from other points along the right-of-way, as long as the right-of-way 
accommodates travelers from one point along the right-of-way to another point as often as 
convenient or necessary. 
(5) "Maintenance" means any physical act of upkeep of a highway or repair of wear or damage 
whether from natural or other causes, including the following: 
(a) vertical and horizontal alignment alterations to meet applicable safety standards; 
(b) widening an existing road or flattening of shoulders or side slopes to meet applicable safety 
standards; 
(c) grooming and grading of the previously cpnstructed road surface; 
(d) establishing and maintaining the road crown with materials gathered along the road; 
( e) filling ruts; 
(f) spot filling with the same materials of the road, or improved materials; 
(g) leveling or smoothing washboards; 
(h) clearing the roadway of obstructing debris; 
(i) cleaning culverts, including head basins and outlets; 
U) resurfacing with the same or improved materials; 
(k) installing, maintaining, repairing and replacing rip rap; 
(I) maintaining drainage; 
(m) maintaining and repairing washes and gullies; 
(n) installing, maintaining, repairing, and replacing culverts as necessary to protect the existing 
surface from erosion; 
(o) repairing washouts; 
(p) installing, maintaining, repairing and replacing marker posts; 
(q) installing, maintaining, and repairing water crossings; 
(r) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing cattle guards; 
(s) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing road signs; 
(t) installing, maintaining, and repairing and replacing road striping; 
(u) repair, stabilization and improvement of cut and fill slopes; 
(v) application of seal coats; or ·· 
(w) snow removal. 
(6) "Public lands not reserved for public uses" means the surface of federal lands open to entry 
and location and includes the surface of lands that are subject to subsurface coal withdrawals 
or mining claims. 
(7) "R.S. 2477 right-of-way" means a right-of-way for a highway constructed in this state on public 
lands not reserved for public uses in accordance with Revised Statute 2477, codified as 43 
U.S.C. Section 932, and accepted by the state or a political subdivision of the state prior to 
October 21, 1976. 
Amended by Chapter 293, 2003 General Session 
Page 2 
• 
• 
Utah Code 
72-5-302 Rights-of-way across federal lands -- Title -- Presumption -- Scope. 
(1) This part applies to all RS. 2477 rights-of-way . 
(2) The state and its political subdivisions have title to the RS. 24 77 rights-of-ways in accordance 
with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-103, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) 
(a) Acceptance of a right-of-way for the construction of a highway over public lands, not reserved 
for public uses, is presumed if the state or a political subdivision of the state makes a finding 
that the highway was constructed and the right-of-way was accepted prior to October 21, 
1976. 
(b) The existence of a highway in a condition suitable for public use establishes a presumption 
that the highway has continued in use in i~s present location since the land over which it is 
built was public land not reserved for public use. 
(4) 
(a) Unless specifically determined prior to the cut-off date provided in Section 72-5-301 by the 
state or a political subdivision of the state with authority over the RS. 2477 right-of-way, the 
scope of the R.S. 24 77 right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary for all highway 
uses as of the cut-off date determined according to the facts and circumstances, including: 
(i) highway drainage facilities; 
(ii) shoulders adjacent to the right-of-way; and 
(iii) maintenance activities defined in Section 72-5-301 that are reasonable and necessary. 
(b) Unless specifically determined by the state or political subdivision of the state with the 
authority over the R.S. 2477 right-of-way, an RS. 2477 right-of-way is presumed to be at 
least 66 feet wide if that is the usual width of highway rights-of-way in the area. 
(c) The scope of the RS. 2477 right-of-way includes the right to widen the highway as necessary 
to accommodate the increased travel associated with those uses, up to, where applicable, 
improving a highway to two lanes so travelers can safely pass each other. 
(5) The safety standards established by the Department of Transportation in accordance with 
Section 72-6-102 apply to all determinations of safety on R.S. 2477 rights-of-way used for 
vehicular travel. 
Amended by Chapter 293, 2003 General Session 
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72-5-309 Acceptance of rights-of-way -- Notice of acknowledgment required. 
(1) The governor or the governor's designee may assess whether the grant of the R.S. 2477 has 
been accepted with regard to any right-of-way so as to vest title of the right-of-way in the state 
and the applicable political subdivision as provided for in Section 72-5-103. 
(2) If the governor or governor's designee concludes that the grant has been accepted as to 
any right-of-way, the governor or a designee shall issue a notice of acknowledgment of the 
acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant as to that right-of-way. 
(3) A notice of acknowledgment of the R.S. 2477 grant shall include: 
(a) a statement of reasons for the acknowledgment; 
(b) a general description of the right-of-way or rights-of-way subject to the notice of 
acknowledgment, including the county in which it is located, and notice of where a center-line 
description derived from Global Positioning System data may be viewed or obtained; 
(c) a statement that the owner of the servientestate in the land over which the right-of-way or 
rights-of-way subject to the notice runs or any person with a competing dominant estate 
ownership claim may file a petition with the district court for a decision regarding the 
correctness or incorrectness of the acknowledgment; and 
(d) a statement of the time limit provided in Section 72-5-310 for filing a petition. 
(4) 
(a) 
(i) The governor or the governor's designee may record a notice of acknowledgment, and any 
supporting affidavit, map, or other document purporting to establish or affect the state's 
property interest in the right-of-way or rights-of-way, in the office of the county recorder in 
the county where the right-of-way or rights-of-way exist. 
(ii) 
(A) A notice of acknowledgment recorded in the county recorder's office is not required to be 
accompanied by a paper copy of the center-line description. 
(B) A paper copy of each center-line description together with the notice of acknowledgment 
shall be placed in the state archives created in Section 63A-12-101 and made available 
to the public upon request in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act. 
(C) An electronic copy of the center-line description identified in a notice of acknowledgment 
shall be available upon request at: 
(1) the county recorder's office; or 
(II) the Automated Geographic Reference Center created in Section 63F-1 -506. 
(b) A notice of acknowledgment recorded in the county recorder's office is conclusive evidence of 
acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant upon: 
(i) expiration of the 60-day period for filing a petition under Section 72-5-310 without the filing of 
a petition; or 
(ii) a final court decision that the notice of acknowledgment was not incorrect. 
Amended by Chapter 97, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
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72-5-310 Notice of acknowledgment -- Court determination -- Presumption of acceptance. 
(1) The governor or the governor's designee shall provide a copy of the notice of 
acknowledgement by certified mail and return receipt requested to: 
(a) the last known owner of the servient estate in land over which the right-of-way or rights-of-
way subject to the notice runs; and 
(b) any person known to have a competing dominant estate ownership claim. 
(2) 
(a) A person with a servient estate or competing dominant estate ownership claim to the 
right-of-way may petition for a decision of the district court as to the correctness of the 
acknowledgment of acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant issued under Section 72-5-309. 
(b) Venue for the court action shall be the district court for Salt Lake County. 
(c) The petition shall be filed no later than 60 days after the date on which the petitioner received 
a copy of the notice of acknowledgment. 
(d) The state, through the governor or the governor's designee, shall be named as a respondent 
and served with a copy of the petition in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(e) No one other than a person with a servient estate ownership claim in land over which the 
right-of-way or rights-of-way subject to the notice runs or a competing dominant estate claim 
may challenge the correctness of a notice of acknowledgment. 
(3) The petition for a court decision of the correctness of the notice of acknowledgment shall be a 
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the notice of acknowledgment the petitioner asserts is incorrect; 
(c) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(d) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(4) Except as provided under this Part 3, Rights-Of-Way Across Federal Lands Act, all pleadings 
and proceedings to determine the correctness of a notice of acknowledgment in the district 
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(5) The court sha ll make its decision without deference to the notice of acknowledgment. 
(6) 
(a) In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable presumption that the R.S. 2477 grant has 
been accepted is created when: 
(i) a highway existed on public lands not reserved for public uses as of the cut-off date under 
Section 72-5-301; and 
(ii) the highway currently exists in a condition suitable for public use. 
(b) The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the burden of proving 
acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not 
subject to Subsection (6)(a). 
Amended by Chapter 9, 2006 General Session 
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General Land Office No. 2089 
No. 2089 
The United States of America. 
Mineral Certificate No. 5-5 
No. 5-5 
To all.whom these Presents shall come greeting: Whereas, in issuance of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, Chapter Six, Title Thirty-two, there have been deposited in the 
General Land Office of the United States the Plat and Field Notes of Survey of the Park Silver 
Mining Company assignees of Edward P. Vollum, Julien F. Carter and William H. Howland 
upon the Flagstaff Mine accompanied by the Certificate of the Register of the Land Office as 
Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah whereby it appears that, in furtherance of the said 
Revised Statutes of the United States, Edward P. Voll um, Julian F. Carter and WilliamH. 
Howland did, on the fifth day of April, A.D. 1873 enter and pay for said mining claim or 
premises, being Mineral Entry No. 5-5, in the series of said Office, designated by the Survey or 
General as Lot No. 38, embracing a portion of the unsurveyed Public Domain in the Uintah 
Mining District in the County of Summit and Territory of Utah in the District of Lands subject to 
sale at Salt Lake City, containing five (5) acres and fifty-one hundredths (51/100) of an acre of 
land more or less and according to the returns on file in the GenerarLand Office bounded 
described, and platted as follows, with magnetic variation at sixteen (16) degrees thirty (30) 
minutes East to such. 
Beginning at Corner No. I. a Post. marked "No. l ." and "No. 38". Thence north forty-
seven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes East, two hundred and fifty (250) feet to top ofRidge, 
twelve hundred (1200) feet to Corner No. 2. a Post marked "No. 2," and "No. 38" from which a 
Fir Tree eighteen (18) inches in diameter bears West at the distance of two (2) feet. Thence from 
said Corner No. 2, South forty-two ( 42) degrees thirty (30) minutes East one hundred (100) feet 
to a point from which Discovery Shaft on the claim bears South forty-seven (47) degrees thirty 
(30) minutes West at the distance often hundred (1000) feet, two hundred (200) feet to Corner 
No. 3 a Post. marked "No. 3" and "No. 38" from which a Fir Tree fifteen (15) inches in diameter, 
bears South eight (80) degrees West, as the distance of five (5) feet and an Aspen Tree fourteen 
(14) inches in diameter, bears north five (5) degrees East, at the distance of nine (9) links: 
Thence from said Comer No. 3 South forty-seven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes West, eight 
hundred and fifty (850) feet to top of Divide, twelve hundred (1200) feet to Corner No. 4, a Post 
in mound of stone marked "No. 4" and "No. 38". Thence north forty-two (42) degrees thirty (30) 
minutes West, one hundred (I 00) feet to a point from which Discovery Shaft on the claim bears 
North forty-seven (47) degrees thirty (30) minutes East, at tbe distan.ce of two hundred (200) 
feet, two hundred (200) feet to the place of beginning, containing five (5) acres and fifty-one 
hundredth (S 1/100) of an acre of land more or less and embracing tweJve hundred (1200) linear 
feet of said Flagstaff Mine, to wit: one thousand (1000) linear feet north-easterly and two 
hundred (200) linear feet South-westerly from Discovery Shaft on said mine, as represented by 
yellow shading in the follow plat. 
From said Discovery Shaft, U .S. Mineral Monument No. 2, bears South sixty-five (65) 
degrees East, at the distance of eight hundred and eighteen (818) feet, a Shaft bears north thirty 
(30) degrees East, at the distance of thirteen (13) feet, and a Shaft bears South sixty-four (64) 
degrees West, at the distance of sixteen (16) feet. 
00290b 
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Now know ye, that the United States of America, in consideration of the premises and in 
conformity w ith the said Revised States of the United States, have given and granted, and by 
these presents do give and grant unto the said Park Silver Mining Company and to their 
successors and assigns the said mining premises herein before described as Lot No. 38 embracing 
a portion of the unsurveyed Public Domain with the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment 
of all the land included with the exterior lines of said survey, nor here in expressly excepted from 
these presents and of twelve hundred (1200) linear feet of the said F lagstaff Mine vein, lode, 
ledge, or deposit for the length hereinbefore described throughout its entire depth, although it 
may enter the land adjoining, arid also all of the ·other veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits throughout 
their entire depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside the exterior lines of said survey of the 
surface extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits in their 
downward course may so far deposit from a perpendicular as to extend outside the vertical side 
lines of said survey; 
Provided that the right of possession hereby granted to such outside parts of said veins, 
lodes, ledges, or deposits shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between the vertical 
planes drawn downward through the end lines of said survey at the 'surface, so continued in their 
own direction that such vertical planes will intersect such exterior parts of said veins, lodes, 
ledges, or deposits; · 
And Provided further that nothing in this conveyance sha ll authorize the grantees herein, 
their successors or assigns to enter upon the surface of a mining claim owned or possessed by 
another. 
To have and to ho ld said mining premises together w ith all the rights, privileges, 
immunities, and appurtenances of whatsoever nature thereunto belonging unto the said Park 
Silver Min ing Company and to their successors and assignees forever, subj ect none theless to the 
fo llowing conditions and stipulations: 
First. That the grant hereby made is restricted to the land hereinbefore described as Lot 
No. 38 with twelve hundred (1200) linear feet of the Flagstaff Mine vein lodes, ledges, or despite 
for the length of the aforesaid throughout its entire depth as aforesaid, together with all other 
veins, lodes, ledges, or deposits throughout their entire depths as aforesaid, the tops or apexes of 
which lie inside the exterior lines o f said survey. 
Second. That the premises hereby conveyed, with the exception of the surface, may be 
entered by the proprietors of any other vein, lode, ledge, or deposit, the top or apex of which lies 
outside the exterior limits of said survey, should the same in its downward course be found to 
penetrate, intersect, extend into or underlie the prem ises hereby granted, for the purpose of 
extracting and removing the ore from such other vein, lodge, ledge, or deposit. 
Third. That the premises hereby conveyed shall be held subject to any'vested and 
accrued water rights for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes and rights to 
ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights as may be recognized and 
acknowledged by the local laws, customs, and decisions of courts. 
2 
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Fourth. That in the absence of necessary legislation by Congress, the legislature of Utah 
may provide rules for working the mining claim or premises hereby granted, involving 
easements, drainage, and other necessary means to its complete development. 
In testimony whereat: I Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, have 
caused these Letters to be made Patent and the Seal of the General Land Office to be herewith 
affixed. 
Given under my hand at the City of Washington the twenty-eighth day of December in the year 
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six and of the Independence of the United 
States the one hundred and first. 
By the President U.S. Grant 
By D.D. _, Secretary 
S. W. Clark-Recorder of the General Larid Office 
Recorded Vol. 24 Pages 413 to 420 inclusive 
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